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This thesis investigates the intersection of masculinity and citizenship in the striving for dignity 
of young male Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Germany from 2016 to 2018. It describes 
discourses and practices of dignity in the context of everyday lives shaped by compulsory 
integration policies, instances of inhospitality and the stigma of refugee identity. The study 
contributes to growing interest in the impact of displacement on the masculine identity of male 
refugees but seeks to develop this work by situating masculinity in relation to citizenship. The 
everyday lives of Syrians and Palestinians in Germany were framed by questions such as what 
needs to be done by when to be able to remain in Germany? What constitutes someone as a 
“refugee” or citizen? What establishes oneself as worthy of the right to belong? The thesis 
therefore goes beyond asking what happens to masculinity in displacement to explore how 
dignity centres on the intersection of masculinity and claims to citizenship as the site of a 
dialectic that was configured in diverse and sometimes surprising ways. What emerges is not a 
clear narrative or experience of “accomplishment”, nor is it a “crisis of masculinity” of migrant 
men who suffer from the stigma of displacement and exclusion in the host society. It is more 
accurate to characterise young male Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Dresden as vacillating 
between two poles, in which masculine identity was an inventive and plastic identity that 
offered a site for claims to belong in Germany, but also, in other instances, the perceived or 
real barrier to such belonging. The thesis therefore describes everyday lives oriented in 
complex ways and with varying consequences to the interplay of masculine trajectories and 
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In Milan, Jamil would move around the city openly and he relished explaining to me how he 
avoided the police by looking like he knew where he was going. He would pretend to talk on 
his phone and confidently hold a newspaper under his arm. Leaving the metro he would not 
hesitate about which way to go but keep his head down and follow other people. When he got 
on the train for Nice in south-west France he made sure to sit close to Italians in order to be 
as discrete as possible. He sat on the upper floor of the double-decker train because he figured 
that if border control came on board they would only have limited time to check people before 
departure and they would start at the bottom of the train. They did in fact come on board, 
seven or eight of them. In Jamil’s re-telling of his journey from Syria to Germany, he 
performed this moment, showing how he struggled to look calm, settled and at ease while he 
pretended to read a newspaper. When border control came up to the top-deck they walked 
straight past him, he said smugly. As the train left for France he glanced outside and saw that 
they had detained two Syrian men. 
In Nice he met a group of Moroccan men who had also just arrived in France and they 
gave him advice on how to go from Nice to Paris. They were also going to the train station 
but he didn’t follow them because he didn’t want to rush and risk getting caught. He stayed 
alone, moving slowly and deftly, skirting main roads in the centre of the city to avoid the 
police. When he arrived at the station and got to the train he was in a compartment with two 
men from Africa who looked at his ticket and told him he wasn’t in the right place; he got up 
and quickly left for the next compartment. At first the door between the compartments wouldn’t 
open, but eventually it did. It turned out that he had been in the right compartment, but when 
he returned the two men were gone and passengers told him they had been taken by border 




Jamil1 was helping to improve my Syrian Arabic in late 2016. I would go to his apartment in 
the evening a few times a week high in one of a cluster of 1970s tower blocks in a suburb on 
the eastern edge of Dresden where Jamil had settled, like a number of refugees from Syria. 
Jamil is Palestinian from Syria and he and others in the neighbourhood would affectionately 
describe their cluster of apartments as a Palestinian village, and one old man, a Palestinian-
Libyan man, as the “Mukhtar”, or village chief. The account above is an extract from a detailed 
narrative of Jamil’s journey to Germany in 2015 that he told me on my first visit to his 
apartment. It was one of a number of narratives of the journey to Germany from Syria, Egypt, 
Lebanon and especially Turkey that would be shared with friends that had a similar “script”, 
including instances of crisis, cleverness, bravery and fortune. Another interlocutor, Akram, for 
example, reached a dramatic crescendo in his account when the engine of the small dinghy he 
and others were travelling on from Turkey to Greece faltered, and Akram, who was twenty at 
the time, intervened courageously to fix it. The more I reflected on the relish with which these 
narratives of agency and sometimes divine intervention were shared, in the context of journeys 
that entailed considerable hardship, boredom and powerlessness, and the way that such 
narratives were juxtaposed to the “slots” afforded to the displacement of male refugees as 
“worthy victims” or “unworthy interlopers”, the more they seemed to embody a feature of the 
everyday lives of my interlocutors in Dresden in 2016 and 2017: the attempt to turn the 
stigmatising and unsettling condition of becoming refugees into a source of dignity.  
In and among the misfortunes, violence and uncertainty of Jamil’s journey to Germany, 
which included being robbed at gun point in Libya and a treacherous journey on a boat from 
Libya to the southern coast of Italy, he asserted a claim to masculine strength, autonomy and 
resilience. Dignity in displacement in everyday life in Dresden shares similarities with the 
attempts of such narratives to fulfil expectations of a valorised masculine identity, involving 
processes of seeking to turn displacement into a source of “masculine pride and success” 
(Inhorn & Isidoros 2018). At the same time, narratives of the journey, and the virtues that they 
often displayed, can be seen to communicate more than claims to masculinity. The narratives 
can be thought of as articulating a rite of passage where obstacles are overcome which “birth” 
arrival in Germany and with it the right to claim citizenship. It is this relationship between 
                                                             
1 All names of individuals in the thesis have been changed to ensure anonymity. I have also changed or not 
provided other information that could identify someone, such as exact place of origin or age.  
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masculinity and claims to belong as the terms of asserting dignity that lies at the heart of this 
thesis.  
The Dignity of Displacement contributes to literature that seeks to foreground the 
masculine identity of migrant men but goes beyond asking what happens to masculinity in 
displacement. Recent literature has explored the diverse ways that masculine identity serves as 
a source of stigma in displacement, as well as the means by which men seek to grapple with 
such stigma and assert dignity. In this thesis, I situate masculinity among male refugees in 
relation to claiming citizenship in Germany. I draw attention to the complex negotiation, 
affirmation and tension of these orientations as the site of a dialectic that was configured in 
new and surprising ways, where notions of what it means to be a man (or to become a man), 
and what it means to stake a claim to belong in Germany, could take diverse forms. While 
divergent and new, shifting representations of masculine virtue could be the source of claiming 
citizenship in Germany, in other contexts, and for differently situated men, masculine identity 
could face or produce obstacles to such belonging. This thesis therefore zooms-in on the lived 
experience of a group of young Syrian and Palestinian men as they negotiate top-down 
integration initiatives that accompanied their recognition as refugees in Dresden, Germany, and 
explores everyday lives oriented to crafting dignity in displacement by negotiating masculinity 
and citizenship.  
 
Masculinity and Citizenship  
 
Work on migration has lagged behind gender studies (Charsley & Wray 2015). Lucia 
McSpadden and Helene Moussa could complain in 1993 of migration scholars’ discussion of 
refugees “as a unitary, non-gendered phenomenon […] as if there were no differences between 
the experiences of men and women” (1993, 203). The emergence of work on migration and 
forced displacement and gender tended to focus on women, as the embodiment of the 
humanitarian category of “womenandchild” (Jaji 2009, 177). The effect of this focus is that 
the male experience is rendered “invisible” (Brun 2000). As Griffiths, who works on the 
experience of failed male asylum applicants in the UK writes, “there is a tendency for migration 
scholars either to sideline men or to present them as oppressors, fanatics, or criminals.” (2015, 
469) In fact, to a great extent this trend reflects broader work in gender studies. In a 2006 
review of 157 ethnographies about gender and reproduction, Inhorn found that only one of 
these studies focussed on men. She writes, “This is a problematic state of affairs because 
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excluding men from the study of gender suggests that their bodies, attitudes, and actions are 
both ‘natural’ and ‘essential’.” (Inhorn 201, 801)  
Masculinity refers to the “cluster of norms, values, and behavioural patterns expressing 
explicit and implicit expectation of how men should act and represent themselves to others” 
(Miescher and Lindsay 2003, 4 in Jaji 2008). An important concept in thinking about 
masculinity has been the notion of “hegemonic masculinity” coined by Connell, to describe 
“the pattern of practice… that allowed men’s dominance over women to continue” (Connell & 
Messerschmidt 2005, 832). However, while the concept aimed to describe changing practices, 
it has become synonymous with static typologies of varying degrees of patriarchal men and 
does not allow recognition for changing norms and expectations of men over time (Inhorn 
2012). Nonetheless, the concept’s attention to hierarchies of masculinities and the importance 
of power in shaping masculine identity has remained important (Ghannam 2013). Inhorn 
(2011) has developed the term “emergent masculinities” to “capture all that is new and 
transformative” in men’s masculine identity. This encapsulates “individual change over the 
male life course, change across generations and social change involving men in transformative 
processes” (803). In putting forward the term, Inhorn aims to problematise depictions of Arab 
men according to what she terms the “four P’s”: “patriarchy, patrilineality, patrilocality and 
polygyny” (Inhorn 2012, 302). In addition to “emergent masculinities”, Ghannam has coined 
the term “masculine trajectories” to articulate changing norms over time: “the process of 
becoming a man and how during this process, which lasts over a life span, men identify with 
various ideals, norms, and values.” (2013, 7) Masculine trajectories do not develop neatly, 
rather they are defined by ambiguity and are influenced by unexpected circumstances, 
representing a “continuous quest for a sense of illusive coherence that has to be cultivated and 
sustained” (Ibid, 7). This attention to “emergent masculinities” has produced a rich body of 
work on men in the Middle East, in particular, such as changing attitudes towards birth control 
(Inhorn 2012), the importance of providing good food to families among working-class men in 
Cairo (Naguib 2015), revolution stories as new forms of masculine capital (Norbakk 2017), 
and the adaptation of young Palestinian men in Lebanon to the impossibility of fulfilling the 
“fedayeen” slot (Barbosa 2018).  
Growing attention to the experiences of male migrants has explored the connection 
between migration and masculine identity. Migration has been explored as a “rite of passage” 
(Monsutti 2005) where boys and young men leave home to work and endure difficult 
conditions with the expectation of returning in the future as socially-validated men (see also 
Gaibazzi 2013; Marsden 2005; Osella & Osella 2000). In many cases, migration can entail 
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undermining or challenging common gender expectations and norms, which can result in men 
adopting new practices, such as domestic responsibilities, as in the case of Afghan traders in 
Uzbekistan (Marsden 2015), or among Malaysian men in Australia (Pease 2009). Literature 
has shown the challenge for men and women of such adjustment and the resulting conflict, 
such as marriages breaking down after migration (Pasura 2007; Hansen 2008; Boehm 2008; 
Gallo 2006; Charsley & Wray 2015). Work has also sought to draw attention to men’s 
experiences of vulnerability, including an emerging consensus that suggests women are 
generally better able to cope with the changes and disruption wrought by migration (Jansen 
2008; McSpadden 1993; Korac 2002; Kaplan 1990). In particular, men can confront the loss 
of status that comes from a changing position in the community and no longer being 
breadwinner or finding high-status work, such as among middle-class Bosnian men in the 
Netherlands (Jansen 2008), and Somali men in the UK (Hansen 2008). The distinction between 
economic migration and forced displacement is in most cases an artificial one but it can play 
an important role in the extent to which men have time to prepare for and therefore accept a 
loss of such status (Jansen 2008). Scholars have also shown the kinds of gendered challenges 
from host countries that can confront men in displacement. This includes the association of 
male migrants from the Middle East as violent, duplicitous and a danger to women in media 
discourse and in policy (Johnson 2011, 1026). There is also the assumption that men are tough 
enough to cope with conditions of displacement without support. The relatively restricted 
access to material resources and NGO initiatives for Syrian men in Jordan, for example, has 
led one scholar to ask, “Are Syrian men vulnerable too?” (Turner 2016) In the UK, Griffiths 
(2015) has shown how men seeking asylum face a difficult balancing act between being too 
strong, and therefore threatening and violent, and being too weak, and therefore pathetic. In the 
event of having their application refused they can quickly be given the label of “dangerous 
bogus asylum seeker”.  
Furthermore, while there is evidence that the refugee label can have positive 
associations, including its function as “a lightning rod for a political cause” (Pearlman 2018; 
Zeno 2017), in many cases it is experienced as a stigmatised identity. Hannah Arendt, who was 
a refugee from Nazi Germany, wrote in her essay ‘We Refugees’: “In the first place, we don’t 
like to be called ‘refugees.’ We ourselves call each other ‘newcomers’ or ‘immigrants.’” (1994, 
110) Similarly, a Syrian refugee man in Berlin, quoted by Pearlman, described the stigma of 




Today, the word “refugee” is used in a horrible way. It’s something either to be 
pitied or blamed for everything. Overpopulation? It’s the refugees. Rents going up? 
It’s the refugees. Crime? It’s the refugees. If you label people refugees, they remain 
refugees for the rest of their lives (2017, 272). 
 
The stigma of the refugee label is often lived in gendered terms. Among Syrian men in Egypt, 
Suerbaum has described how the term “refugee” was a source of emasculation, synonymous 
with “helplessness, poverty, dependence, and neediness” (2018, 670). The way men’s 
experience of displacement and becoming “refugees” can complicate and upset norms of the 
masculine role has led to what has been identified as a “crisis of masculinity” (Donaldson & 
Howson 2009). In the case of Eritrean and Somali refugees in the US, men described fears, 
such as “to be a beggar”, “not to stand on my own feet”, and “not to be able to take care of my 
mother” (McSpadden 1993, 220). Jaji describes how “real men” in the public sphere in Kenya 
“exhibit wealth through consumption patterns that mark them as successful”, as a result refugee 
men who face barriers to formal employment find refugee status “demeaning and 
marginalising” (2009, 182). Male refugees who receive assistance and aid from NGOs can 
suffer what Harrell-Bond described as a “second stress” after the initial violence of 
displacement, as men’s identities, based on the role of provider, are diminished (1999). The 
result can be a loss of dignity and pride. Hansen describes, for example, rocketing consumption 
of khat among Somali men in the UK who once had professional jobs and struggle to adjust to 
the loss of status associated with low-skilled work available in the context of displacement 
(Hansen 2008). The same has been noted among internally-displaced men in Georgia in what 
Kabachnik et al. have characterised as “traumatic masculinities”, to describe how “the status 
and roles of IDP men have been severely disrupted, with changes to their social networks and 
altered economic circumstances where their experiences and training are no longer seen as 
useful.” (2013, 776) Others have shown how this can result in forms of “protest masculinity” 
through involvement in violence and gangs (Ong 2003; Noble et al 1998; Bourgois 1995). 
However, the notion of a “crisis of masculinity” has been problematised by scholars 
showing how migrant men can be resilient, adjust and find ways of creating a valorised 
masculine identity in the context of displacement. Kleist shows the role of associations among 
Somalis in Denmark as sites to construct masculine identity in a context where Somalis face 
high unemployment and discrimination in mainstream society (2010). This entails processes of 
producing a “gender baseline”, in which “respectable masculinity” is differentiated from 
“failed masculinity”. Suerbaum has charted a similar process among young Syrian male 
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refugees in Cairo, in which her interlocutors seek to “masculinise” as a way of “unbecoming 
refugees” through asserting hegemonic masculinity, such as constructing women in highly 
traditional roles in what Kandiyoti (1993) has termed “patriarchal restoration”. For Somalis in 
Denmark, this can even be constructed through return or “penetration” of the homeland, 
Somaliland, and the construction of the self as a modern, professional man (Hansen 2008). 
There has been exploration of the expression of “emergent masculinities” in new contexts, such 
as the caring roles of Syrian fathers shortly after migrating to Norway in 2015 (Naguib 2018), 
or the care of other migrants among Afghans in Athens (Palivos 2018). Others have shown the 
strategic ways that refugees display contrasting masculine identities in order to balance 
different interests and expectations, including to access employment opportunities, as in the 
case of Palestinian-Jordanians (Achilli 2015). Inhorn and Isidoros write in a special issue on 
Arab masculinity that she and others no longer follow the “now hackneyed” tropes of “crisis 
of masculinity” and “hegemonic masculinity”, and introduces how scholars have shown the 
way that Syrian male refugees “visibly perform their masculine ‘responsibility,’ attempting to 
communicate a very different image of what it means to be a refugee man” (2018, 7).  
I contribute to this literature by exploring processes by which young Syrian and 
Palestinian refugees position themselves as mature men in the context of displacement. At the 
same time, however, I seek to go further than asking “What happens to notions of masculinity 
in situations of marginalisation and loss?” (Kleist 2010) Rather, I investigate how constructing 
masculine identity in displacement and seeking to “become men” intersects with inclusion and 
belonging in Germany, or citizenship. This question is lived in everyday life through being 
acted upon by top down integration programmes, and with it the possibility and promise of 
citizenship. The lives of Syrian and Palestinian refugees were framed by questions such as what 
needs to be done by when in order to be able to remain in Germany? What constitutes someone 
as a “refugee” or citizen? What establishes oneself as worthy of the right to belong? Exploring 
processes of positioning oneself as dignified in displacement is not, therefore, to ask what 
happens to masculine identity, but rather, how does masculinity intersect with citizenship? 
Scholars have explored refugees as the embodiment of exclusion in host societies. Work 
has revealed the ways that outsiderness and uncertainty is produced by states, such as the 
“deportability” of undocumented migrants in the US (De Genova 2002) and the encampment 
of asylum seekers in the UK (Darling 2009). Biehl (2015) has described the asylum procedures 
and management of Syrians in Turkey in what she characterises as “governing through 
uncertainty”, in which the state deliberately constructs policies to create uncertainty for Syrians 
and therefore avoids granting legal rights. The effect of such policies is to mark asylum seekers 
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as those “forever at the border” (Darling 2011, 264 in Biehl 2015). Such processes have also 
been shown in the “documentation regime” for migrants in Italy for example. While learning 
the details of complex bureaucratic processes offers a space to construct “insiderness”, at the 
same time it can produce a state of marginalisation and uncertainty (Tuckett 2015). 
However, there is also recognition of the limited value of seeing displacement through 
the prism of exclusion alone. Holmes and Castaneda have taken aim at the limitations of 
applying Agamben’s influential conception of “bare life”, formulated in relation to the 
concentration camps of Nazi Germany, to explain the circumstances faced by those who are 
displaced. They write that “refugees are multiple and diverse, differentially involved in making 
political and symbolic claims”, and to this extent,   
 
are not simply ‘bare life’ removed from the realm of the political, but rather political 
actors whose subjectivities are shaped by the uneven social and symbolic 
environments in which they simultaneously are positioned and position themselves 
(2016, 20).  
 
Indeed, refugee status, when it is afforded, comes with certain rights, including the right to 
protection and financial support. Despite the stigma of the term, and attempts to avoid it, it can 
often be the case that people seek refugee status to gain the protections and rights it should 
offer. In contrast to what Agamben conceptualises as a state of “permanent exception”, the 
lived experience of many refugees is more complicated. As Ong writes, taking such a 
perspective “ignores the possibility of complex negotiations of claims of those without 
territorialised citizenship” (2006, 23). Subsequently, in many settings refugees occupy an 
ambivalent place between recognition and misrecognition, inclusion and exclusion. This 
reflects the kinds of ambivalence in Derrida’s conception of “hostipitality” (2000). Rozakou, 
for example, shows in her investigation of a refugee camp in Greece, how humanitarian 
workers construct refugees as “neither fully inside nor totally outside the community but, 
rather, in the vague space that hospitality draws in between” (2012, 573).  
In settings such as Western Europe and Germany, such “hospitality” has tended to entail 
the expectation of “integration” in the past few decades (Korac 2009). The right to stay and 
eventually to become citizens has become subject to a “neoliberal logic”, in which asylum is 
less a “right” for the displaced, but rather something to be earnt through fulfilling requirements 
such as learning the language, completing programmes of integration and becoming financially 
independent. This can be the case for refugees in Germany, as shown by Heinemann, who 
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writes of the prevailing attitude in Germany and Austria that “If you want to belong – you have 
to learn the national language” (2017, 177). In the US, Nawyn (2011) has shown the ways that 
“social citizenship” has become “eclipsed” by “market citizenship” in which the right to remain 
is based on being economically productive. Such a conception of citizenship can be shared by 
migrants who have been shown to disagree with having access to social rights in their first 
years in a welfare state, such as the Netherlands, in what Kremer has termed “earned 
citizenship” (2016).  
The extent to which migrants and refugees seek the legal status of “citizenship” is an 
empirical one and there are many reasons why forcibly displaced persons would not invest 
themselves in this process. This might include the expectation of repatriation or return, as in 
the case of Arab Iraqi political migrants in the UK (Al-Rasheed 1994). Malkki explored this 
among Burundian refugees from Tanzania in the late 1980s and 1990s, for whom “refugeeness” 
attested to a kind of “categorical purity” at the centre of their claims for a future Hutu-
dominated state in Burundi (1995). In many settings there are also questions about the 
importance or value of citizenship status, such as migration in Africa where migrants 
successfully integrate “despite their restricted access to formal documentation” (Kuch 2016). 
Indeed, there has been critique of the assumption among NGOs and policy-makers that the 
solution for displacement is to settle migrants. Hoffman problematises the “highly normative 
vision” of the “state-citizen relationship” among international NGOs which disrupted the 
system of migration to Syria for Iraqi migrants when they had previously been free to make 
livelihoods and integrate, introducing new kinds of biopolitical mechanisms and violence 
(2016). The extent to which citizenship is sought after by a population of migrants can also 
change. While Malkki charted the “symbolic purity” of refugee identity among Burundians in 
Tanzania, for example, recent work has shown the processes by which Burundians have eagerly 
taken up the offer of citizenship in Tanzania and enthusiastically embraced the right to vote 
(Kuch 2018).  
At the same time, citizenship extends beyond its classic definition of a legal status “with 
duties and rights” (Marshall 1983 [1950] in Lazar 2013, 1). An important approach has been 
to explore instances in which refugees and migrants make claims to rights, despite not being 
citizens. Nyers and Rygiel state, for instance, that we need to ask “how, through various 
strategies of claims-making, non-citizen migrant groups are involved in practices and ways of 
engaging in citizenship even when lacking formal status.” (2012, 2) This is what Isin has 
termed “acts of citizenship” and has been explored in the context of demonstrations and sit-ins 
and is embodied in the figure of the “activist citizen” (Isin & Nyers 2014). What has made this 
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concept and approach so influential is the way that it enables a site to explore the agency of 
individuals. Rather than citizenship being a status that one has or is given through fulfilling a 
set of terms, it is embodied in enacting a political subjectivity. This has been explored in the 
context of demonstrations for rights, as in the case of the sit-in organised by Afghans in Istanbul 
(Erensu 2016), demonstrations to claim the right to the freedom to work by Palestinian refugees 
in Brazil (Moulin 2012), as well as the solidarity between migrants and activists in Calais 
(Rygiel 2011).  
Another way of thinking about citizenship entails a much broader notion of “moral 
belonging”. Citizenship has been defined as the practices that represent belonging to society as 
“an imagined community of commensurable persons”, encompassing the “moral and 
performative dimensions” of citizenship (Holston & Appadurai 1999; Anderson 2013). Isin 
writes of this moral dimension of citizenship as “that kind of identity within a city or state that 
certain agents constitute as virtuous, good, righteous, and superior, and differentiate it from 
strangers, outsiders and aliens, who they constitute as their alterity…” (2002, 35). He notes 
elsewhere that this entails “one who has mastered appropriate modes and forms of being an 
insider” (Isin 2013, 27). What this draws attention to is the relational character of “enacting 
citizenship”. Citizenship as “moral belonging” again distinguishes it from its meaning as a 
legal status. This is shown, for instance, in what Rosello (1997) has critiqued as the exclusion 
from “cultural citizenship” suffered by Latin American citizens of the US who confront 
discrimination.  
In this thesis, citizenship is both a status to achieve (i.e. the right to remain), and the 
everyday lives of refugees are closely bound-up with the integration initiatives that are 
supposed to enable this, as well as representing broader notions of moral belonging. This can 
be understood in relation to the stigma associated with refugeeness, where the process of 
negotiating, articulating and performing the capacity and “worthiness” to belong in the political 
community is, at the same time, a process of grappling with one’s stigmatised identity as a 
refugee, or outsider. What I explore in this thesis is the way that dignity for refugees in 
Germany entails negotiating citizenship in relation to processes of constructing a masculine 
identity. Negotiating belonging and becoming a man are not separate pursuits but are closely 
intertwined. Grappling with a maligned status as both powerless and needy yet threatening 
male outsiders necessitates processes of performing and negotiating masculine identity and the 
place of such masculinity within the fabric of Germany. To this extent, the thesis takes up the 
work of scholars exploring the intersection of citizenship and masculinity.   
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Tensions between masculine identity and citizenship have been detailed in work such 
as Katherine Ewing’s Stolen Honor, where she explores representation of Turkish-German 
Muslim men and “how the theme of masculinity is […] deployed to stigmatize a minority as 
part of the process of forming a national subject” – a post-war, democratic subject with an 
“egalitarian orientation grounded in constitutional patriotism” (2008, 14). The result is the 
creation of an “abject Other” that is denied cultural citizenship in Germany. There is evidence 
to suggest stigmatised ethnic minority and migrant men adjust to expectations of masculine 
identity in new environments. Ewing shows this in the case of Turkish-German men who 
employ strategies such as displacing stigma on to others, compartmentalising their identity, 
and identifying with the modern (Ibid, 121). Similar processes have been shown in the case of 
Syrian refugees in Belgium who employ “comparative strategies of self” to displace stigma on 
to other refugees and migrants, such as the figure of the economic migrant (Vandevoordt & 
Verschragen 2019). In the case of Bosnian men in the Netherlands, Jansen shows how some 
younger men develop their identity as “serious”, matching expectations of the Dutch host 
society and therefore allowing them to negotiate belonging (2008). This fits with a broader 
thesis that postulates the ways that migrant men adjust masculine identities to “fit in” with the 
dominant and valorised masculinity of the host society (Howson 2013). In an insightful article, 
Ingvars and Gislason show how Syrians who arranged a sit-in protest in Athens in 2014 to 
protest being prevented from onward migration “engaged democratic practices” to perform 
their moral responsibility and therefore forged a “new refugee masculinity” (2018, 387) that 
showed their capacity to belong.  
This study builds on existing literature to explore the intersection of masculinity and 
citizenship in the everyday lives of young Syrian and Palestinian men in their first years as 
refugees in Germany. What emerges from these reflections is a disparate picture, and one that 
adds nuance and complexity to accounts which have tended at times to produce images of 
masculine self-realisation and “accomplishment” and inclusion, on the one hand, and a “crisis” 
of masculinity and exclusion on the other. It shares with work that draws attention to the 
aspirations of migrants, and their often uncertain consequences. Through thick description and 
attention to the everyday lives of young Syrian and Palestinian men, I situate how the dignity 
of “becoming men” and negotiating citizenship exist in a complex relationship. Being “good 
at being a man” (Herzfeld 1987) could at times be the site of one’s dignity and deservingness 
as a member of society, where what constitutes masculine self-realisation is an inventive, 
plastic and adaptable identity. Not only fulfilling the expectations of a watching German state 
and society, their migration could represent a gift to give; Germans, in the view of my 
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interlocutors, do (or should) in some instances “integrate” with Arabs. Yet fulfilling masculine 
expectations and negotiating inclusion could be the site of tensions and contradictions where 
what it means to be a man – in most cases a young Arab, Muslim man – confronts expectations 
of citizenship. What I capture is not a clear narrative or experience of “accomplishment”, nor 
is it the “crisis” of migrant men who suffer from the stigma of displacement. Rather, the thesis 
offers an account of everyday lives oriented in complex ways and with varying consequences 
to the interplay of masculine trajectories and citizenship as sources of dignity in the new 
environment.   
 
From Uprisings in Syria to the “Refugee Crisis”  
 
The migration of Syrians to Germany from Syria, as well as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and 
elsewhere has its roots in the 2011 uprising. This took place in the turbulence of the Arab 
Spring that followed the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, triggered on the 17 December 2010 
by Omar Bouazizi’s self-immolation in protest at corruption and poor living standards. 
Observers doubted whether the protests would reach Syria, where the regime of Bashar Assad 
was relatively more repressive, civil society had been effectively curtailed for decades, and 
Syria itself was a highly diverse country (Pearlman 2017, 5). However, protests did begin in 
March 2011 in Dara’a after the detention and torture of teenage boys for writing anti-
government graffiti. When a delegation of respected elders went to the governor of Dara’a to 
ask for the release of the boys, he told them to return to the boys’ mothers and “make more 
children” (Chatty 2017, 221), a shocking disrespect that played a part in turning what had been 
peaceful demonstrations for the boys’ release into violent protests. Dara’a was followed 
immediately by Homs and Hama on the 18 March 2011, where demonstrators demanded 
broader political reform. There was considerable hope at this stage of the protests where, as in 
other Arab states, the protests reflected frustration with corruption and demands for 
democratisation and political freedom. Rima, a writer from Suwayda in Pearlman’s evocative 
collection of interviews with displaced Syrians, We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled, 
describes how she joined the protests and began shouting “Freedom!” 
 
“This is the first time I have ever heard my own voice.” I thought, “This is the first 
time I have a soul and I am not afraid of death or being arrested or anything else.” 
I wanted to feel this freedom forever. And I told myself that I would never again let 




In response to protests, minor reforms were introduced by the regime, such as opening dialogue 
with some reform-oriented figures and holding parliamentary elections. This was combined, 
however, with a violent crackdown from the Syrian National Army with the assistance of the 
Shabiha, Alewite militia who supported Assad, resulting in large-scale arrests and torture of 
protestors, including a massacre of a peaceful vigil held at Clock Square in Homs on the 19 
April 2012. In the following month, demonstrations in Homs were suppressed, leading to the 
deaths of 8000 people. Despite the violence, there was not yet large-scale migration out of 
Syria. In the first twelve months of the revolution, only 50,000 Syrians had crossed borders to 
neighbouring countries (Chatty 2017). 
The revolution, which was initially led by working-class urban and rural youth, turned 
into divisions based broadly on sectarian differences, primarily through the regime’s own 
doing, including the release of war-hardened al-Qaida militants in December 2011 in order to 
substantiate its claim that demonstrators were “terrorists”. The regime’s crackdown resulted in 
the formation of a militarised group formed mainly of army defectors, the Free Syrian Army. 
It was set-up initially to protect demonstrators, but it quickly began to fight the army and make 
military gains. Subsequently, what began as demands for reform became a military conflict 
with the emergence of diverse opposition groups, including Islamist-oriented rebel forces, such 
as Al-Nusra Front. As it developed into a military conflict, Syria soon became the site of a 
highly complex and protracted proxy war, in which Iran, Hezbollah and later Russia supported 
the Assad regime, and a range of outside actors supported diverse rebel forces, including groups 
funded by rival Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and the US. In eastern Syria, chaos and a 
power vacuum led to take-over by Islamic State from neighbouring Iraq, which established its 
capital in the city of Raqqa in January 2014. The consequences of the war raged on several 
fronts since 2011 has been the loss of approximately 400,000 lives as of the beginning of 2017 
according to a World Bank report (2017) and the destruction of large swathes of the country. 
At the time of writing, the Assad regime with the support of Russian airpower has re-taken 
most of Syria, with remaining areas under rebel control in Idlib coming under sustained aerial 
bombardment by Russia, leading to renewed fears of a humanitarian emergency for the 3 
million civilians in the region, many displaced from other parts of Syria.  
The consequence of the destruction has been that a country with a long history as a state 
providing refuge from various conflicts in the region over past decades, including Lebanon, 
Palestine and Iraq, has suffered large-scale displacement of its population. UNHCR estimates 
that in 2019 there are 6.6 million internally-displaced people in Syria and as many as 5.6 million 
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people who have left the country.2 Major countries of migration are Jordan, Lebanon and 
Turkey, as well as 1 million refugees who fled to Europe, a significant proportion of whom 
came to Germany between 2014 and 2016. 
 
Migration to Germany and its Consequences  
 
In 2013, there was the initial migration of people from Syria along the Mediterranean route to 
Europe. The numbers reached 626,000 in 2014, and then rose steeply in 2015 with the opening 
of the “Balkan route”, including the emergence of a “free market” of smuggler organisations 
and networks to take boats from the east coast of Turkey to Greece (Da Silva 2017). While the 
boat journey had considerable risks, and UNHCR reported that 4000 people drowned making 
the crossing in 2015, it was considered safer than previous routes, such as the crossing from 
Libya to Italy. From Greece, the majority of people travelled by train, bus and on foot to 
Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Austria and Germany, and some travelled onwards to Sweden, 
which received 163,000 migrants. According to the UN, 921,713 migrants travelled along the 
Balkan route in 2015 and 149,100 travelled from Libya to the south coast of Italy. Of this 
figure, 51% of people came from Syria, 20% from Afghanistan and 7% from Iraq (BBC News 
22 December 2015). After the decision to waive the Dublin Protocol on the 24 August 2015, 
and with it the “March of Hope” of thousands of people previously stuck at Keleti train station 
in Budapest, the numbers of migrants arriving in Germany rose rapidly. By October 2015, 
700,000 Syrians had migrated to Germany (Achilli 2016) and there was the emergence of a 
discourse of crisis when it was reported that as many as 600 new applicants were being 
processed every day (Selim et al. 2018, 34). It has been estimated that around 1 million Syrians 
arrived in Germany by the end of 2018.   
The term “Willkommenskultur” (culture of welcome) originated in the importance of 
recruiting appropriate specialists in order to be able to manage the needs of new arrivals 
(Hamann & Karakayali 2016). In 2015, it quickly came to refer to massive public engagement 
and mobilisation in response to the breakdown of the state. As Bock (2018) notes, in just a few 
months in 2018 there emerged in Germany a discourse of a “refugee crisis” (Flütchlingskrise). 
The failure to be able to effectively handle and administer the large numbers of people who 
came was reflected in February 2016 when the state admitted that 130,000 asylum seekers had 
“disappeared” from shelters across Germany (Ibid, 386). The result of the breakdown of public 
                                                             
2 https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html  
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administration was the space for new forms of civic engagement leading to a huge mobilisation 
to assist the newcomers. A powerful image from the time was crowds waiting at the central 
train station in Munich to welcome people arriving on trains from Budapest with children’s 
toys and flowers. In the midst of this, an image of a boy lying face down in the water went 
viral. The drowning of Alan Kurdi (initially reported as “Aylan”) on the journey to Greece 
from Turkey on the 2 September 2015, shortly after the decision to suspend the Dublin 
Protocol, has been identified by Borneman and Ghassem-Fachandi as a key moment in the 
promotion of a culture of “xenophilia” (2016). They describe the effect as follows, 
 
The photo inevitably brought our eyes to its punctum—the small baby shoes staring 
back at us and his arm lifeless at his side. Its immediate effect was to puncture 
indifference, collapsing all geographic and temporal distance to suffering, 
eliminating any innocent position. 
 
A survey by the Social Sciences Institute of the Evangelical Church in late 2015 showed that 
10.9% of the German population were volunteering to provide assistance to refugees in 
Germany, about 8 million people. Of these volunteers, 40% of people were involved in offering 
German language lessons (Hamann & Kayakali 2016). There emerged a network of 
spontaneously organised collections for clothing and other supplies throughout Germany 
coordinated on social media (Bochow 2015), as well as fundraising events, such as the “refugee 
welcome parties” organised in towns and cities, and even a refugee solidarity event at SchwuZ 
in August 2015, a gay club in Berlin (Holmes & Castaneda 2016). “The prevailing mood in 
Germany”, Der Spiegel reported, “was not one of populist outrage but of enthusiasm.” 
(Borneman & Ghassem-Fachandi 2016). There was a feeling that people coming to Germany 
were “deserving” and it has been noted by scholars that it was an unusually long period of 
grace for the plight of migrants in the German press without recourse to “hysteria and scandals” 
(Vollmer & Kayakali 2018, 120). This was to the extent that the traditionally centre-right Der 
Bild newspaper even published a supplement in Arabic welcoming refugees to Berlin.  
However, this mood of xenophilia was not true everywhere. Even at the high point of 
Willkommenskultur there were foreboding signs for those who looked hard enough. In a piece 
for Anthropology Today in December 2015, Chris Hann warned, 
 
It became clear almost at once that the euphoria of Willkommenskultur (culture of 
hospitality) would be short-lived. Celebrations to mark the 25th anniversary of 
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German unification [3 October, 2015] were subverted by the burning issue of the 
moment. Almost every talk show in Germany this autumn has juxtaposed sober 
analysis from supporters of the chancellor with more or less passionate criticism 
from those claiming to speak on behalf of concerned citizens (besorgte Bürger). 
 
During this period there was considerable vandalism and destruction of asylum shelters. 
According to figures from the Federal Bureau of Crime, attacks on such shelters increased from 
199 in 2014 to 1005 in 2015 (BBC News 2016). Pegida, the populist far right social movement 
was formed in October 2014 in Dresden in response to the establishment of 11 asylum shelters 
in the city. Tensions escalated at a camp in Heidenau, close to Dresden, in August 2015, when 
local people gathered for three days of protests, including chanting and throwing rocks and 
setting-off fireworks. As the Augsburger Allegemeine newspaper warned in September 2015, 
“One million refugees? The atmosphere is threatened to change” (Vollmer & Kayakali 2018). 
On all accounts such a change happened at the end of 2015 with the events of New Year’s Eve 
and the sexual assault of as many as a thousand women in Cologne by predominantly North 
African asylum seekers, resulting in what has been described as a “moral panic” (Kosnick 
2019). As Borneman and Ghassem-Fachandi write of the event, “The divisive and threatening 
spectre of sexual assault contributed to a return to ambivalence, mobilizing Germans for a 
Stimmungswechsel [mood swing] from a dominant xenophilia to xenophobia.” (2016, 116) 
This event particularly highlighted existing anxieties of the relatively high numbers of young 
men arriving to Europe (Selim et al. 2018). However, such a “mood change” did not lead to a 
decline in the number of people volunteering in Germany, even six months after New Year’s 
Eve. Furthermore, a DeutschlandTrend survey in February 2016 showed that 94% of 
respondents supported Germany continuing to receive refugees (Bock 2018). Nevertheless, 
there did seem to emerge a change in the enthusiasm associated with migration to Germany, 
and as the figures also show, a majority now supported an upper limit to the intake of migrants. 
Even before the assaults of New Year’s Eve, there had been moves to drastically reduce 
migration. In November 2015, Germany ended exemption to the Dublin Protocol and like other 
European states erected controls on its borders, representing a threat to the Schengen free-travel 
zone. At the same time, Hungary, Macedonia and Serbia moved to close the Balkan route, 
resulting in huge numbers of people stuck in Greece. Eventually, on the 18 March 2016, a deal 
was made with Turkey for people arriving “illegally” on Greek islands to be sent back and for 
a host of measures in Turkey to prevent migration. In return, EU states would take the 
equivalent number of asylum seekers arriving in Greece from camps in eastern Turkey and 
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would pay Turkey 6 billion euros. Furthermore, in March 2016 Germany instituted policies 
that prevented family reunification for people granted subsidiary protection, a policy that was 
eventually lifted on the 1 August 2018. The deal with Turkey and suspension of family 
reunification was part of a range of policies to reduce migration, including the strengthening 
of border control in what is branded as “Fortress Europe”. There was a rapid increase in funding 
for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), from 143 million euros in 
2015 to 238 million euros in 2016 and then 302 million in 2017. In 2017, this resulted in the 
number of asylum claimants being reduced to 650,000. In 2018, further restrictions followed a 
deal between Italy and Libya to prevent migration. 
Despite these measures, there continued to be massive political implications of the 
decision to accept high numbers of refugees in Germany as it became the stage for an insurgent 
far right (Rehberg, Kunz, and Schlinzig 2016). In the federal elections in September 2017 in 
what was framed as a vote on Merkel’s decision to accept refugees in 2015-16, the CDU 
received its worst result for two decades and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) became the 
first far right party to enter the Bundestag since World War Two. After another disappointing 
set of results at local elections in 2018, Merkel was forced to announce that she would not stand 
again as chancellor in 2021. There were a number of reason for her resignation but analysts 
cite backlash to her refugee policy as among the most important (Le Blond 2018).   
 
Integrating Refugees  
 
How has Germany managed the incorporation of its new refugee population? Initially, new 
arrivals were housed in temporary “camps”, including school gym halls, empty warehouses, 
even a disused airport, Tempelhof Airport in Berlin. In Dresden, there were several buildings 
turned into asylum shelters, including an unused former school near Albert Wolf Platz in 
Prohlis which was then re-purposed for use as a centre for the integration programme. As 
asylum applications were processed, refugees left the camps for accommodation provided by 
Socialamt (Social Security Office), often crowded apartments hosting two people to a bedroom 
with a shared kitchen and bathroom. Many Syrians and Palestinians from Syria, at least 
initially, were provided with three years refugee status which allowed the right to family 
reunification as well as to access social security. Others, especially those who arrived later, 
often received a one-year visa which they had to renew annually and did not allow for family 
reunification and other rights. However, after three years of receiving such visas they were 
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granted the same rights as other refugees, including the possibility to apply to bring family 
members to Germany.  
The Jobcenter, which features a great deal in the chapters that follow, was responsible 
for administering social security and overseeing the integration programme in Germany. Every 
refugee had a supervisor at the Jobcenter, and the relationship to this person was perceived by 
my interlocutors as essential for accessing opportunities for further language and training 
opportunities after the compulsory programme. The Jobcenter provided a single individual with 
a maximum budget of 410 euros a month for housing, which was enough to rent a studio 
apartment in Dresden. While finding an apartment from the social housing giant Vonovia was 
often not too challenging, it was trickier to find somewhere in more affluent areas or with other 
housing providers. Not everyone was able to make a quick transition from the camp to social 
housing to living independently, however. One man I knew from Homs was still living in the 
camp two years after he first arrived because of a problem with his paperwork, and those who 
did not receive refugee status, such as Palestinians from Lebanon, or Afghans, remained in 
social housing. In addition to providing rent for an apartment, the Jobcenter provided 700 euros 
to furnish the apartment and administer a monthly stipend of 400 euros to live on. It was also 
responsible for administering the integration programme (Integrationskurs), which became 
compulsory in the Integration Act passed in August 2016 as part of a host of packages that 
sought to grapple with the challenges posed by the arrival of high numbers of migrants.  
The integration course consists primarily of completing language classes that begin for 
most people with A1 of the Common European Framework, or beginner level, to B1, or 
intermediate level, the minimum level required to apply for the right to remain in Germany. 
Each course takes approximately two months and consists of 200 hours teaching. A1 and A2 
courses have internal exams that need to be passed to move on to B1, while the B1 course has 
an externally moderated exam and certificate. This is followed by a three-week orienteering 
course which introduces the politics, history and society of Germany and has a multiple choice 
exam consisting of a selection of 33 questions from a possible 333 questions. Depending on 
what an individual wants to do, they may then be entitled to complete the longer B2 course 
which is a requirement for doing an Ausbildung (vocational training), the aim of many of my 
friends, as well as a Weiterbildung (further education). Others, however, looked for work after 
B1, typically in restaurants, local hotels, or Arab-owned shops. In the event of not finding work 
it was common to have to do the six-month Maßnahme, a programme which provides help with 
German and assistance in skills, such as preparing a curriculum vitae. For those entering an 
Ausbildung, they were no longer the responsibility of the Jobcenter and they would receive a 
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grant from the Agentur für Arbeit (Employment Agency). Another option was to attend school 
in order to complete the Abitur, the equivalent to A-levels, and the main route for going to 
university.  
 
The Fieldwork Setting 
 
On the 27 September 2016, the day before I arrived, Dresden was in the news. Two improvised 
devices had exploded, one at the entrance of the Fatih Mosque in the district of Cotta, and the 
second on the terrace of the Congress Centre overlooking the River Elbe. Eventually in August 
2018 Nino Köhler, an active member of Pegida, would be charged and sentenced to ten years 
in prison. The week after I arrived, Dresden hosted the twenty-sixth celebration of re-
unification on the 3 October. There were stalls set-up during the long weekend which included 
speeches by Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. In the event, 
Dresden hit newspaper headlines again when a huge far right rally, led by Pegida, booed and 
heckled Merkel during her speech, including chants of “Merkel muss weg” (Merkel must go) 
and “Wir sind das Volk” (We are the people). This reflects a pattern in which national and 
international media coverage of Dresden has tended since 2014 to be associated with the 
insurgent far right, as the city is the birthplace of the Pegida movement which, at its height, 
was attracting as many as 25,000 people from across Saxony and elsewhere to their 
Spaziergang (walk) through the centre of Dresden.  
Refugees were distributed to villages, towns and cities across Germany, and relatively 
few found themselves in Dresden, a city of 550,000 people on the eastern border of Germany, 
close to the Czech Republic (see Figure 1). In 2016, there were 8130 refugees in Dresden 
compared to 82,105 in Berlin, for example.3 Despite its relatively small number, the political 
implications of migration to Dresden have been enormous. Yet if this is what drew me to 
Dresden, I was keen to situate the experience of my interlocutors beyond headlines of the far 
right. I was fascinated in the first weeks and months of my fieldwork to learn that many local 
people in Dresden were baffled by the transformation of their city into the flag bearer of the far 
right and some could hardly believe the city’s association internationally. This is not to say that 
it was an entirely new phenomenon, and I was to learn much later that the small mosque in 
Johannstadt in Dresden where my friends occasionally went to Friday prayer was named the 
Marwa El-Sherbini Mosque after an Egyptian engineering student who was murdered in court 
                                                             
3 https://service.destatis.de/DE/karten/migration_integration_regionen.html#ANT_SCH_I  
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in Dresden in 2009 by Alex Wiens, who had just been charged with verbally abusing her. 
Nonetheless, Dresden’s association with the far right was for many locals a shocking 
transformation of the city’s image.  
Dresden’s history and its reconstructed Old Town owes a great deal to its illustrious 
past as the seat of the Saxon monarchy. The extent of the wealth and power of the Saxon 
Electors and from 1808, Saxon Kings, is reflected in the Royal Palace at the centre of Dresden 
– the former royal residence and now museum. The city’s status as the capital of the wealthy 
Kingdom of Saxony had always made it a centre for arts and learning. It was in Dresden in 
1818, for example, that the philosopher Schopenhauer penned his most important work, The 
World as Will and Representation. This association continues to this day, perhaps most notably 
in classical music and opera, housed in the famous Semper Oper. Dresden’s status as a centre 
of arts, culture and learning threatened to come to a violent end during World War Two on the 
3 February 1944 when British and US planes carpet bombed the city in “Operation 
Thunderclap”, destroying in one night an area of 1600 square miles and killing as many as 
25,000 people in what continues to be one of the most controversial offences of the Allies in 






Figure 1 - Dresden in Europe (© OpenStreetMap: www.openstreetmap.org/copyright) 
 
 




In the aftermath of the war, the shell of Dresden was included in the new German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) which between 1945 and 1989 led to profound changes to the region’s society, 
politics and economy. One of the many consequences of this history is that Dresden and 
Saxony, like the rest of GDR, did not see the arrival of large numbers of guest workers from 
Italy and later Turkey after the war as in West Germany. Main sources of migration to the GDR 
were from Vietnam and Mozambique, which had established worker agreements and 
traineeships (Hillmann 2005). The transformation of the state-planned economy and 
communist society after reunification in 1989 led to profound changes in Dresden, which 
according to some analysts can be felt today in the prominence of the far right (Chazan 2017). 
The emergence of the far right in Dresden and the wider GDR is seen in part as an expression 
of the resentment and indignity associated with reunification and disappointment at high 
unemployment and relatively poor infrastructure and wages compared to other parts of 
Germany.4 That said, Dresden today is an increasingly wealthy city, it has a dynamic economy 
centred around the pharmaceutical industry and electrical and mechanical engineering.  
 
Doing Fieldwork  
 
It took some time to be able to meet and get to know Syrians and Palestinians in Dresden. 
Tellingly perhaps, the first person I met, Ali from Iraq, was when we both stood watching an 
enormous Pegida demonstration on the 7 October 2016 close to the main station, 
Hauptbahnhof. Ali introduced me to Jamil, who would help me to improve my Syrian Arabic, 
and introduced me to others. However, it was not until I began the A1 class of the 
Integrationskurs in November 2016 that I really began to meet and get to know the individuals 
who would become my “key informants”. The 200 hours of each course was a conducive space 
for slowly getting to know and trust one another and explain my interest in learning about the 
everyday lives of Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Germany. The classes, which normally 
took place from 8am to 1pm, were punctuated with two 15-minute breaks where we would buy 
sweets, drink coffee and smoke cigarettes. There would also be opportunities to catch-up and 
make plans on the tram to the school and afterwards on the way home. Slowly, as I got to know 
people better, I would join them in the different settings and activities of their daily lives. 
                                                             
4 The European Commission notes that Saxony in 2017 had an above average unemployment rate of 4.4%, 




In conducting participant observation, I joined friends in the activities that made up 
their everyday lives as newly-arrived refugees in Germany. I attended meetings at the 
Jobcenter, went shopping at the newly-opened Arab shops, attended visits to the hospital, and 
hung out in cafes. A considerable portion of my fieldwork was spent visiting people’s 
apartments. Without the money, as well as the knowledge, familiarity or sense of security to 
spend too much time going out, the home was often the most common space to see friends. My 
interlocutors tended to live alone in studio apartments or shared an apartment with one or two 
friends. They lived in various parts of the city, and I often spent considerable portions of each 
day travelling between these areas by tram. When we went to the city centre, the majority of 
time was spent in the modern development around Prager Strasse, a long straight pedestrianised 
high street from the main station to Prager Strasse tram stop. This area has two shopping centres 
that we would regularly visit, Altmarkt Gallerie, a mall with food outlets and expensive shops, 
and Centrum Gallerie, where there are more affordable shops. Prager Strasse was flanked on 
one side by a short pedestrianised street, Ferdinandstrasse, which is dubbed, at least by 
Germans if not Arabs, as “Arab Street”. Here there were a few Arab supermarkets, including 
Seta Markt, the largest supermarket for Arabic food, complete with a mobile phone repair 
service, oven (frn) and perfumery (see Figure 3). This street was the site of coming and going, 
a place to stop on the way back from language classes, on trips from the Jobcenter, or for simply 
hanging out in town. Close to Ferdinandstrasse was Starbucks, the main café where my friends 
would sit, in the corner of Centrum Gallerie.  
I got to know around ten young Syrian and Palestinian men who I would see regularly 
and whose lives and experiences are the focus of this thesis. In addition, there were other people 
I would see occasionally, including two middle-aged couples with children. Although most of 
my interlocutors are young men between the ages of 18 and 35, or shabāb, and the majority 
are single, they nevertheless constitute a very diverse group. They hailed from a range of 
regional, ethnic, national, religious and socio-economic backgrounds. Alongside Syrians, I got 
to know Palestinians from Syria, predominantly from Yarmouk Camp in Damascus, almost all 
third-generation descendants of Palestinians displaced from present-day Israel in the 1948 
Nakba. Palestinians in Syria do not have Syrian citizenship and although they share many of 
the same rights, they nonetheless confront discrimination and certain restrictions, such as the 
right to own property. The distinction between Palestinians and Syrians could be important in 
Germany and I investigate this explicitly in the discussion of political activism in Chapter 6. 
In view of this difference, and the fact that the vast majority of Palestinians I met would self-
identify as Palestinian, I refer to “Syrians and Palestinians” throughout the thesis. The scale of 
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displacement from Syria reflects the diversity of my interlocutors who came from across Syria, 
including Dara’a, Homs, Damascus, Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir ezZour, and many other places. In 
addition, I came to know people from a range of socio-economic backgrounds, and this 
profoundly shaped the experience of integration in Germany despite the class-levelling effects 
of displacement (McSpadden & Moussa 1993). The majority of my friends, however, came 
from lower middle class and working class backgrounds and aimed to enter work in professions 
such as electricians, cooks, hairdressers and computer repair. A few of the people I got to know 
left Syria after completing a degree at university and hoped to use their knowledge and 






There are few voices of Syrian and Palestinian women in the study. While scholars have shown 
the importance of situating the “construction” of men in their relationships to women, such as 
the importance of female siblings (Joseph 1993; Ghannam 2013; Inhorn 2012), for Syrians and 
Palestinians in Germany, women tended to be present in their absence, such as the aspiration 
to marry in the future. Almost all my interlocutors were single and came without female 
members of their families, therefore contact with female kin or a girlfriend was restricted for 




many of my friends to private messages and calls. Talking to girlfriends especially could play 
a very important role in the everyday lives of my friends, who could spend hours every day 
communicating on online messaging services such as WhatsApp, but this was not a sphere that 
I came to learn much about. In general, I met relatively few women in Dresden, reflecting the 
fact that according to the Pew Research Centre, 73% of migrants to Europe in 2015 (across all 
nationalities, but this trend was reflected among Syrian migrants) were men.5 I also confronted 
a similar challenge to what has been described by other male anthropologists who struggle to 
meet and spend time with women (see Kelly 2008), although this is certainly not always the 
case (Marsden 2005). For the Syrian and Palestinian women I did meet, our exchanges were 
nearly always limited to public settings, such as language classes. Within these classes too, 
however, there tended to be an informal division of space. For example, during break times 
women would often stay in the school and men would go outside to smoke. To this extent, most 
women I met tended to be wives of the few friends who were married, and the extent to which 
we talked varied from couple to couple. For these reasons, this account of young men is largely 
centred on the voices and experiences of the men themselves. However, I agree with Najmabadi 
who has written that “if we use gender analytically, sources about men are also sources about 
women.” (2005, 1)   
I began fieldwork wanting to investigate the politics of integration in the framework of 
hospitality offered by Germans in individual and community initiatives “after” 
Willkommenskultur. Considering this initial aim, it is worth mentioning why I do not discuss 
in detail community initiatives to support refugees in Dresden. Despite being renowned for the 
far right, there were a number of initiatives in the city. There was, for instance, a theatre group 
called Montagscafé in Neustadt on Monday evenings; an ABC-Tische (ABC-tables) event 
hosted at a local museum where Germans were available for conversation practice; and there 
was a social evening hosted at the Pentecostal church in Striesen fortnightly. Most interesting 
was the Willkommen im Hochland initiative in the village of Pappritz, north-east of Dresden, 
which organised a whole set of activities to assist in bringing together local people and asylum 
seekers accommodated in a hotel in the village, in response to strong hostility among residents 
when conversion of the hotel began in 2014. Attending German classes was intended to prepare 
me for being able to participate in such initiatives, but as I spent more time with the people I 
met in language classes, I found few of my interlocutors got involved. One of the reasons for 
this is because many of the activities and programmes organised by organisations tended to be 




aimed at asylum seekers who did not receive funding from the state to learn German or support 
to look for work. To this extent, such initiatives were not an important part of the everyday 
lives of my interlocutors. Attending was also complicated by what remained my basic level of 
German, which limited the extent to which I was able to communicate with German 
participants and follow activities taking place. 
 
An Ausländer among Ausländer 
 
Anthropology is often defined by its method of participant observation, which is best 
summarised by DeWalt and DeWalt as learning about the “daily activities, rituals, interactions, 
and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of 
their life routines and culture” (2002, 1). It entails “deep hanging out” (Geertz 1998) over a 
normally long period which, as Fetterman writes, “helps the researcher internalise the basic 
beliefs, fears, hopes and expectations of the people under study.” (1989, 45) In spending 
considerable time with young Syrian and Palestinian men in Dresden, I aimed to inhabit and 
experience first-hand, as far as possible, the spaces where people spent time, the perceptions, 
aspirations and frustrations of differently situated people, and the lived experience of particular 
kinds of state interventions and the uncertainty of encounters with Germans. One advantage of 
participant observation over other social scientific methods is the way that it situates discourses 
in real, everyday life contexts, allowing scholars to compare what people say with what people 
do. It is in ethnography’s capacity to record chance conversations, spontaneous reactions and 
unpredictable events that provides a powerful analytical approach and what affords the analysis 
in the chapters that follow.  
During fieldwork, I tended to make notes on my phone from conversations taking place 
and observations of events and situations in order to remember the details, and afterwards I 
would write these up into fieldnotes. In some cases, this included full quotes when there was 
time and space to record these. As phones were such a present part of all our lives and we 
would constantly keep up to date through messages and voice recordings on WhatsApp, I 
would also discuss topics and points of interest in longer discussions over the phone and in 
voicemails during and after my fieldwork. In addition, I conducted more formal, unstructured 
interviews with a number of my interlocutors about specific, key themes that emerged during 
fieldwork. I also conducted interviews in German with the help of an interpreter with 
representatives from key institutions, including the Jobcenter, the Auslanderrat (Foreigners 
Office), organisers of a Maßnahme programme, as well as teachers on integration courses.  
27 
 
O’Reilly makes the point that participation and observation in participant observation 
is a “contradiction” (2005), which she later revised to a “dialectic” (2012). Both these terms 
point to the tension between participation (as an insider) and observation (as an outsider). This 
tension is something that all ethnographers face to varying degrees (Spadola 2011; Inge 2013), 
and I similarly faced the challenge of combining the intimacy and trust that made fieldwork 
enjoyable and rewarding with my status as a researcher. I often felt at risk of becoming 
maṣlaḥjī, meaning someone who takes advantage of someone else, and it was a term that my 
interlocutors would sometimes employ, jokingly, to describe the nature of our new and 
somewhat peculiar friendship, and the way that I had suddenly appeared from the UK and 
would at a point in the future return there. I therefore agree with what Coffey has noted as the 
way that ethnographers need to have discipline in order “to maintain fruitful fieldwork 
relations” (1999, 41), ensuring that the ethnographer takes steps to create the distance necessary 
to be able to conduct research. One way I achieved this was to invite my interlocutors to analyse 
observations, patterns and themes that emerged during my fieldwork, reflecting what Schielke 
(2015) has described as the way that conducting ethnography is an “open-ended conversation”.  
It is important to be aware of the impact of the researcher’s presence on research and 
how this influences findings (Davies 2008). Typically, anthropologists are newcomers to a 
community and slowly seek to negotiate inclusion into that community. In my case, I was a 
newcomer to Germany seeking to join a community of newcomers. I was, as my interlocutors 
would often tell me, as much an “Ausländer” (foreigner) in Dresden as they were. Indeed, I 
often responded with the same sense of surprise and uncertainty as my friends to aspects of life 
in Dresden, or a feature of German language (see also Mandel 2013). Furthermore, speaking 
Arabic in public put me in a similar position of outsiderness and there was a joke that I was 
trying to “integrate” with Arabs while everyone else was trying to “integrate” with Germans. 
To this extent I developed a degree of insiderness with my interlocutors based on certain 
common experiences of outsiderness in Dresden in a way that would have been difficult as a 
German researcher. One of the advantages of this was that I could be a soundboard for 
fascinating reflections on German society, and many of these feature in the chapters that follow.  
At the same time, however, I could occupy an ambivalent position, and despite being a 
fellow “Ausländer” I was also seen as “European”, as fitting in more easily, as moving around 
free of the stigma and discrimination they confronted, and as having a certain intuitive 
understanding of the society around us. To this extent, my status as a European insider certainly 
shaped many of my encounters, and there was no doubt that certain topics, perspectives and 
experiences were shared, or not shared, on the basis of this. In a discussion with one 
28 
 
interlocutor, Omar, for example, he said he did not want to talk to me about his relationship to 
his father because I was European and therefore I “wouldn’t understand”. I could also be the 
target of discourses of cultural superiority, as in the frequent comparison of the richness of 
Arabic and what my friends perceived as the relative poverty of German, English and other 
European languages. I shared some of the experiences of Vandevoordt (2017), who described 
his impression of how his conversations with Syrians in Belgium were framed by the fact that 
he was a Belgian citizen. However, my experience was varied; I was both the object of 
discourses that sought to assert dignity and deservingness in front of a “European”, but also 
developed the intimacy to see how such discourses could break down. To this extent, a great 
deal of the richness of the account that follow comes from the sharing of doubts, 
disappointments and self-deprecation among my interlocutors. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
 
The thesis begins by exploring the lived experience of labour market integration policies in 
Germany. Such policies were an important part of discourses among my interlocutors that 
sought to turn forced displacement into a form of migration that embodies masculine agency 
and a claim to “neoliberal citizenship”. In this chapter, I contrast different responses to the 
language programme and access to further education and training administered by the 
Jobcenter. This could represent different things for people from different socio-economic 
backgrounds and aspirations and expectations for the future. For those seeking white-collar 
work, or skilled blue-collar jobs, the programme was the embodiment of why Germany was a 
good place to migrate, offering opportunities to achieve masculine self-realisation and 
belonging. For those looking for “low-skilled work”, as well as aspiring traders and small 
business owners, however, a programme designed to facilitate pathways into work could be 
experienced as the largest obstacle to “becoming something” in Germany.   
Chapter 2 continues with a focus on the lived experience of state policies as the terms 
of inclusion and exclusion. While Germany could be seen by many as a place that provided 
opportunities to train and find work, it necessitated a period in which the state supported 
individuals, providing rent and a monthly stipend among other things. For many, this was 
experienced as a source of stigma that turned them into the emasculated figure of a “dependent 
refugee”. Similar to recent scholarship, I show attempts to deflect and overcome such stigma 
through masculinising strategies, such as “comparative strategies of self” which construct a 
hierarchy between the self and “abject others” as well as through discourses of reciprocity. 
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However, the chapter also expands much recent work by revealing how accessing welfare in 
encounters with the Jobcenter could constitute the site for asserting dignity. This is because 
welfare was seen as something to claim and to negotiate, turning the association of welfare 
from dependency and helplessness into a site of risk, strategy and resilience and entailing a 
process of making claims to rights.  
Chapter 3 considers how my interlocutors respond to the role of gender norms as terms 
of belonging in Germany, the so-called “integration imperative”. It resists a culturalising 
explanation for the often rigid rejection and public defiance of such norms by showing how 
refusing to “integrate” in sites such as the compulsory orienteering course could become a 
symbol of virtues of autonomy and authenticity and therefore a source of dignity in their 
stigmatised position as refugees in Germany. In contrast, to publicly assent to or practice such 
norms, “to be integrated”, could be rebuked as evidence of people who “assimilate” and “do 
not think for themselves”. However, precisely because responses were shaped by reaction to 
the “integration imperative”, there could be the expression of a very different discourse about 
gender relations in other contexts, offering terms by which to represent themselves as “modern” 
men who belong in Germany.  
Chapter 4 explores the consequences for my interlocutors of the prominence of the far 
right in Dresden. In doing so, it seeks to address an absence in the literature on the experience 
of refugees and ethnic minority groups of living in the vicinity of a vocal and active far-right. 
I distinguish between, on the one hand, everyday experiences of hostility and discrimination 
which were often associated with the far right and its sympathisers, and, on the other, the 
organised far right, in particular Pegida and AfD. For many of my friends, experiences of 
harassment and discrimination produced a sense of exclusion and powerlessness in which the 
best response was to keep a low profile and avoid trouble. This differed, however, to 
encountering the presence of far right movements or political parties which could be perceived 
as a fringe, “abject Other”, opening up a space for solidarity with the mainstream public that 
was otherwise difficult to achieve. Counter-intuitively, I argue, the far right could afford a 
space to assert and display “responsible masculinity” and make a claim as worthy citizens-to-
be in Germany.  
Chapter 5 focusses on friendship, sociality and what one interlocutor characterised as 
the “flavour of life” (ṭaʿm ilḥaya). It considers how my interlocutors valorised the importance 
of care and responsibility between friends, family and within communities as the expression of 
recent work on “emergent masculinity”. Going further than elucidating the “caring” side of 
men, the chapter shows how this was a source of dignity in contrast to the host society, in what 
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has been characterised as “reverse stigmatisation”. Yet while discourses of “reverse 
stigmatisation” are often seen as cementing difference and producing distance, I show how in 
the context of Dresden they could serve to open up space for refugees to contribute to the host 
society as a “gift” to give Germans. Ironically, however, at the same time as friendship and 
social relations take on new meaning and become a source of pride, they could become the 
object of mistrust and uncertainty as a result of the context of displacement.  
Chapter 6 explores differences between Syrians and Palestinians in relation to political 
activism in Dresden. Syrians often criticised activism as out of place in Germany, even as they 
expressed strong anti-regime sentiment in private. One reason for this is the way that 
campaigning for Syria was perceived to construct Syrians as forcibly displaced, refugee-
victims, in contrast to valorised figures of “citizens-to-be”. For Palestinians, however, 
campaigning for Palestine was often part and parcel of everyday life in Germany and was not 
problematised to the same extent because it was not seen to produce a tension between refugee 
identity and citizenship in Germany. Yet even as political activism for Palestinians was seen to 
embody masculine virtues and their rights as citizens-to-be, such activism could risk exclusion 
through its association with anti-Semitism and the way it could come to embody the figure of 
























Yasin, who is in his late fifties and from Syria, was telling me about things he did and did not 
like about Germany when we were sitting in the living room of the apartment he shared with 
his wife, Layla, and their son, Manar. Like many of my Syrian and Palestinian interlocutors, 
there were rules and restrictions he found surprising and disappointing when he arrived in 
Dresden, such as the rule that made it impossible to use the barbecue they bought close to their 
home. However, one thing Yasin appreciated in Germany was the way that they put a piece of 
wood to support a young tree to stop it growing at an angle or falling over in the wind. Almost 
all the trees have this support, he observed. In Syria, they don’t do this, and the trees grow at 
all angles, or they do it but the wood is so weak that it blows over in the wind and the tree falls 
over with it.  
 
Yasin’s observation about the wood that supports young trees is a good analogy for the 
perception of many of my interlocutors of the kind of support they receive from the state in 
Germany through a package of integration policies and access to social security. Germany’s 
Integration Act passed in August 2016 pledged to give refugees more and earlier opportunities 
to access integration classes and chances to enter work and training, while reducing benefits 
for those who do not fulfil their duties to learn German or apply for jobs. As part of this, 
Germany has made an “exemplary investment”, committing billions of dollars to refugee 
welfare and “hiring and training more than ten thousand new employees and German language 





possibilities of achieving social adulthood and, with it, inclusion in the state as productive 
members of society.  
Yet the analogy of wood supporting trees can also be extended. The same wood that 
helps a young tree stay upright and grow straight can also prevent it growing in different 
directions. It fixes the tree in its place and tries to get it to grow the way it should – the way 
that is preconceived by the state, or local authority, as being for its own good. In the case of 
the integration course, what could be experienced as supportive and the means of going the 
right direction in the future, could also be experienced as restrictive, preventing new 
opportunities and choices. Rather than enabling social adulthood and belonging, the support 
could lead Syrians and Palestinians in Germany to feel they were in the wrong place. In this 
chapter, I explore aspirations for the future of my interlocutors and how these intersected with 
the pathways offered by the state. Specifically, I explore how different classed aspirations for 
“masculine maturity” produced different responses to the programme of integration.  
There has been critique of traditional approaches to life-stages, in which youth is seen 
as part of a linear process of transition from one discrete phase to another often marked by 
certain “vital events”, such as marriage. Johnson-Hank has shown for her interlocutors in 
southern Cameroon that “the key transitions that might be seen as aspects of adulthood do not 
occur at the same time or in the same order; their occurrences are not highly correlated, and 
many of them are reversible” (2002, 869). There are, as Vigh notes, multiple ways to transition 
to adulthood, and some youth may not seek to transition to adulthood at all (2006). At the same 
time, however, caution about the inevitability of transitions from youth to adulthood does not 
mean that such transitions are not significant in people’s lives. This recognises that vital events 
are a powerful “emic reality” (Christiansen et al 2006, 14) and reflect “structural expectations” 
from family and society (Ghannam 2013). What this draws attention to is the process of 
transitioning to adulthood as an important source of aspiration for youth. In the case of many 
young Arab men, the markers of adulthood have been identified as “employment, home, 
marriage and socio-cultural knowledge of society” (Peteet 1994; Suerbaum 2017; Ghannam 
2013).  
Forced displacement does not necessarily change the pursuit of personal and social aims 
and expectations, and it is often unhelpful to draw a distinction between economic migrants 
and forced migrants (Jansen 2008). However, scholars have shown how protracted 
displacement can undermine these aims, or what Lovell has termed the “achievement of 





to adulthood as refugees and asylum seekers face “protracted and radical uncertainty” (Horst 
& Grabska 2015). Such uncertainty about the future, such as waiting to return or third-country 
resettlement, can lead to life stages “being put on hold” (El-Shaarawi 2015). Europe has for 
decades been the destination for migrants from Africa to seek to escape “social death” but 
without official refugee status, such migrants are unable to work legally and can face conditions 
of protracted poverty, violence and uncertainty (Lucht 2011; Gaibazzi 2013). In the case of 
migrants who gain refugee status in Europe, the focus has often been the challenges and loss 
of status suffered by middle-class men, both young and old, who can find their aspirations 
difficult to realise in the new context (Jansen 2008; Kleist 2010).  
In this chapter I focus on my interlocutors’ aspirations to find work and, with it, to have 
the means to cease to be “shabāb”, or youth, and reach what Osella and Osella (2000) have 
termed “masculine maturity”. There was often a sense of maturity that came from the journey 
to Germany, living alone and in some cases taking responsibility for younger siblings in the 
absence of parents (see also Suerbaum 2017). However, for almost all my friends, finding work 
and no longer relying on the Jobcenter for support were the terms by which they sought to 
“become men”. At the same time, finding work, or entering a training or education programme 
that would lead to work, was the site in which they articulated the claim to belong in Germany. 
This reflects what has been termed as a “neoliberal citizenship regime” (Vandevoordt & 
Verschragen 2019a), or “market citizenship” (Nawyn 2002), in which “contributing” rather 
than “taking” from the state is indicative of “deservingness” or “worthiness” to belong (Tobin 
2018). The connection between being productive men and claims to citizenship was embodied 
in terms for the right to remain in Germany, which included not receiving state support for two 
years, either through work or entering an education or training programme.  
In exploring aspirations to achieve social adulthood and belonging, I follow Appadurai 
who argues that anthropology has been focussed on “pastness” and that the ethnographic lens 
should be oriented towards aspiration, anticipation and imagination (2013). This leads us 
towards what has been termed the “near future”, which offers a view of “how people position 
themselves – cognitively, morally, spiritually and practically – to be open to future 
possibilities.” (Cooper & Pratten 2015, 12) It is precisely this positioning that I focus on in this 
chapter, as I explore how responses to labour market integration policies were conditioned by 
the nature of aspirations to achieve masculine maturity. These responses overlap with but also 
extend beyond class boundaries. On the one hand, I share the findings of McSpadden (1999) 





male Eritrean and Ethiopian interlocutors, where they could access language classes and further 
education. Among my interlocutors, men from often middle-class backgrounds could find the 
programme comprehensible and that it fit relatively unproblematically within a schema of 
learning and education as the means of proving oneself and finding skilled work. This was also 
often the case too for men looking to do an Ausbildung (vocational training) in order to become 
qualified in a skilled trade. On the other hand, those looking to enter lower-skilled or manual 
work, as well as men who aspired to be small business owners or traders, could experience the 
integration programme as limiting and therefore an obstacle to the fulfilment of their 
aspirations for the future and the possibility to belong in Germany. What I draw attention to 
therefore is the relationship between diverse aspirations for the “near future” and consequent 
responses to the integration programme as both the means and impediment to achieving social 
adulthood and belonging.  
 
“You need to become someone” 
 
Graw and Schielke (2012) suggest that a more appropriate image than a dinghy on the 
Mediterranean Sea for Sub-Saharan African migrants to Europe is the image of the house “built 
by the migrant, often higher than its surroundings and with walls of reinforced concrete or red 
brick… often empty for most of the year” (2012, 8). Their point is that migration to Europe is 
often oriented by migrants to being able to return to their hometown as socially recognised 
adults – to own a house and to get married. Although my friends did not discuss return to Syria, 
at least not any time soon, migration was often articulated in analogous terms to the house in 
the village: the pursuit of masculine maturity.  
Syrians and Palestinians in Dresden were often asked what they wanted to be in the 
future and there was rarely much doubt in people’s responses, reflecting the way that 
encounters with a supervisor at the Jobcenter, or discussions in language classes, or 
conversations with Germans in other contexts often seemed to include questions about the 
future. A number of my interlocutors would say they intended to become an “engineer” or a 
“doctor”, or a similar professional, high-skilled employment, and what for most of my friends 
was “men’s work”. These responses reflect what Inhorn and Isidoros have described as the 
process by which forced displaced men seek to turn displacement from a picture of helplessness 
and victimhood into a site of “pride and success” (2018). Migration in these accounts becomes 





discourse which serves to turn refugees into individuals seeking economic opportunity who 
chose to come to Germany. Indeed, for many of my interlocutors, coming to Germany was not 
a result of fleeing Syria directly but happened after spending years in countries such as Egypt, 
Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Coming to Germany certainly promised more security in terms 
of the right to remain and nationality, but it was primarily determined by the opportunities 
available to train, work and earn an income. Some knew a great deal about Germany and had 
hoped to migrate even before the outbreak of war, like a doctor I met who was able to start 
practising medicine soon after he was accepted as a refugee because he had spent years learning 
German in Syria. Most people did not describe having any intention of coming to Germany but 
regretted that when they knew they would migrate they had not begun making preparations in 





When my interlocutors discussed the reason to migrate to Germany they would sometimes 
avoid mentioning the conflict in Syria altogether. Jensen and Löfving have described how there 
is often a discourse of “moral distinction” among migrants who are forcibly displaced 
compared to “economic migrants” who “voluntarily” leave their place of origin (2007, 8). I 
often heard something similar and my friends would contrast themselves positively to migrants 






from Morocco, for example. There was a sense that people who migrated to Europe to look for 
work were in some respects morally suspect. Nonetheless, it was common to represent 
migration from Syria as being about a choice and the pursuit of new opportunities, as much if 
not more than fleeing the conflict in Syria. Some people would describe this as being about 
meeting women, but more common were the economic opportunities of coming to Germany. 
In fact, on a few occasions I watched debates between friends about the extent to which 
migration to Germany should foremost be classified as a consequence of the conflict, or a result 
of taking new opportunities for education, training and work. The debate centred on whether 
the initial cause for leaving Syria was the primary way of defining migration, or whether it was 
the decision to come to Germany itself from sites of secondary migration. In most cases, people 
agreed that conflict was the cause of leaving Syria in the first place, and the decision to come 
to Germany was the possibilities it offered for the future.  
Migration as a choice to achieve self-realisation, such as becoming a doctor or engineer, 
was intimately connected to opportunities in Germany. It was common for people to describe 
how in Germany “you have to become someone” because of the opportunities provided by 
access to training and education. This view was summed up by Suhail, who is in his mid-
twenties from eastern Syria and had completed his degree in Syria before fleeing to Germany 
in late 2015. He characterised the opportunities of being a registered refugee in Germany in the 
following terms, 
 
A refugee here needs to try to be better. Needs to do something better in his life. 
Needs to take something from this experience. In Lebanon, there is no work. The 
Lebanese don’t have work, so you look for any work. In Germany, you have lots of 
opportunities. You can go to university. You can find opportunities to work. You 
can do an Ausbildung. You feel your situation is better. 
 
In the view of Suhail, unlike the situation for Syrians in Lebanon, Germany offers opportunities 
for self-realisation, including university, work, or entering vocational education, managed 
through encounters with the supervisor at the Jobcenter. Suhail reflects what McSpadden 
(1999) has shown for her Somalian and Eritrean interlocutors in the US who aspired for the 
same high-status careers they aimed for before migrating, therefore showing how forced 
displacement did not lead to the expectation of a loss of status. However, this notion of 





with a degree from Syria and whose parents were professionals. I noticed that people from 
diverse backgrounds and who may not have anticipated going to university to study in fields 
such as engineering or medicine would describe similar intentions in Germany. Akram, for 
instance, who was in his early twenties and came from a small city in northern Syria would 
often describe his desire to become an airplane engineer. His aspiration was a jump in social 
status and represented the expectation of new opportunities in Germany.  
In contrast to what scholars have described as the “stuckness” experienced in 
displacement, my interlocutors could describe migration to Germany as a place where “you 
will have more of a future”. This reflects the kinds of opportunities that were associated with 
the integration programme. Since 2016, all refugees must attend a programme of “integration” 
in Germany which is overseen and managed by the Jobcenter on behalf of BAMF, Bundesamt 
für Migranten und Flüchtlinge (the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees). The Jobcenter 
is responsible in Germany for anyone who fulfils three criteria: poverty, the legal right to work, 
and the capacity to work at least 3 hours a day, 5 days a week. Phillippe Schäfer, who manages 
the migration division of the Jobcenter in Dresden, defined the role of the Jobcenter in an 
interview as first securing “a basic standard of living” (Lebensunterhalt), and second getting 
people into work as a way to take people out of “need” (Bedürftigkeit). These two 
responsibilities are tied together as funding for accommodation, healthcare costs, language 
training and the monthly stipend are given on condition of participation in, and completion of, 
processes of finding a job. When someone joins the Jobcenter, whether refugee, migrant or 
German citizen, they are asked to sign a contract in which they commit to actions such as 
preparing job applications and attending interviews.  
The focus of the state for enabling access to the workplace for refugees begins with 
assistance to learn German. The Integrationskurs (integration course) provides classes from 
A1 to B1 of the Common European Framework and includes the three-week orienteering 
course. Each class is 200 hours long and takes about two months to complete followed by a 
test which needs to be completed in order to enter the next level, and everyone is strongly 
encouraged by consultants at the Jobcenter to complete this programme. Schäfer explained, “In 
the beginning no one can speak the language, so they all have to learn the language. The better 
or the further your language develops, it is now time to look, what do you have for an 
education?” Following language classes, Jobcenter claimants are encouraged to pursue further 
education and training if they do not have evidence of qualifications because of the difficulty 





                    
If I have no qualifications, if I am untrained, then there are simply not the places 
where I can earn 2,500 euros… you have to teach the young person that it is better 
to get an education even if it takes longer, but in the long term, of course, leads me 
to lead a problem-free life. 
 
What this shows is that the Jobcenter places emphasis on learning German and afterwards 
entering training and further education. Completing the stages of the language programme was 
the measure of progress for the Jobcenter towards determining options for training and 
education. It is therefore unsurprising that many of my interlocutors saw language as essential 
to “becoming something” in Germany. As one friend, Noor, who struggled to learn German 
and failed the B1 test, told me one day when we were on the tram home from the B1 class: 
“language is like the key to Germany” (Il-lugha yakūn mtl il-miftaḥ l-almānya).  
One important symbol of progress was reflected in language certificates. These would 
be shared with family, a girlfriend, as well as social groups in Dresden and Germany. The 
messages would often be a single picture of the certificate, which in the case of the B1 and B2 
certificates showed the final result and a breakdown of the different parts of the exam - reading, 
writing, listening and speaking. Learning German was often a feature of my friends’ 
representation of their progress in Germany, reflecting what Amara (2018) has described in the 
context of Palestinians learning Hebrew in Israel as the “bragging factor”, in which mastering 
Hebrew affords social prestige as a result of its association with power and modernity. On the 
phone to parents or a girlfriend, it was common for someone to reference a particular instance 
in which they commanded the language in an everyday situation or received recognition from 
a German person.  
In the event of not passing a test, however, there could be a powerful sense of failure 
and regret. This was the case for Omar, who was in his early twenties from a city in eastern 
Syria and whose father was a doctor. Much to his surprise and everyone else’s in our class, he 
failed the B1 language test and I met up with him shortly after he found out. He said, “when 
they told me, I forgot how to speak German […] I just said, wie… wie… (how… how…).” For 
Omar, who aspired to study medicine and become a doctor like his father, failing the test was 
a big blow. He described failing as one of the worst things that had happened to him since he 
got to Germany and situated it in a sequence of events that included the death of his girlfriend 





be unable to call his mother to tell her that he passed and make her proud and he was 
disappointed with his friends Khalid and Jessica who had collected their results at the same 
time, who he described as laughing and joking and talking about their future. Omar told me his 
anxieties about his Arab friends finding out he had failed and he refused to turn on his phone 
to avoid speaking to anyone. In the particular context of Germany, language played a key role 
in asserting the claim to competency and managing the new environment. In fact, although he 
didn’t tell me, I saw the lengths at which Omar sought to keep “face” when I met a mutual 
friend of ours, Rami. He mentioned that he had seen Omar and he had told him that he passed 
the B1 test! 
The progress embodied in attaining different language levels was not only about 
pathways to masculine maturity, they were also essential to the process of negotiating inclusion 
in Germany.  
 
The Right to Remain  
 
The conversations of my interlocutors were often preoccupied with the question of what needed 
to be done by when in order to guarantee the right to remain (qadm lijuʾ). The terms for the 
right to remain were often described as clear and well-defined but I noticed that my 
interlocutors often had contrasting ideas about what they included. There were variations about 
the required language level and number of years in work or training. Nonetheless, it always 
entailed achieving a particular language level, no longer receiving support from the Jobcenter, 
and a clean criminal record. The extent to which this was such a source of discussion reflects 
the level of speculation about the impact of different factors, such as the difference between 
Palestinians and Syrians (see Chapter 6), and comparisons between Germany and other states 
in Europe.  
The terms of the right to remain reflect what Ong has described as the way that 
citizenship is “increasingly associated with neoliberal criteria” (Ong 2006, 6). Neoliberalism 
refers to the process of governing with a market rationality and is associated with attacks on 
big government and the bureaucratic welfare state. As a political philosophy it sees the market 
as better than the state in distributing public resources and fosters individualism and 
competitiveness. The consequences of neoliberalism is de-regulation, the growth of flexible 
working, reduction in public spending and public assets, and the liberalisation of capital 





considers neoliberalism in Foucauldian terms as a “mode of political optimisation” (Ong 2006, 
3). Ong identifies two such “optimising technologies”: “technologies of subjectivity”, meaning 
that citizens optimise their knowledge in order to be competitive in the market-place, and 
“technologies of subjection”, regulating populations in order to increase their productivity. As 
Hilgers writes, “The self is developed and conceived of as an enterprise in a competitive 
framework that leads individuals to manage themselves in accordance with the logic of the 
market.” (2011, 358). The neoliberal subject is encouraged not to make claims on the state, but 
rather to become an “enterprising citizen-subject”. Syrians in Jordan, for example, are expected 
to conform to the neoliberal ideal that refugees are “contributors” not “takers” from the local 
and national economy (Tobin 2018). It is in this context that we see the emergence of a 
“neoliberal citizenship regime” in Europe (Vandevoordt & Verschragen 2019a, 43), in which 
“deservingness” is associated with financial autonomy and acceptance of local cultural norms, 
or cultural assimilation, often proven through passing tests.  
The role of learning German was important in estimations of the terms of the right to 
remain because passing B1 level of German and completing the orienteering course was one 
of its requirements. Learning German was also seen as the means to enter work and training 
and was therefore the terms by which to become autonomous from the Jobcenter. The 
association between learning German and the right to remain is reflected in comments by Omar 
after he eventually passed the B1 exam. Months after he failed, he re-took the exam without 
telling anyone using his own money, rather than face a delay of a number of months to be able 
to re-take the exam with funding from the Jobcenter. When he excitedly told me about passing, 
he conveyed his strong conviction that things were now back on track. In fact, he had come to 
see failing the exam as fate, which enabled him to join the Abitur (A-level) programme. He 
told me when we sat together to discuss the programme, “There is a year and a half before my 
visa is extended. By then I will have C1 and I will be away from the Jobcenter, then I can stay 
forever! Anyone bad (mw kwiyys) will be thrown out”, and he flicked his hand away. For Omar, 
failing the B1 exam had been a barrier on his path to self-realisation. At the same time, his 
comment shows that failing the exam was bound-up with terms of inclusion and citizenship in 
Germany and the right to remain. After he passed the exam, he could confidently assert his 
right “to stay forever”, and he distinguished himself from “anyone bad” – anyone incapable of 
learning German, or of bad character, or both, as the two could often be closely linked. His 
discourse reflects what Monforte et al. (2019) describe as the way that migrants endorse the 





What this shows is the complementarity between notions of achieving manhood and 
fulfilling the terms of the right to remain. This is brought together in the anxieties about finding 
work of one of my interlocutors, Mohammed. Mohammed had completed a degree before 
coming to Germany but was unable to validate it and therefore felt that he had to begin again. 
One evening at his apartment after the federal elections in September 2017 when the far-right 
AfD entered the Bundestag with a dramatic 12.6% of the vote, largely on the basis of an anti-
refugee and so-called “anti-Islamisation” discourse, he explained to me that he was determined 
to find an Ausbildung and to study a subject related to economics, such as accountancy. The 
attraction of such a course was that he would be able to work as quickly as possible. He told 
me, 
 
I just want to become something. I am 25, and I feel like I have achieved nothing 
in my life, nothing. I just want to go the fastest way towards getting a job […] My 
degree is worthless. And now I am worried that if I don’t get a job quickly, they 
will throw me out of the country, you saw how AfD got a majority here in Saxony.  
 
What Mohammed’s anxieties reflect is the interconnection between “becoming something”, 
through finding work, and the right to remain. He not only wanted to find work as quickly as 
possible because he is in his mid-twenties and feels he has yet to achieve something in life, but 
also because this is the condition of remaining in Germany. He worries that not finding work 
and supporting himself will result in being “thrown out of the country” by a resurgent far-right. 
Despite his anxieties and frustration of being unable to verify his degree, succeeding in 
Germany’s programme of integration was the means of becoming something and negotiating 
the right to remain.  
Omar and Mohammed both endorsed the state’s terms of inclusion despite their 
uncertainties. They saw that learning German and getting access to a training programme 
offered the means to achieve masculine maturity and to negotiate their inclusion in the 
neoliberal citizenship regime. Not everyone was so confident about the state’s mechanism for 
inclusion, however. For many, there remained a lingering sense of doubt, and my friends would 
weigh up the likelihood of being sent back to Syria. As a “European” who might be able to 
offer some insight, I would often find myself put on the spot in these conversations when 
someone asked, “Philip, they won’t send us back, will they?” Suhail encapsulated this 





in Germany, which I introduced as the way in which Germany was the site of pathways to 
manhood through access to training and education rather than being forced into low-paid work. 
After a meeting at which he was told the Jobcenter would not fund him to do the B2 language 
course and he instead needed to do the six-month Maßnahme - a programme that provides 
training in German and skills for looking for work - which he, like most people I spoke to, 
considered a waste of time, he told me: 
  
It is still early. You need to think about the fact that they might tell you, that’s it. 
Maybe they will not give you the visa. You might have to return to Syria […] I will 
try to do things right. But I explained to you I don’t like to think about the future a 
lot, it is because not everything will happen as I want it to. 
 
In late 2017, therefore, there remained uncertainty about people’s future in Germany, which 
was exacerbated by the success of the anti-immigration AfD in the 2017 federal elections. 
Striving in language programmes especially was the site of both “becoming something” as well 
as negotiating inclusion – “trying to do things right”, as Suhail says, in order to fulfil 
expectations of the state. Yet if this was the case for many of my interlocutors, for others the 
language classes and programme of integration were experienced as a site of exclusion. Rather 
than the wood supporting a young tree, it could be seen as a straitjacket.  
 
“The certificate? My dick.” 
 
Laith and I would meet at his apartment or a small bar at the bottom of the building next door 
to drink beer. He is from a village in the west of Syria and is in his early twenties. Before 
leaving Syria he had opened his own hairdressing salon with money from his father, but now 
he needed to do a number of years language learning and training to be able to get the necessary 
qualifications to be able to open a salon in Germany. It was in this context that Laith at a point 
during most the evenings we spent together would become serious and without prompting 
explain what “Germany” is doing wrong with refugees. I sensed this was cathartic for him and 
offered a means of justifying a way of life he described as “lazy” (kslān) and “disgusting” 
(wiskh) because of his messy apartment and habit of staying out late. He explained, “All Syrians 
have knowledge and competency of a trade”, but in Germany “they are being made to sit” (lāzm 





such a discussion that Laith once explained to me that he was a more capable hairdresser than 
Germans, saying, “I didn’t study how to cut hair, but I am better than a hundred European 
hairdressers who have a certificate! The certificate? My dick (ziby).” One example of how he 
distinguished himself from European hairdressers was through not using the hair clipper, unlike 
German hairdressers, which he complained does not look good.  
What Laith conveyed is his technical mastery as a hairdresser in contrast to Germans 
despite, or rather because of, his lack of a “certificate”. His frustration with being unable to 
open a salon is not simply the time and difficulty of getting the necessary qualifications because 
of the challenge of learning German to B2 level, but also the assumption in Germany that such 
qualifications are necessary or desirable. What he dismissively refers to as “the certificate” 
(ilshahadeh) produces hairdressers who rely on the blunt instrument of the hair clipper. Laith, 
on the other hand, is capable of making anyone look like any picture they bring. Such an 
extravagant display of his own capabilities in contrast to German hairdressers can be read as 
“reverse stigmatisation” by someone whose capabilities are not recognised in the host society 
and is unable to work (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of “reverse stigmatisation”). This kind of 
defence and valorisation of the capabilities of Syrians was common among my friends. For 
instance, Syrian doctors were often compared favourably to German doctors. I was told a 
number of times that while German doctors are slow and rely on blood tests and complex 
machines, Syrian doctors are much more intuitive and capable of telling you what is wrong 
from a few simple observations and tricks.   
Alongside cynicism about learning and education in Germany, there were other 
opinions. When I asked friends the best thing about German society, they would often reply 
that it was the culture of learning. Laith, for example, said this was one of the things he admired 
in Germany, and gave the example of Germans reading books on public transport. However, 
the culture of learning was seen to come at the expense of being competent with your hands. 
One image of moral distinction I was told was that Arabs, unlike Germans, intuitively learn a 
range of practical skills through spending holidays from school helping their father, brother or 
uncle to do skilled work, such as plumbing, construction, or car maintenance. One interlocutor, 
Hasan, who is Palestinian from Syria and worked as a butcher in one of the new Arab 
supermarkets in Dresden, explained this to me one evening when we talked at Khalid’s house. 
In a long discussion about the difference in culture and society between Syria and Germany, 
he talked about how Germans, unlike Syrians, do not know how to use their hands. I quote 






They complained that in Germany everyone just studies. You see people who are 
20 years old and don’t know how to do anything. They don’t learn with their hands. 
Studies? They are not important. What’s important is that you know how to do 
things with your hands. This is what finds you work and is useful.  
  
For Hasan, what matters is the capacity to be able to do things with your hands, which is learnt 
through the way of life of working class boys and young men in Syria. He told me that he learnt 
skills in construction from working with his father during holidays from school, which he 
contrasted to Germans who take time off during holidays. He boasted, “If you were to give me 
the equipment and materials, I could build you a house right now.” At which point, the others 
in the group laughed and made fun of him, in part, I think, because of Hasan’s reputation for 
drinking and smoking hashish. Nonetheless, there was a broadly shared working-class, 
masculine ideal of work, toil and productivity which contrasted learning through “doing” with 
other male family members to the formal education of Germans.  
This ideal evokes the figure of the “master” in Elyachar’s study of workshops and 
microenterprises in the region of El-Hirafiyeen in Cairo. The knowledge of a master is the 
result of learning over a lifetime and is the embodiment of a shaʿbi, or popular, ideal of the 
masculine man. She writes, “the master [who] begins to gain his mastery as a child worker 
(sabi) becomes a man in the biological, social and professional senses of the word.” (2011, 
101) What Elyachar describes about the ideal of competency of the master shares with the 
discourse of Laith, Hasan and others. In fact, one such master described by Elyachar, Ibrahim, 
who is able to diagnose the problem with any car just by listening to it as it enters the garage 
from his office, is similar to how Laith described the competencies of his friend’s father. He 
told me a story about how a wealthy German thought that his expensive Volkswagen was 
broken but the father of his friend, who is unable to work in Germany, was able to fix it when 
no German could.  
Elyachar explains that the figure of the master is constructed through “social power” in 
a “habitus performed by masters daily in a network of relations with workers, family members, 
customers and officials.” (Ibid, 101) This social power is reflected in the way that the master 
is inseparable from the workshop, so when a master says “I”, it could be himself or the 
workshop, showing how it is embedded in his person. Mastery is transmitted across generations 





notes, the most important thing a master can pass on is often “goodwill” with customers rather 
than know-how, which is liable to change. This social power was invoked by Laith in the 
process of being hired; in contrast to the kinds of alienation and bureaucracy and superficiality 
of what Laith dismissed as “the certificate”, he described an ideal of the competency of the 
master in being able to judge and appraise through a look, and finding work as embedded in a 
known social world. He said, 
 
Here you can’t work unless you have an Ausbildung. In Syria, there is none of this 
talk (mafī hada l-ḥakī). You go to a guy, “ya muʿlim, Philip wants to work at your 
place. Is it possible?” He looks at you like this [he looked me up and down].  
“Yes, I want someone. OK, come work.”  
“But I don’t know how to work.”  
“No problem. Come and I will teach you.” 
 
Laith’s description of how the “master” (or muʿlim) would look an apprentice up and down 
shows a very different mode of appraisal to the system in Germany. Rather than relying on a 
certificate, he is able to employ someone based on a look. Laith also depicts an ideal of society 
in which the master “is known, a neighbour or family friend, as opposed to the distance, 
alienation and indifference associated with certificates and job applications. Laith therefore 
problematises the integration programme according to a working-class ideal of “mastery” 
which emphasises “situated learning” and the role of the apprentice, and work that is embedded 
in social relationships. However, critique was not only on the basis of proper notions of learning 
and finding work shared by working class men with a trade. It was shared by others who saw 
it as limiting their freedom to pursue opportunities in the flux of everyday life in Germany.    
 
A Shop of One’s Own 
 
It was common for my friends to characterise Syrians as natural traders who are able to squeeze 
out economic opportunities from any context. This is a discourse that is shared in other 
contexts, such as among Syrian refugees in Egypt (Suerbaum 2016) and in Jordan (Tobin & 
Alahmed 2019). In Germany, however, the state’s policies of integration could be seen as 
restricting such “natural” propensity to trade and start businesses and with it pathways to 





and flexibility that allowed them to seize new opportunities. Like others, Talal hoped to own a 
shop or small business in Dresden. Talal is Palestinian from Syria and left Syria when he was 
young after a period doing various informal jobs in Lebanon. In a conversation with Talal about 
work one day, he described to me what he considered as “real” work. He explained that the 
common “mini-job”, where work was limited to 15 hours a week, or the “1-euro job”, 
compulsory work for someone not attending the integration course or doing any other education 
or training, was not real work. For Talal, real work was “private work” (shugl khāṣ), 
 
Not working for someone, or working for a company, or anything else. Something 
private to you. You open a shop, or a small company; even if you have a car and 
you work with it. 
 
Talal articulates what Rabo (2005) has identified as the place of a “shop of one’s own” as the 
embodiment of masculine aspiration. Rather than training to find work in a company, which is 
the pathway Talal sees as the inevitable consequence of the opportunities provided by the 
Jobcenter, Talal conceptualises being your own boss as real work. Talal had begun his own 
small business organising events for the Arab community in Dresden on occasions such as 
engagement parties, weddings and birthdays. However, this did not yet match his ideal of real 
work because he did not own the venues where he performed and was always hosted by his 
clients. He explained this would be work “when I rent a venue for a year or five years, and I 
arrange everything, and I am responsible.” Real work is when you do not suffer the uncertainty 
of being an employee, conforming to the ideal of being an independent, masculine man. What 
Talal describes shares considerable similarity to owning a shop among traders in Aleppo as a 
mark of being “honourable, reputable, independent and settled men”. But this is not reserved 
to traders, “all in Aleppo have become aspiring market men. But a shop of one’s own has 
become a global aspiration.” (Rabo 2005, 170) 
My interlocutors would valorise people who had opened shops in Dresden, often 
individuals who had been living in the city for some time. When friends talked about opening 
businesses, it was in most cases a food shop, a café, a ḥilwīyāt shop (patisserie), a shisha lounge, 
or a restaurant. Bassem, for example, who came from what he described as a wealthy family in 
eastern Syria through his father’s work in the oil industry, was keen to become a trader in the 
future, plying his wares from Canada to Germany to Egypt, where he had spent time before 





Arabia and its allies in mid-2017, that he wanted to contact a number of local farmers around 
Dresden to arrange for the sale of German livestock to Qatar. He also described his ambition 
and hopes for opening a café or restaurant in Dresden. This came up one time when we walked 
along the banks of the River Elbe and he said suddenly, “I am very upset with myself”. He 
pointed across the river to the construction of a large white tent on the opposite bank which he 
assumed was the idea he had been nurturing for some time of constructing a riverside café. He 
wanted to build a place similar to what you find in Istanbul, “A place where you can come and 
sit with your girlfriend and watch the small boats go by, something romantic.”  
A number of my friends became involved in the plans of a relative, family member or 
friend to open a new shop, restaurant or café. Akram, for instance, hosted his cousin from 
Hamburg for several days while he explored the potential for opening a shisha shop in Dresden, 
where renting shop space was considerably more affordable than in Hamburg. It was not only 
people who already had access to capital who imagined such ventures. In late 2017, in a matter 
of weeks it seemed that almost all of my friends had got hold of, or applied for, access to a 
credit card, after it had recently become known that a Swiss bank would provide cards to 
refugees. The cards were useful for many things, but among them was the possibility to build 
up credit for a project in the future and there were accounts of enterprising individuals who got 
a credit card and borrowed and returned money continuously in order to build up the amount 
they could borrow. I was told about a Syrian man in Munich, the cousin of someone I knew, 
who now had access to 7000 euros which he planned to use to begin a small food shop. The 
card could become the object of hope, of future plans and a mode of reckoning with a sense of 
stuckness.  
There was often a tension between my friends who aspired to set up a business and to 
fulfil the figure of an independent small trader and entrepreneur, and the pathways offered by 
the Jobcenter. Rami was one of the sharpest critics of the programme of integration and the 
Jobcenter, which he dubbed “studies, studies, studies”. Rami is in his early thirties and is 
Palestinian from Syria. He had held a number of jobs in various businesses and lines of work 
before migrating to Germany, including his uncle’s perfume shop in Dubai. He would often 
enjoy talking about ideas for a business, and one such idea that often came up during the 
evenings I spent cooking and talking with Rami at his apartment on the top floor of a tower 
block was his idea set up a bikini shop on a beach in Greece. The business would initially just 
sell bikinis, he would joke, but then it could expand to include a bar and a small restaurant 





would be good quality, but cheap, their price being kept down by buying in bulk. There were 
several iterations of Rami’s vision as an independent business owner in the future, but it tended 
to come back to the bikini shop in Greece.  
At one point Rami put into practice his entrepreneurial ambition by beginning a “black” 
business in Dresden with his friend. I first learnt about the project overhearing a phone call he 
made one evening when we were sitting together watching German documentaries and 
drinking coffee. The plan was to buy kitchens online and quickly resell them, joining what was 
a lively trade in Dresden using websites such as Ebay Kleinanzeigen (a local Ebay site), or 
Facebook groups such as “Syrians in Dresden”. The difference with this business compared to 
others, Rami explained to me, was the scale. Others took one kitchen a week but he and his 
business partner aimed to buy a kitchen a day. They had contact with a Moroccan man who 
owned a van and would pick up the kitchen and deliver it to a storage place for twenty euros. 
They would clean the kitchen, make it look presentable and then put it online for a higher price, 
targeting Germans rather than Arabs because they would be willing to spend more. The issue 
was to find an affordable storage space and this was the topic of the conversation I overheard. 
Over the coming months, Rami was often busy picking up a kitchen, arranging transport, and 
going to the garage they eventually found in order to sell a kitchen to a client. His partner, who 
spoke and wrote German better, did the more time-consuming work of selecting kitchens, 
preparing adverts, and negotiating the price and viewings. It was a striking distinction to the 
kinds of inertness and fatigue of Rami in language classes. Rather than “studies, studies, 
studies” he was mobilising social capital, forging networks and discussing logistics.   
For Rami and others, this aspiration was at odds with the means and possible futures 
offered by the integration programme. The Jobcenter offered a different kind of future – a long 
and slow process to access the job market. He would often say that “we don’t have time to 
study” when he complained about the limitations of the integration programme as the pathway 
to self-realisation. He meant the several years learning German and accessing education was 
too slow, but it also went beyond this; for Rami, classes and education isolated him from the 
risk and immediacy of opportunities outside the classroom. Rami would talk about wanting to 
find any work, which would seem to encapsulate what Donaldson and Howson (2009) 
identified as the way male migrants and refugees will look for any work in order to fulfil a 
masculine role in the home. Yet I interpret Rami’s aspiration differently. He was not motivated 
by a determination to leave the Jobcenter for permanent low-paid work, but rather the chance 





the environment and people, and develop the skills, knowledge and capital he needed. As an 
aspiring entrepreneur who valorised the figure of the autonomous self-made individual, 
opportunities for self-realisation offered by the Jobcenter isolated him from the productive 
uncertainty of seeking work (Cooper & Pratten 2015). 
The example that was often invoked and valorised by Rami and others who saw their 
future as business owners and entrepreneurs was that of previous migrants, such as Turkish 
guest workers, or Gastarbeiter. While in German public discourse there is a strong notion of 
Turkish-Germans forming an underclass in society, constituting the “abject Other” to the liberal 
German nation (Ewing 2012), in the perspective of some of my interlocutors, Turkish-Germans 
were a model to emulate. The contemporary Turkish-German community was seen as 
achieving success and wealth, they had opened businesses, become well-known sportspeople 
and even entered politics, such as the leader of the Green Party, Cem Özdemir. Unlike 
contemporary refugees, these successful migrants were not forced to sit in an integration course 
but rather came to Germany to work and became successful doing so.  
This came up one evening when I visited Rami and a friend of his called Fuad also 
came over. Fuad’s uncle had lived in Germany for many years and he contrasted his experience 
of looking for work with his uncle. He told us,  
 
It is a big mistake [the integration course]. It only started in 2010. My uncle did it 
then after 30 years being in Germany! If you look at the Tunisians, or Turks, they 
didn’t study the language, but they all speak the language now. My uncle doesn’t 
know how to write, and he opened a falafel factory.  
 
As urban Palestinian-Damascenes, and as refugees, Fuad and Rami do not share much with the 
Turkish labourers who came to Germany as guest workers from rural Anatolia in the 1960s and 
1970s. Instead, the image of the Turkish guest worker becomes populated with their aspirations 
to use guile, independence and hard work to achieve self-realisation, and the embodiment of 
the limitations and strictures of pathways to self-realisation and social adulthood offered by the 
integration programme. Fuad’s Palestinian uncle, who never had to do the integration 
programme, reflects this, having eventually established his own falafel factory, an ideal of 
entrepreneurialism and masculine self-realisation.  
It has long been recognised that labour market integration policies in western European 





face completing language and training programmes to find work in the host country. This is 
the argument of a controversial article in Die Welt in 2015 titled, “Two-thirds can barely read 
or write”. In the article, German economist Ludger Wößmann argues for the need to create 
schemes for alternative access to the workplace that don’t depend on completing educational 
programmes in Germany. He makes this case based on the claim that 60% of Syrians have not 
completed basic school education and he backs this up with historic figures for refugees in 
Germany that show the majority tend to have less education and lower host-country language 
preparation than labour migrants. He cites figures showing that at least half of the refugees 
studying an Ausbildung in Munich failed the programme in 2015. The language programme 
could be a challenge for many of my friends, and the majority of people in the B1 class I 
attended failed the exam first time around. Yet, what the examples above show is the extent to 
which one of the major reasons that people did not engage with the programme of integration 
was the sense that the process and the future it offered did not accord with their gendered and 
classed aspirations for the future.  
What emerges for both Laith and Rami is in striking contrast to what Sarah Tobin and 
Maisam Alahmed describe in the case of Syrians in Jordan, where Syrians face the opposite 
problem. Rather than being “forced to sit” in integration programmes that seek to enable 
Syrians and Palestinians to access education and training, their reputation as hard-workers in 
Jordan, something shared by Jordanian society, the government and NGOs, becomes the source 
of their exploitation. Notions that Syrians naturally enjoy hard work and are good at it “serve 
to normalize the idea that Syrians can, should be, and will be abused in their employment, and 
that this is an expected and anticipated occurrence.” (Tobin & Alahmed 2019, 32) This leads 
to limitations in the kind of employment they can access, something many Syrians find 
frustrating. In Jordan, Syrians are not “prevented” from getting work, but this has its own 
limitations.   
 
Hopes that Migrate  
 
The integration programme was therefore not seen as offering the means by which to “become 
something” for Laith, Rami and others, but rather seemed designed to prevent them from being 
able to find work and reach social adulthood and to exclude them from belonging. In the same 
conversation at Laith’s apartment which I referred to above, he complained about his sense of 






Everyone who comes from Syria has a trade and knows how to do something well 
[…] Germany needs to make use of this. At the moment we are all sitting. We take 
money from the Jobcenter and nothing. We don’t give anything back. They don’t 
ask for anything back. 
 
Here Laith articulates his exclusion from the neoliberal citizenship regime in which being 
economically productive is the terms by which to negotiate one’s “deservingness”. The process 
of sitting and receiving money during the integration classes serves as the site of exclusion 
from citizenship in Germany because “they don’t ask for anything back”. He told me about a 
carpet maker from Aleppo he met in Dresden who used to own 12 factories and was producing 
the finest carpets in Syria. In Germany, however, the man is unable to work because of the 
need to learn the language. When I suggested that perhaps it was reasonable that he needed to 
speak German, Laith picked up a bottle and thundered back, “someone who makes bottles 
doesn’t need to speak German; he just makes bottles. He doesn’t need to talk to the bottles!” 
Laith’s account of the way in which he and others, such as the Aleppan carpet maker, are not 
allowed to pay Germany back, shares with how Vandevoordt and Verschragen have 
conceptualised citizenship as a “gift” (2019a). They explain the determination of Syrian 
refugees not to accept their social right to receive welfare as reflecting the way that such rights 
are experienced as a “gift” they are unable to “return” because of the difficulty of finding well-
remunerated work, therefore placing them in a position of moral subordination.  
The result of the challenge or limitations to their particular pathways to masculine 
maturity was a sense of exclusion from the state. In his work with migrants from Guinea-Bissau 
in Portugal, Vigh (2009) describes how his interlocutors suffer “the impossibility of gaining a 
worthy life”. He writes, “hope in such situations does not necessarily die out but migrates — 
ahead of the migrants that follow it” (105). His interlocutors come to see Portugal as a 
“trampoline” and imagine migrating elsewhere. In contrast to Vigh’s case, however, where 
migrants do not have the legal right to work and find themselves trapped in low-paid and 
insecure work, Laith sought to escape what he perceived as integration policies which denied 
his freedom to work. He contrasted his situation in Germany to relatives in the US who he saw 
quickly entering work often through contacts from his village in Syria, typically in food stores 
and restaurants, generating what he saw as self-sufficiency and autonomy. Laith found this 





being seen as the terms by which to optimise his participation in the job market in Germany, 
the integration programme was experienced as preventing his participation. He did recognise 
that such a scheme was effective for people entering skilled, high status work, telling me, 
“Germany is good if you want to be a doctor or an engineer, but not if you are like me.” For 
people like him, Germany seemed to offer obstructions to work and therefore belonging.  
This sense of exclusion was shared by others, such as Rami, who also saw opportunities 
to find work and to become independent elsewhere. For Rami, integration classes were 
experienced as preventing him from accessing opportunities offered by work. This was a 
vicious circle, because the expectation of employers that people complete the programme also 
made it difficult to find low-paid, low-skilled work without it. While the integration programme 
foreclosed particular futures, there were limited opportunities to find work without the 
language skills and training that it offered. In part, this was a particular problem in Dresden, as 
Phillippe Schäfer, manager of the integration division of the Jobcenter, told me, there was a 
high demand for low-paid and low-skilled work in Dresden which made it difficult for migrants 
who don’t speak German to compete. Some months after I left Dresden, Rami did find work 
cleaning rooms at a hotel. However, the anti-social hours and abuse from management led him 
to give it up after a couple of months. Rami imagined migrating to Canada where, he told me, 
his friends “were allowed to find work”. In similar terms to Laith, he saw Canada as a place 
where the state offered proper means of inclusion by enabling newcomers to work and, in the 
process, fulfil expectations of self-realisation and the terms of neoliberal citizenship. Rami 
would often complain that life in Germany was “complicated” when he talked about the need 
for a particular level of language and certificates and the extent of bureaucracy. I sensed that 
migration to Canada was seen as offering the chance to escape this complexity and achieve 
self-realisation in familiar terms. Others talked about migration to UK, which was imagined as 
similar to the US, where the state offered little assistance on the basis that migrants use their 
own resources to find work. This reflects what Nielsen (2004) has shown in the case of Somalis 
who migrate from Denmark to the UK, in part because of the long integration and language 
programmes in Denmark that are felt to prevent access to the workplace.  
The perspective of Laith and Rami contrasts to the comparison drawn by McSpadden 
(1999) between Sweden and the US for migrants, where the former provides better 
opportunities through integration programmes. In the case of Laith and Rami, such mechanisms 
of welfare could be experienced as barriers to both manhood and citizenship. This draws out 





invested their aspirations for the future in completing the integration programme, and “people 
like him”. This provides ethnographic expression to what has been noted as the limits to the 
“the emergence of a kind of ‘standard package’” in labour market integration support measures 
in Europe (Martin et al. 2016, 9). Experts have suggested greater flexibility in integration 
policies and urge more immediate and alternative access to the labour market. They note that 
“self-employment is an important option in becoming independent from state subsidies and in 
improving social status”, but in Germany “up until now self-employment has hardly been 




There were complex responses among Syrian and Palestinian refugees to the pathways to 
masculine maturity and inclusion offered by the state in Germany. Labour market integration 
policies were seen by many from both middle and working class backgrounds as bound-up 
with the means of turning forced displacement into a site of masculine accomplishment. This 
could be fraught with uncertainty and frustration, through failing a language test, for example, 
or enduring anxiety about being able to remain in Germany. Nonetheless, the pathway offered 
by such policies was invested with aspirations for the future, as mature men, and the terms of 
inclusion. For others, such as men from working-class backgrounds with a trade, the integration 
programme could be experienced as a barrier to achieving social adulthood and the site of 
exclusion. The formalities of the programme of language learning and vocational education 
could be seen to offend proper pathways to finding work, which centred on the valorised figure 
of the “master” and “situated learning”. In the case of aspiring entrepreneurs and owners of 
small businesses, the programme was lived as an impediment to the more proper work of 
amassing capital, developing social networks and following in the footsteps of the valorised 
figures of self-reliant migrants, such as the image of the successful Turkish guest worker. The 
consequence of the perception of barriers to a particular notion of self-realisation was also a 
sense of exclusion from belonging; being “forced to sit” was to be unable to pay into the state. 
This suggests, therefore, that the results of the programme of integration were variable; the 
extent to which such programmes offered the terms of gendered social adulthood and inclusion 
in the neoliberal citizenship regime were shaped by individuals’ gendered and classed 




















Omar and Laith both looked forward to no longer being dependent on the Jobcenter. They had 
just met when we were walking through streets in Neustadt during a festival one Saturday 
evening and they told each other how they would soon no longer be refugees. Omar, who was 
in his early twenties, was going to begin the Abitur (A-levels) at school, and therefore would 
receive the student loan (BAföG) and not a stipend from the Jobcenter. Laith would begin work 
soon at a restaurant. When I asked what it means to no longer be a refugee, Laith said “It 
means that you don’t get money from the Jobcenter, and they can’t tell you what to do. For 
example, you can go where you want to go.” For Omar and Laith, the meaning of “refugee” 
was not only a legal category but a description of their dependency on the Jobcenter and the 
control and limitations associated with it.  
 
My interlocutors often described coming to Germany as part of a process of skills training and 
an opportunity to find work. As I showed in the previous chapter, there was a coming together 
of conceptions of masculinity and neoliberal discourses in which worthiness was embedded in 
finding work, achieving independence, and providing for yourself. However, finding work was 
an aspiration for the near future that required, at the least, one or two years of learning German. 
During the 15 months I spent in Dresden, almost all my Syrian and Palestinian friends received 
support from the state and specifically the Jobcenter. The only exception to this was the few 
people who left the integration programme to take on generally low-paid jobs in Arab or 
Turkish-owned businesses. In this respect, welfare and contact with the Jobcenter were a 





and taking a number of steps to arrange work and skills training, the Jobcenter is responsible 
for providing refugees with the support required to sustain themselves in Germany, including 
rent for a home up to approximately 400 euros, a monthly stipend of 400 euros, health insurance 
and reduced tickets for public transport. The consequence of such support, as Omar and Laith 
suggest above, was various obligations, surveillance and restrictions. In this chapter, I explore 
the lived experience of receiving welfare from the Jobcenter and the responses of my 
interlocutors to the stigma of dependency. In particular, I complicate the understanding that 
displaced men seek to elide such stigma only through processes of distancing themselves from 
dependency. In the context of Germany, where most of my interlocutors had no real choice 
about whether to receive support from the state or not, the process of claiming benefits could 
become the site for the display not only of their dignity as masculine men, but also as “partial 
citizens” with rights to claim (Ong 2006). 
Associations with the term “refugee” can vary (Zeno 2017), but very often it is a 
stigmatised identity (Ludwig 2016; Pearlman 2018). One of the main reasons for this is its 
association with dependency and negative attitudes towards refugees in host societies often 
centre around this. In the context of Germany, for example, Pearlman writes of media 
stereotypes that construct refugees as “lazy consumers of state welfare” (2018, 308). While in 
Chapter 1 I showed how masculine maturity and inclusion were associated with becoming 
economically independent in the terms of the “neoliberal citizenship regime”, dependency on 
the Jobcenter could produce the opposite: a site of emasculation which undermined claims for 
inclusion. Scholars have conceptualised welfare and aid as a Maussian “gift” that creates 
“moral subordination” and indebtedness on the part of the receiver, in this case refugees, who 
must display their “gratefulness” and victimhood (Malkki 1992; Rozakou 2012; Harrell-Bond 
1999). The consequences of dependency have been shown to be particularly stark for male 
migrants. As masculine identity is often centred on the role of “breadwinner” and “provider” 
of the home (Donaldson & Howson 2009), being unable to work and to fulfil this role, and 
becoming dependent on a state, NGO, or a family member, has been shown to have potentially 
far-reaching consequences for men’s sense of self-worth (Kabachnik et al. 2013; Charsley & 
Wray 2015). The emasculation that accompanies dependency has been at the heart of work that 
shows how men may struggle more than women in the context of displacement (McSpadden 
1993; Jansen 2008) and can lead to processes by which displaced men seek to actively 





This chapter explores the lived experience of male refugees who relied on state support 
and often expressed the stigma of such dependency. In fact, for many of my interlocutors, their 
aspirations to “become something” in Germany were closely connected to a period of being 
dependent on the state. As in the work of others, I am attentive to the discourses of my 
interlocutors who sought to distance themselves from dependency as a means of fashioning 
themselves as masculine men who are “worthy” of inclusion in the host society (Vandevoordt 
2017; Monforte et al. 2019), but I also add complexity to this picture by revealing the very 
different discourses that emerged from encounters with the Jobcenter. Confronting bureaucracy 
was a constant part of everyday life, sharing with what Pearlman has noted for Syrian refugees 
in Germany who “felt that they dedicated the bulk of their time and energy to waiting for 
appointments and completing paperwork” (2017, 318). I explore encounters with the state that 
seem to foreground the powerlessness of my interlocutors, manifesting their need and inability 
to get by without the Jobcenter or to make basic decisions about their lives such as where to 
live and who to live with. Yet I noted a pattern in which such encounters were inscribed with 
masculine agency by my interlocutors who would boast of their cleverness and self-control. In 
addition, these experiences of encountering the welfare office reveal a stark contrast to a 
neoliberal construction of citizenship which was often shared by Syrians and Palestinians in 
Dresden, in which “deservingness” was a function of economic productivity and financial 
autonomy. In their accounts of agency at the Jobcenter, welfare was not a gift that debases 
them, but a right to be claimed and strategically negotiated, reflecting what Isin and others have 
referred to as an “act of citizenship” (2013). How a stigmatising fact of life as refugees in 
Germany could become the stage for dignity draws attention to the malleability of masculinity 
and refugee identity for my interlocutors. 
 
 “This is not money from me” 
 
The regime would never give you money without working […] you feel that there 
is something wrong, this is not my money. When it’s your money, and you are tired 
from it, you feel qimeh (value) from money.  
 
This is what Rami told me one morning when he realised that his monthly stipend (rātib) from 
the Jobcenter had not been paid because he had not sent the paperwork for the annual 





the next few weeks prompted Rami to reflect on his circumstances as being dependent on the 
financial support of the Jobcenter. As was often the case among my interlocutors, he described 
how receiving money from the state was something he was not used to. The claim that the 
regime “would never give you money” was a boast, meaning that he and other Syrians and 
Palestinians were able to, or had to, manage by themselves in Syria, or at least through a 
network of family and contacts. They were used to being self-sufficient and therefore felt 
estranged from the welfare provided by the state. As Rami says, “this is not my money”, and 
the money lacks “value” (qimeh).  
This estrangement is compounded by bureaucracy that makes receiving welfare a 
sometimes complicated and protracted process. Rami’s issue with re-registering at the 
Jobcenter, he complained, was not because he did not send the right paperwork in time, but 
because there was a problem with the type of ID that he provided. It is a good example of the 
kinds of inflexibility and bureaucratic circuitousness that is often the complaint of people 
forced to navigate bureaucracies, such as the experience of Sierra Leoneans in London who 
confront “bureaucratic protocols, indecipherable documents, abstract rules, and official forms 
of validation” (Jackson 2008, 65). As Rami put it succinctly later in the conversation, “you 
can’t even go to the toilet without a piece of paper”.   
Rami’s alienation from the money he was given expresses something I heard a number 
of times from friends. For some, this alienation produced a feeling of flippancy and insincerity 
whereby because it is not money you have earned, it is money that can be flitted away on non-
essential things like buying cigarettes and alcohol. This was the position of Bassem, who I will 
discuss further below. He told me that he was content to spend the money he received from the 
Jobcenter on clothes, alcohol and having a good time because it was not money he had earned, 
but when he finds a job he would be much more careful. For others it produced the opposite 
effect, and money that had not been earned through work should be used carefully and on 
essential things, and the rest should be saved so that it could be used when needed, in case of 
emergencies, or to start a business venture. The same discomfort around receiving money from 
the state could lead people to take less than what they could. Hussein, for example, made a 
point of telling me that he would not take the full 700 euros provided by the Jobcenter for 









This tension around receiving welfare from the state reflects Mauss’s notion of “the gift”. 
Mauss argued that a gift contains something of the self and is therefore inalienable, “to make a 
gift of something to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself” (Mauss 1990, 15) 
which creates an obligation for the receiver to reciprocate. Aid, welfare or being granted 
asylum can be conceptualised as a gift which places the receiver in a state of “moral 
subordination” until they have reciprocated the gift (Indra 1993; Vandevoordt 2017; Moulin 
2012). Didier Fassin has described humanitarianism in terms of the gift, whereby “victims” are 
“those for whom the gift cannot imply a counter-gift, since it is assumed that they can only 
receive.” (2007, 512) Awareness of the power relations intrinsic to such giving was the cause 
of the “gift taboo” in Greece, in which there was a wariness of any kind of offer of material 
assistance as impeding the formation of horizontal relations of solidarity. Rozakou explains, 
“Gifts are potentially dangerous, because they invoke the vicious circle of reciprocity, by 
definition an unreciprocated gift generates inequality and places the giver in a hierarchically 
higher position.” (Rozakou 2016, 193) 






The nature of receiving welfare as a gift that creates stigma and moral subordination is 
reflected in how my interlocutors would avoid referring to the Jobcenter in public. A group of 
friends from Dara’a would refer to it as “Abu Jābir” when they talked among themselves. 
When I asked them why, they said it was because it was not good for Germans to hear Arabs 
say “Jobcenter”, which is the only word they would understand when they were talking in 
Arabic. In this respect, the Jobcenter was similar to “hashish”, which they referred to as 
“aghrāḍ” (things). An Iraqi friend also told me that he had heard the Jobcenter referred to as 
“bayt ʿam” (uncle’s house), which for Syrians would invoke the Assad regime’s infamous 
prisons in Syria. The term “Jobcenter” could also be useful short-hand to make fun of others. 
One evening while we were walking back to their apartment block, Akram and Hamid were 
doing caricatured impressions of regional Syrian accents in German, such as Shawī, a dialect 
of the countryside, or the distinctive accent of Latakiyya. In making fun of these accents, it is 
not a coincidence that the phrase they repeated each time was: “Ich war beim Jobcenter 
Gestern” (I was at the Jobcenter yesterday).  
The result of the stigma associated with dependency on the Jobcenter was the 
valorisation of individuals who found work and became independent. Typically, these tended 
to be people who had left the language course prematurely - or after completing the obligatory 
B1 programme - and subsequently found often low-paid work with a German company, such 
as becoming a construction worker (Bauarbeiter), or else had found an opportunity in one of 
the new Arab shops and fast-food outlets. This was also possible for doctors from Syria, who 
were able to do a fast-track programme to gain accreditation to practise medicine in Germany. 
During a conversation with Suhail, who at the time was waiting for the opportunity to do the 
four-month B2 language programme, he spoke highly of those who had found work and 
contrasted their independence and maturity to himself, 
 
They want to help their parents, they want to marry, they want to live their lives. 
Not like the way we are living our lives, that you live with only a little money, and 
every day you go, you come, you go, you come. You hate yourself.  
 
Similar to Rami above, Suhail bemoans the complexity and rigidity of bureaucracy in Germany 
which he “hates” and conveys as superfluous. In contrast, Suhail’s friends who found 
employment, mainly people with low-income work and long hours, avoid the indignity of being 





can assume their responsibility to help their parents and they are able to marry. That said, Suhail 
and others who expressed the virtue of refugees who found work, would at other times describe 
the uncertainty and difficulty of what was often described as dead-end work. His comment 
should therefore be seen as reflecting his frustration at the stigma and indignity of dependency 
and negotiating with bureaucracy, but it did not change his desire to learn German in order to 
enter the necessary education and training to be able to find skilled work.  
Receiving benefits entailed terms and conditions and with it particular controls and 
surveillance. Suhail referred to the way that claiming support often involves being summoned 
to meetings with a supervisor at the Jobcenter and the expectation of supplying paperwork. 
However, the control of movement and oversight from the state extended far beyond these 
meetings. Recipients were expected to attend the language courses that the Jobcenter pays for 
and failure to attend without a good reason could lead to having the stipend cut. There was also 
the condition that claimants ask permission from the Jobcenter if they want to leave Saxony, 
and if a supervisor discovered that someone claiming state support had left without permission, 
this would lead to a financial penalty. This was the case for Akram after a trip to Norway which 
he did not have permission for because he should have been attending the compulsory 
integration course. A few weeks later he submitted bank statements in order to claim a refund 
for the cost of furnishing his new apartment when his supervisor noticed that he had used his 
card abroad. The result of the infraction was a penalty of 150 euros, equivalent to over one 
third of his monthly stipend. In practice, such restrictions on movement were easy to avoid and 
many people I knew left Saxony for long periods at a time, making sure not to use their card. 
One Syrian man who Akram and I spoke to outside the Palestinian food shop on 
Ferdinandstrasse shortly after Akram discovered he had the fine, said that he regularly spends 
months with his mother and family in Sweden without ever being caught. However, he told us 
that he was always ready to return if he received an invitation for a meeting at the Jobcenter; it 
was therefore a circumscribed, tentative freedom of movement.   
Dependency on the state could be described as emasculating as it undermines virtues 
of autonomy and self-sufficiency and the “provider” role. Suhail described how dependency 
denies the chance to fulfil male responsibilities, for example, such as being able to send money 
to parents in Syria. In fact, the way that dependency was experienced as emasculating was often 
invoked directly in terms such as “it makes me feel like I am not a man”. There is evidence that 
discourses of the greater “suffering” of displaced men than women is a result of becoming 





et al. 2013). Many of my friends, who were young and single and had lived with their families 
before leaving Syria, had never had this role. They were therefore differently placed to the 
experiences of older, married men who faced a loss of status, such as middle-class, middle-
aged Bosnian men in the Netherlands (Jansen 2008) or married Somali men in Denmark (Kleist 
2010). Nonetheless, they shared these expectations because of the gendered values and 
expectations they were brought up with. This has been described by Ghannam (2013) in Cairo, 
where she shows how boys are taught from a young age the virtue of hard work and 
responsibility to female kin, to the extent that boys who find work are taught to split their small 
earnings with female members of their family.  
Omar left Syria when he was 17 where he lived with his parents and was never 
responsible for a home, or his family, but he too described his emasculation at being dependent 
on the Jobcenter. He described this distinction when we talked at the café where we would 
regularly meet one day in relation to his upbringing and the differential expectations of boys 
and girls. He explained, “I don’t want money, or to get their letters, and have to see them, and 
to go there asking for money. We were not raised like this. Boys are taught from the beginning 
to work, to do things in the house. The girls study, and the boys go to the shop and bring things 
to the house.” Omar invokes what Ghannam describes as the responsibility of boys to work 
and provide from an early age, contrasting his role in taking responsibility for going to the shop 
with his sisters who were busy studying.  
At the same time, discourses about the Jobcenter could be highly variable as it was not 
only a site of restrictions and obligations associated with receiving the stipend, but was also 
responsible for providing what I described for some individuals in Chapter 1 as vital access to 
education and training. Nonetheless, for many of my friends dependency on the Jobcenter could 
be the site of frustration and humiliation (Zeno 2017) and a very common expression that was 
shared between my interlocutors was “kus ikht il-Jobcenter!” (Fuck the Jobcenter!) This same 
sense of frustration and shame could also be described and talked about in light-hearted and 
self-deprecatory ways. My friends could describe situations which manifested their lack of 
options and freedom to manoeuvre in a sexualised discourse. For instance, in the lead up to a 
meeting at the Jobcenter when someone had not taken the necessary steps that had been agreed, 
or had missed class a number of times, they might describe how the Jobcenter, or a supervisor 
at the Jobcenter, “raḥ yanīkūnī” (will fuck me). Akram would often talk about the penalty of 





(Hart 2008). Others, such as Jamil, a former teacher who was in his mid-thirties, described the 
Jobcenter as “mum and dad”, expressing the way that it both supported and infantilised him.  
What this shows is that dependency was often experienced as a source of frustration 
and humiliation for Syrian and Palestinian men in Dresden. The stigma of the label of “refugee” 
could often be embodied in the web of controls and expectations associated with receiving 
welfare from the Jobcenter, and this stigma was experienced as a form of emasculation that 
offended attributes of autonomy and self-reliance (Rommel 2018). However, this was not 
simply a state of being for young Syrian and Palestinian male refugees, a feature of a “crisis of 
masculinity” facing men in displacement. The stigma of dependency prompted discourses in 
which my interlocutors sought to establish their dignity as masculine men and worthy citizens 
by distancing themselves from such dependency. 
 
Dignity through Distancing Strategies 
 
My interlocutors could grapple with the stigma of receiving benefits from the Jobcenter by 
distancing themselves from dependency through contrasting themselves with a so-called 
“abject Other”. The creation of an “abject Other” against which to hierarchise has been 
explored in a number of different contexts among displaced and stigmatised communities. 
Ewing (2008), for example, shows how young Turkish-Germans seek to escape their 
stigmatisation in German society through differentiating themselves to the abject figure of the 
patriarchal Turkish man. Vandevoordt and Verschragen (2019) describe “boundary making” 
among Syrian refugees in Belgium, by which they displayed their individual and collective 
level of culture, education and work ethic in contrast to others. In Dresden, my friends would 
often distinguish themselves from the despised figure of a refugee man who was described as 
being content to be dependent on the Jobcenter, who did not aim for autonomy and 
independence, or to “become something” in Germany. A common way of talking about such 
men was that they were happy “to eat, sleep and drink”. It is revealing that the other context in 
which this expression was often used was to describe life under the Assad regime where there 
was little freedom of speech and a highly circumscribed civil society.  
The figure of the man who is content to be dependent can be understood as what Jensen 
describes for the “skollie”, “poor, coloured male thugs” in Cape Town, who occupy “a central 
non-place around which political and everyday identity is structured” (Jensen 2008, 5). This 





would contrast themselves as worthy and masculine men. Take, for instance, a conversation I 
had with Suhail one morning at his apartment over coffee. What prompted us to talk about the 
Jobcenter was its decision that Suhail would need to do the Maßnahme, a six-month programme 
which aimed to teach job-hunting skills, before he was able to do the B2 language course. I 
asked Suhail about my observation of the two sides to the Jobcenter, on the one hand enabling 
new opportunities, but on the other the cause of frustration because of the need to accept 
welfare and the control that comes with it. He agreed and explained that he would leave the 
Jobcenter as soon as he can. He told me, “shukrān (thank you), but I want to be in charge of 
my own life”. He contrasted his attitude, his determination to be independent, with others who 
were content to accept support from the state. He explained, 
 
There are other people who are happy to live off the Jobcenter. They sit and have 
their monthly stipend (rātib). They can eat and drink, and that’s it, they don’t need 
anything else. Maybe they will work black on the side so they can earn more money. 
But they don’t want to work formally because they will lose the money from the 
Jobcenter. What are you? A dog that eats and drinks, and that is enough? 
 
One way that Suhail makes sense of his status as dependent on the Jobcenter is to assert his 
determination to become independent and be in charge of his own life. He contrasts himself 
and his attitude to men who are content “to sit and have their monthly rātib”. This figure of the 
“abject Other” is someone who chooses his own dependency and does not seek to work and 
become an independent and autonomous man. Rather, this man is a “dog” (kelb), a term which 
in Arabic has the connotation of someone who is unclean and worthless. If he does work, he 
does so “black” so as to avoid losing his welfare support. For Suhail, “black work” was 
shorthand for bad character: dishonest, lazy and opportunistic. 
For others, black work was seen in opposite terms, as a commitment to being 
autonomous and independent. However, this alternative way of thinking about black work also 
created space for the construction of the stigmatised figure of the refugee who is content to be 
dependent. Doing black work could be seen as a stage for acumen, skill and determination to 
work. This is similar to what I described as the important role of Rami’s “black” business 
selling kitchens in Chapter 1. Akram, for instance, had worked black with Turkish handymen 
in a city in western Germany before he came to Dresden. He was not against working illegally 





opportunities anyway which he put down to the small Turkish community. When I asked him 
if he agreed with the negative characterisation of men who work black, he replied indignantly: 
“Of course not! Whoever this person is he is talking rubbish.” He contrasted the plucky 
individual who works black in order to earn extra money to send to his family in Syria, with 
the person who is content to live from the Jobcenter, who “sits at home with his wife and they 
don’t do anything […] they get up and sit and live off money from the Jobcenter.” 
Akram describes a figure in very similar terms to Suhail, a man who is content to live 
from the Jobcenter. Yet in contrast to this figure, black work offers the opportunity to enact the 
masculine responsibility to support family at home. It is valorised by Akram as displaying the 
will to work and refusal to sit at home. What Suhail and Akram’s comments do therefore is to 
implicitly distinguish themselves from the figure of the “abject Other” and in doing so assert 
their commitment and determination to be autonomous from the Jobcenter.  
Comparing oneself to an “abject Other” as the means by which to assert determination 
to become independent of the Jobcenter is similar to a discourse among my interlocutors about 
being able to reciprocate the state in the future. As I described above, welfare can be 
characterised as a “gift” that debases the receiver until it is reciprocated. My friends would 
often tell me about their plans to return the amount the state had “invested” in them through 
work and paying taxes. This was the suggestion of Omar when we sat together at a small café 
in a village an hour north of Dresden after a trip to visit the Rakotzbrücke (Devil’s Bridge). In 
this setting, which he characterised as “very German”, Omar brought up his determination to 
pay off the money the state had spent on him. He tried to work out what this figure might be 
by the time he finishes his education and suggested the modest sum of six thousand euros, 
before revising it to twelve thousand. “It won’t take me long before I have paid this off in 
taxes”, he boasted. He told me resolutely, “I want to be in a position in which I have paid for 
myself.” What Omar sought to do is discursively displace the present, a time of dependency 
and reliance on the state, to a future point when he is gainfully employed and paying taxes and 
therefore no longer indebted through the “gift” of welfare. 
Omar’s calculation of his capacity to repay his debts shares with what my interlocutors 
would often describe as Germany’s (or Merkel’s) “invitation” for Syrians to come because of 
its wish for a young, strong, and educated workforce. In this interpretation, my friends would 
boast that their permission to come to Germany was not a result of their victimhood but rather 
their ability to contribute to the national economy in the future after a period of investment in 





about politics, but it was not meant as a form of censure. This shares with the currency of the 
neoliberal citizenship regime among my interlocutors that I described in Chapter 1, in which 
their capacity to belong in Germany was understood according to their productivity and 
contribution to the national economy. The discourse of their capacity to reciprocate contrasts 
to what Vandevoordt and Verschragen (2019a) describe as the perception among Syrians that 
the welfare they receive from the Belgian state is impossible to reciprocate in the future because 
of the difficulty of finding work, and therefore becomes an “unreciprocal gift” which takes on 
a “humanitarian logic” - receiving support that cannot be repaid. In Germany, there was not 
the same doubt about future employment for most people and my interlocutors would stress 
their capacity to re-pay the gift and therefore symbolically change the terms of their 
dependency. Rather than welfare as support which embodies their helplessness and neediness, 
it becomes a form of investment which is on the cusp of being repaid. Similar to the figure of 
the “abject Other”, there is a process by which my interlocutors distance themselves from the 
dependency of welfare through a discursive shift towards the future when they are not 
dependent refugees but citizens who have re-paid their debt.  
Not everyone agreed with this notion of reciprocity and the idea of state support as a 
“gift” that needs to be repaid. For others, the amount the state paid to refugees should be seen 
as receiving what they are owed. In this conception, the destruction of Syria was the 
responsibility of outsiders, and therefore Syrians, as innocent victims of a proxy war, are 
essentially owed this support from those who are involved. This came up in the conversation 
among the group of friends from Dara’a I discuss above who referred to the Jobcenter as “Abu 
Jābir”. One of the group told me that “the West”, including Germany, held part of the 
responsibility for destruction in Syria and therefore the amount that the state spent on Syrians 
was essentially reclaiming some of the value of their home and everything else they had lost. 
His friends disagreed, but only insofar as the money they received was not from the government 
but taxes from ordinary people. According to this account, welfare was not a “gift” that debases 
Syrians and Palestinians as recipients, but rather represents compensation for the destruction 
of their property and homeland.   
Such processes of distancing the self from dependency on welfare could extend to 
patterns of receiving welfare between married couples. The welfare state has been shown in 
places such as Argentina to have the effect of reproducing the bifurcation between “male 
independent workers” and “female dependent non-workers” by directing almost all their 





benefits are available to men and women, but it could be the same in practice among married 
couples. In late 2017, Fadil had a full-time job alongside occasional part-time work which 
provided him a modest salary. However, he complained that he earned the same amount overall 
as when he was receiving support from the Jobcenter because although it would pay a stipend 
to his wife, Amira, it would no longer cover rent and other costs. He told me therefore that they 
planned to move to a new apartment and place the tenancy under Amira’s name so that she 
would receive support to cover the apartment. This scheme, which was well-known among my 
friends, could often be criticised as opportunistic. What I want to draw attention to, however, 
is the way that this reveals the different implications and stigma of dependency between men 
and women. In the case of Fadil and Amira, while Fadil was determined to work and to be 
autonomous through his work, and therefore avoid receiving support from the state, this was 
very different for Amira, who did not seem to suffer the same stigma. 
This section reveals how my interlocutors sought to distance themselves from the 
stigma of their status as dependent refugees to construct themselves as embodying masculine 
virtues of autonomy, hard work and independence, and as fulfilling expectations of the 
neoliberal citizenship regime - as contributors to Germany rather than takers. What these 
discourses do is to legitimise the present condition of stigma by drawing a direct link to a point 
of resolution. In the first case, this is through showing discontent with being dependent on 
welfare, and determination to be independent in contrast to an “abject Other” who is content to 
receive benefits. In the second case, this is through expressing a point in the future when the 
“gift” will be repaid. The third case makes welfare a form of compensation for the damage 
inflicted to Syria as the site of an international proxy war. The final case, where support is 
received in a wife’s name only, displaces the stigma of dependency altogether. To this extent, 
my analysis shares with much recent literature on the stigma of refugeeness and the strategies 
of male refugees to position themselves as masculine and worthy men through seeking to 
distance themselves from dependency. I will now turn to explore instances when my 
interlocutors actually encounter representatives of the welfare state. In doing so, I show how 










“They are smart, but we are smarter” 
 
Attending meetings with a supervisor at the Jobcenter was a frequent and despised part of 
everyday life for all my interlocutors in the initial one or two years after being granted refugee 
status. In many respects these encounters can be seen as manifesting through body language 
and behaviour what they describe as the tensions of dependency. Friends who I knew as self-
confident could become meek and ill-at-ease with themselves when they went to the Jobcenter. 
This was the case for Omar when I joined him for a meeting at the Jobcenter one day and met 
him outside smoking a cigarette. He told me, “I hate the Jobcenter. They send you a letter and 
you have to come!” and, “when I come here, I feel like I am not a man.” The supervisor had 
organised the meeting in order to find out whether Omar had begun school and during the 
meeting in her office on the fourth floor of the Jobcenter, Omar was quiet and spoke in 
stuttering German. In ordinary life, Omar is quick-witted and funny and he would often amuse 
the whole of our language class with ironic observations, making fun of himself and others. 
Reflecting on the meeting after we finished and when we started to walk back to the town 
centre, he explained that he felt anxious in the meeting. He reasoned, the “Jobcenter is the state 
(ildowla), and I am just disposable (ghīyār)”, reflecting his sense of powerlessness and 
insignificance. 
Encountering the Jobcenter could turn Omar from a dignified man who is worthy of 
investing in, to someone who feels like he is “not a man”. I was surprised, therefore, that a 
short time after the meeting the encounter suddenly took on quite different terms. Rather than 
facing the supervisor anxiously and clumsily, Omar constructed an image of himself as a 
strategist who kept his cards close to his chest. He explained to me how shrewd he had been in 
the meeting when the supervisor had asked if the school he had joined had told him about the 
opportunity to apply for extra funding from the Jobcenter. He had mumbled awkwardly that he 
hadn’t received any information yet when in fact, he explained to me now, he had been told 
and he had the paperwork at home, but he was choosing to wait. Omar had recently started a 
three year programme to complete the Abitur and he was still receiving the monthly stipend 
from the Jobcenter and having his rent paid. The following month, however, he would need to 
rely on the more modest student loan from BAföG and it would not cover all his costs. He 
explained that if he had asked about the extra funding in the meeting she would have turned 
him down because he is still in receipt of support from the Jobcenter. “She would say: what do 





they will agree when he returns in a few months and he is able to show them how much he is 
receiving from BAföG, and how much his rent costs. Omar’s encounter, which embodied his 
status as a welfare recipient and the kinds of control and conditions this entails, became the site 
of his agency. His silence was a strategy, and his strategy a process of risk-taking. In this 
example, it is in the moment of being a claimant or recipient that provides the site of a 
performance and narrative that exemplifies his agency.  
Negotiating what you are owed was a common way that people talked about encounters 
with the Jobcenter. This could apply to accessing benefits and welfare, as in the case of Omar, 
but it could also apply to getting permission to join language classes. When I saw Khalid at his 
apartment one afternoon, he told me how he was able to get access to the B2 language course 
and avoid the dreaded Maßnahme. He narrated to me the conversation with his supervisor, who 
he tended to characterise as stern and unfriendly, which I noted down as the following: 
 
Supervisor: Hello. Did you pass B1? 
Khalid: Yes, but not by much. 
S: Hmm, you should do the Maßnahme. 
K: I would like to do B2. 
S: Why? 
K: I want to do an Ausbildung. 
S: You don’t need B2 for an Ausbildung. 
K: Yes, you do for IT.  
S: Ah, yes. But why don’t you do the Maßnahme to become stronger at the 
language? 
K: I would rather do B2. I think it will be better.  
S: OK, sign here. 
K: No, I won’t sign.  
S: It is for the B2 course! 
K: Ah, ok! 
  
In his account, Khalid demonstrated his capacity to stand up for himself with his supervisor. 
He martialled his knowledge and made the case in German for doing the B2 language course, 
and even showed his refusal to sign when he thinks he is being tricked into joining the 





came to an agreement about the path ahead, but the fact that Khalid told me the exchange in 
full shows the significance he accords to his part and how well he played it. Getting support 
from the Jobcenter, in this case funding for the B2 language course, becomes something 
noteworthy and something to share with others. An otherwise unexceptional exchange is the 
site for displaying the effective way he negotiated what he wants in the conditions of 
dependency.  
What creates space for the narrative of agency in negotiating with the Jobcenter is the 
way that accessing benefits is not straightforward. Bureaucracies such as the Jobcenter can be 
experienced as complex, opaque and arbitrary (Herzfeld 1993), and they can produce 
uncertainty for users (Auyero 2012; Cabot 2013). In contrast to Weber’s conception of 
bureaucracies as rational systems, scholars have shown how they are shaped by emotional 
registers (Lipsky 2010). In fact, the way in which bureaucracies produce uncertainty and 
unpredictability has been increasingly seen as part and parcel of government policy, in which 
restrictive official rules alongside unofficial practices produce legally-tenuous and therefore 
exploitable populations of workers who will work for little and will make no claims to state 
support (Biehl 2016; Tuckett 2015). The unpredictability of bureaucracies has been shown as 
part of a process of producing “political subordination” among the poor (Auyero 2012). 
My friends shared a sense of the Jobcenter as opaque and unpredictable. There were 
many instances when they described their perception that a decision by the Jobcenter was not 
logical or predictable and had been conditioned by the particular feelings of the staff member 
– whether positive or negative. Omar, for example, described this feeling when he summed-up 
encounters with the Jobcenter for Syrian refugees with the expression “ḥasab il-muwaẓaf” (it 
depends on the supervisor): decisions made by the Jobcenter are arbitrary and may or may not 
go the way you want them to. It was common for my interlocutors to explain the result of a 
particular encounter according to whether the person “likes” him or not. For instance, when 
Suhail was forced to do the Maßnahme, he was certain this represented the biased decision of 
his supervisor rather than Jobcenter policy for someone in his circumstances, and subsequently 
spent several weeks launching appeals and official complaints, including soliciting help from 
the Auslanderrat (Foreigners Advice Centre). What these examples show is the widespread 
sense that bureaucracy was determined by an affective economy. But while this was often 
invoked to explain why a decision went one way or another, it also opened up a space in which 
to shape results. The Jobcenter was not a place of rules and procedures but a site to be 





This is apparent in another instance in which encountering the Jobcenter became the 
site for displaying agency. Bassem is from eastern Syria and is in his early twenties and looked 
after his younger brother and sister in Dresden. He also shared the view that the Jobcenter and 
other institutions were unpredictable, where decisions were made based on the mood of the 
bureaucrat. For instance, he explained to me one day that he was sure a woman at the 
Auslanderbehörde (Foreigners Office) in Dresden was trying to get him deported to Syria. His 
newly-issued German passport had contained errors and the woman had instructed him to go 
to the Syrian embassy in Berlin to address the problem. However, he told me correctly, it is 
forbidden by Germany for Syrian refugees to go to the embassy. He explained pithily: “I will 
not be Syrian when I enter the embassy, and I will not be German when I come back out”. For 
Bassem, it was evidence that the woman was determined for him to make a mistake and lose 
his right to be in Germany. One afternoon, I met Bassem by chance at the Jobcenter when he 
was standing in a long queue to speak to reception while I was sitting in the waiting room with 
a friend. He told me he was coming every day to the Jobcenter in order to try to get the money 
he was owed, not only for him, but also his younger brother and sister. When it was finally his 
turn to speak to the reception, he asked them politely about the payment and they told him that 
it would be paid at the end of the month. He told me it was the same thing they had told him 
the day before. I asked him why he came again if they told him yesterday they would pay the 
money at the end of the month. He explained that if he doesn’t come every day, they will think 
he is working illegally because he wouldn’t have enough money to survive and then they would 
not pay him the stipend. “Did they tell you this?” I asked, bewildered. “No, but this is what 
they are thinking”, he replied confidently. “They are smart” he said, “but we are smarter” 
(Humeh zaki bas iḥna zakī akta). By coming to the reception at the Jobcenter every day, he 
was able to boast about outmanoeuvring the Jobcenter who would find a reason not to pay the 
stipend that he had a right to.  
In both Omar and Bassem’s cases, they situate agency in the process of claiming and 
negotiating support from the Jobcenter. Claims to institutions could also extend beyond getting 
access to what you are owed towards a claim for the right to live a good and dignified life. This 
was the case when Khalid sought to negotiate with the Jobcenter his right to live alone. In 
general, once a place to live had been found and the Jobcenter had agreed to cover the rent, it 
was difficult to leave without good reason, such as the arrival of family after reunification, or 
moving to a different area of Germany because of study or work. What the issue of housing 





the chance to live where you want to live and how you want to live. Khalid was determined to 
leave the apartment he shared with his housemate, Tariq, because they often fell out and he 
was unable to concentrate on studying in their small living space and he wanted the 
independence and privacy that came from living alone. However, their rent was paid by the 
Jobcenter and this included a number of terms and conditions; leaving because they were 
falling out was not a sufficient reason for the Jobcenter to agree to Khalid moving to a new 
apartment. Instead, Khalid’s supervisor advised him to split the apartment between the living 
room and bedroom in order not to spend so much time with Tariq. Even when their two year 
contract with the housing provider Vonovia ended, Khalid was unable to leave. However, he 
told me with satisfaction that he had a plan. According to the rules, one of them needed to leave 
Dresden if they wanted to move out. If he moved to Berlin for a month and slept at friends’ 
apartments, when he returned to Dresden he could go to the Jobcenter and ask for a new 
apartment - thereby getting around their restrictions and negotiating his right to live alone. In 
similar terms to Bassem, he told me that “the Jobcenter is smart, but we are smarter”. 
In the end, Tariq left Dresden for another city and Khalid was able to leave the 
apartment. However, the plan Khalid shared with me and other friends turned a situation that 
displayed his dependency on the Jobcenter and his inability to choose where to live, into a site 
of agency. In his example, and the examples of Bassem and Omar, agency emerges from the 
practice of waiting. In Omar’s case, he waits to illustrate his need; in Bassem’s case he waits 
in line every day at the Jobcenter, and in Khalid’s case, he plots to wait in Berlin until he can 
claim the right to live alone. As scholars have shown, waiting can be the expression of 
powerlessness. Andersson (2014) has shown how forcing African migrants to wait is part of a 
European border control strategy in the Strait of Gibraltar in what he describes as “the active 
usurpation of time”. Auyero (2012) describes the often long, uncertain and stressful waiting of 
mainly female claimants at welfare offices in Buenos Aires. For these “waiters”, accessing 
welfare is a site of passivity, and their agency is “minimal to non-existent”. In the accounts of 
my interlocutors, however, such waiting was represented as a site of agency. It was a strategy 
and a choice forced by the refusal, or anticipated refusal, of the Jobcenter to provide what they 
have the right to. Waiting was not the passivity of seeing what the state provides, or the decision 
of a border official, it was a process of taking steps to ensure you are given what you are owed. 
In this process, they describe their cleverness and cunning and their agency in the encounter. 





and dependency is not seen as an expression of the emasculation of being dependent on the 
state but becomes the setting for narratives that foreground dignity.   
This brings to mind the “trickster” masculinity displayed by male sex-workers in the 
Dominican Republic. Padilla (2004) describes the way that such sex workers turn what is a 
stigmatising practice into a configuration of local masculinity, namely “tiguero” masculinity. 
This is a masculine identity which includes the capacity “to resolve, in an acceptable way, the 
dilemmas which have to be faced as a consequence of a tough environment”, relying on “verbal 
skills and a chameleon-like ability to convince” (135). Through hiding their sex work, these 
men are able to enact such notions of duplicity. Similarly, Purser (2009) shows how male 
Mexican workers in the US frame seeking work on the street, the only option available to them 
as illegal migrants, as a choice which displays masculine dignity through an emphasis on skills, 
hard-work and autonomy, reflecting what Bourdieu describes as “making a virtue of necessity” 
(Bourdieu 1977, 46 in Purser 2009). In the context of engaging the Jobcenter, Omar and 
Bassem similarly turn a stigmatising dimension of displacement - receiving support from the 
Jobcenter - into a site of masculine virtue as they display their capacity for resilience, self-
control and strategy. But this is not the only result of encountering the Jobcenter. In the context 
of Dresden, encounters with bureaucracy are the site not only for the display of masculine 
virtues, but also the setting by which to enact citizenship.  
I described above discourses of repayment of the “gift” through paying taxes in the 
future that displaces the subordinate position as refugees in the present. The encounters of 
Omar, Bassem and Khalid at the Jobcenter also problematise access to welfare and support as 
a “gift” which they should be grateful to receive. This is not through repayment of the gift, but 
rather turning the “gift” into a right. To this extent, their actions are comparable to the kinds of 
agency associated with migrants who conduct political action and invoke a discourse of human 
rights to problematise refugee identity as a form of guest-ness that generates moral 
subordination. This has been the main site in which scholars have situated migrants’ agency in 
what Isin (2008) has termed “acts of citizenship”. A good example of this is Syrian asylum 
seekers in Athens who in 2014 arranged a sit-in to protest against being prevented from leaving 
Greece (Ingvars & Gislason 2018). Similarly, Moulin’s account of the impact of Palestinian 







by conditioning the acceptance of protection, by demanding a condition of equality 
that is denied in the logic of gift giving […] they pose the dilemma of living as a 
refugee, and the consequences that stem from it, as one that involves duties and 
rights. Therefore, they call for dialogue and clear rules of procedure: they ask to 
know what theirs is by right and what is not. (2012, 61) 
 
Negotiating with the Jobcenter involves a similar disruption of the “logic” of gift exchange. In 
their accounts of outsmarting the Jobcenter, Bassem, Omar and Khalid don’t situate welfare as 
a gift to wait patiently to be given and to be grateful for, but rather turn it into rights they are 
owed, which they need to be clever, bold and determined to receive. If citizenship is about 
membership of society, this includes the capacity to claim the rights of such membership, “the 
right to have rights” (DeGooyer et al. 2018). In this process of turning the unwanted necessity 
of receiving benefits from the state into a stage for making claims and asserting the right to 
claim and guarantee such support from the state, refugees enact citizenship. 
Heath Cabot writes in the context of what she argues is the agency of clients and lawyers 
in making asylum applications in Athens that she expands the otherwise narrow attention of 
literature that “locates the agency of migrants and asylum seekers largely in the realm of 
political action” (2013, 453). By exploring Syrian and Palestinian men’s capacity “to wait”, 
and how this was boasted as shaping encounters with the Jobcenter, I similarly show how 
negotiation of rights in institutional settings could be a source of agency in processes of not 
only making claims to welfare as rights, but also to making claims to live a good life, as in 
Khalid’s plan to temporarily move to Berlin in order to be able to live alone in Dresden. 
Alongside processes by which my interlocutors sought in everyday life to distance themselves 
from the stigmatising effects of being dependent on the Jobcenter, getting access to state 
support could become the stage, at least sometimes, for a similar performance, entailing 




This chapter has explored the lived experience of welfare and dependency among Syrian and 
Palestinian men in Dresden. In doing so, it has sought to expand on work that has explored the 
ways that displaced men engage with the stigma of “refugeeness”, often through processes of 





interlocutors articulated the stigma of receiving welfare as emasculating, infantilising and 
denying their right to claim to be autonomous and economically productive members of 
society. In similar terms to what scholars have described elsewhere, they sought to distance 
themselves from association with dependency through the construction of an “abject Other”, a 
discourse of reciprocity, of receiving compensation, and, in some cases, displacing dependency 
on to a wife. However, in their experiences of encountering the Jobcenter there emerges a more 
complex picture. In the push and pull of negotiating access to benefits and the perceived 
uncertainty and flexibility of bureaucracy in Germany, welfare did not seem very much like a 
gift at all. Waiting, which in many respects laid bare the limited power and dependency of 
Syrian and Palestinian men, could become the site for narratives and performances of a 
masculine agency that sought to turn welfare from a “gift” that excludes, to a source of making 
claims to citizenship. What was often seen as a source of stigma could, in the particular context 
of bureaucracy in Germany and their status as displaced men, become invested with a very 




















Khalid and I were in the living room of Samira and Talal, a young, married couple. Khalid 
was interested in marriage and Samira was keen to help him, a role that might ordinarily be 
assumed by Khalid’s mother or sister. She began to list candidates she had in mind from her 
network of young Arab women in Dresden. The first candidate, she said, was “sweet” 
(naʿmeh), “white” (abyaḍ), “but a bit large” (smīneh). Khalid asked: “Has she integrated 
(indamjet), or not yet integrated (lisa ma-ndamjet)?” Samira laughed and replied, “la, la, she 
hasn’t integrated yet”. Khalid asked, “does she wear hijab?” “Yes”. She said she would show 
him another woman. The next candidate was less promising: “She is 26”, a few years older 
than Khalid, which prompted him to say “no” immediately. “And she is really, really 
integrated”, she said. “She doesn’t wear hijab!” 
 
This short vignette introduces Khalid’s anxieties about changing gender norms in Germany. 
Gender relations in the context of displacement have been shown as a site that can be 
profoundly unsettling for men and women as roles may change while expectations remain 
similar (Kabatchnik et al. 2013). This unsettlement can often be experienced particularly by 
men, with women shown in a number of contexts as better able to adjust to new norms 
(McSpadden & Moussa 1993). While there is evidence of men’s adjustment and the taking on 
of new roles and responsibilities inside and outside the home in migration contexts (Jansen 
2008) in what has been termed a “new refugee masculinity” (Ingvars & Gislason 2018), work 
has tended to show men’s struggle to match gendered expectations, such as fulfilling the role 





“crisis” and “trauma” that can accompany the challenge to adjust in displacement and how this 
can result in divorce (Pasura 2008) and a sense of the breakdown of moral order (Turner 2000). 
At the same time, in the context of the stigma of refugee identity and the challenge of living 
with dignity in displacement, gender norms and relations can be a space in which men seek to 
assert power, dominance and authority. Relations in the home have been shown as sites in 
which men engage in “patriarchal restoration”, invoking naturalised forms of male dominance 
and roles, such as denying the appropriateness or right of women to work (Kleist 2010; 
Suerbaum 2016; Hansen 2008).  
Khalid’s distinction between “integrated” (unmarriageable) and “not yet integrated” 
(marriageable) women could be read as a reflection of such a process of masculinisation; in the 
context of Germany, Khalid seeks to assert the authority he lacks in everyday life through 
finding an “unintegrated” Arab woman. However, this reading of Khalid’s conversation and 
similar discourses among Syrian and Palestinian men in Dresden is limited. While I argue that 
such gender discourses do reflect a process of “masculinising”, this is not the result of a 
restoration of patriarchal norms in response to a crisis of masculinity. For one thing, unlike 
contexts in which often older, middle-class men do suffer a profound loss of status, this was 
very different for young male migrants to Germany who, as I showed in Chapter 1, could often 
see migration within a prism of masculine self-realisation. Understanding the nature of these 
gender discourses requires situating them in the context of Germany. Specifically, such gender 
discourses for my male interlocutors were deeply connected to the “integration imperative” 
(Bojadzijev 2008, 228 rf. Scheibelhofer 2012) and gender norms as the site of inclusion and 
exclusion in Germany.   
There has been the emergence of a public discourse across Europe in recent decades 
which situates the figure of the “patriarchal migrant Muslim man” in opposition to an image of 
the national self that is centred on gender equality (Scheibelhofer 2012). One influential 
account of gender norms as terms of inclusion/exclusion in European societies is Katherine 
Ewing’s study of the “fantasy” of the patriarchal Turkish man as the “Other” of the German 
national imaginary (2008). The result has been the emergence of policies that promote the 
“emancipation” of Muslim women and challenge the presumed patriarchal tendencies of men, 
such as restrictions on marriage migration (Charsley & Liversage 2015), compulsory civic 
integration programmes (Heinemann 2016), as well as the role of actors such as social workers 
(Ong 2003). Refugees in Germany therefore confront gender relations as key terms by which 





literature has explored the way such policies reflect the aims of changing migration regimes in 
the West (Scheibelhofer 2012), new processes of identity formation (Foerster 2014), and the 
emergence of the far-right (Fekete 2006), there has been less attention to the lived experience, 
responses and ramifications of these policies on the people they target. 
Among my interlocutors in Dresden, the integration imperative was often the context 
for discourses about gender relations. Resisting the imperative to integrate could assert dignity 
through the refusal to be acted upon by the state’s programme to forge particular types of 
citizens and therefore the site of virtues of autonomy and authenticity. Often what seemed to 
matter was not the extent to which one fulfils or embodies a particular notion of proper Arab, 
Muslim gender norms, but the extent to which one is seen to be willing to assimilate and adopt 
perceived European social and cultural norms. Seeming to adopt such norms could lead to 
rebuke as someone who has “integrated” and does not “think for himself”. Rather than seeing 
discourses of conservative gender norms as only or primarily about patriarchal restoration, it 
should be seen as conditioned by responses to policies of integration.  
At the same time, precisely because gender discourses were a response to an integration 
imperative, they were liable to change and vary. Scholars have tended to show how displaced 
men either adjust or do not adjust to changing gender norms in western contexts. In Dresden, 
this was not so clear-cut. Friends who in the context of integration classes could articulate rigid 
and intractable differences in gender norms between Europeans and Arabs, could in other 
instances criticise “old-fashioned” views as “out-of-place” and express the virtue of being 
“open-minded”. If in some instances discourses of conservative gender norms communicated 
an individual’s autonomy and refusal to fill the slot of an “integrated” man, in other instances 
accepting or championing such gender norms in Germany communicated the capacity to 




Displacement can result in the profound unsettling of men and women’s pre-migration roles. 
For men, this often relates to the way they struggle to find work to be able to maintain a home 
and therefore fail to fulfil the status of provider or breadwinner, including, in some contexts, 
becoming dependent on the income of their wives (Gallo 2006; Pasura 2008). In addition to 
being unable to fulfil the masculine slot, displaced men can migrate to societies where there is 





right to divorce and custody of children, and the expectation of women to enter the workplace, 
including policies that actively promote women’s employment. Facing such circumstances can 
lead to perceptions that western societies are “misandristic”, as in the case of asylum seekers 
in the UK (Griffiths 2015), and that they have migrated to a “women’s land”, as in the case of 
Somali migrants to Denmark (Kleist 2010). The difficulty of fulfilling expectations of manhood 
in the context of displacement has led to the notion of a “crisis of masculinity”. In the case of 
internally-displaced Georgians, Kabachnik et al. (2013) have coined the term “traumatic 
masculinities” to capture the “social spaces of crises and trauma that initiate and sustain the 
redefinition of gendered power relations of displaced men and women” (774). Suerbaum has 
noted the following anxieties about gender relations in Europe among would-be Syrian migrant 
men in Egypt, some of which are familiar from my conversations with Syrian and Palestinian 
interlocutors in Dresden: 
 
Would the child be taken away by the state authorities if it was beaten once? How 
much parental authority was acceptable? Does the voice and signature of a woman 
as wife and mother count as much or more than the husband’s or father’s? Can a 
woman decide family-related issues on her own without consulting her husband? 
Can she travel on her own? (2017, 12) 
 
The consequence of the changing circumstances can be the perception of the breakdown of 
morality among men and women in the host society. In the context of Burundian refugees in 
Lukole camp in Tanzania where UNHCR actively implemented policies of gender equality in 
the late 1990s, Turner noted people’s impressions that “women were becoming prostitutes”, 
“men were polygamists” and “women no longer respected their husbands” (2000, 8).  
In Dresden, there was a similar discourse of a “breakdown” of gender relations, in 
particular that Arab women could have loose morals, become “arrogant”, or “crazy”. For 
example, Hisham, a Syrian man in his mid-twenties, was involved in supporting a Syrian friend 
in a legal case to get custodianship of his children from his wife. His friend’s wife, he told me, 
had tried to set his friend up by calling the police and claiming that he had locked the children 
in their bedroom and left the house with the key. He told me that Arab women in Germany go 
“crazy” and he would not marry a woman here for this reason. What accounts such as these 





authority they expected to have in Syria migrate to women, although work has shown how such 
authority in Arab societies is itself often conditional and negotiated (Ghannam 2013).  
At the same time, however, gender relations can be the site in which men seek to re-
assert their status in the context of displacement. This can involve the process of constructing 
the figure of a static, “traditional” woman against which men “masculinise”. Suerbaum (2018) 
describes this for her Syrian male interlocutors in Cairo as the process by which they 
“unbecome” refugees by ignoring the ways that Syrian women are active in business and 
worked before migrating from Syria in order to naturalise men as responsible for earning 
money and women as dependent. This has also been shown in the case of Somalis who return 
to Somaliland, where men look for a “traditional Somali woman”. Hansen shows how men 
found gender relations in the diaspora unsettling and problematic and his interlocutors 
complain of their wives being “defiled by Western ways and modern thinking about 
individuality, equality and rights” (2008, 1119). In this insightful analysis, the homeland 
becomes a figurative virgin to be penetrated by diasporic Somalis. In doing so, Somali men 
“take on the role of the traditional Somali man who has been lost in the civil war and life in 
exile, and thereby reconstruct a hegemonic masculine identity in a transnational context.” 
(1121) 
I noted something similar among some of my interlocutors who would talk at length 
about women who have “integrated” and look for a woman who is “authentic” (aṣly). This 
reflects the discourse of Akram when I joined him on a trip to Norway to meet a Syrian woman. 
Akram, who is in his early twenties, emphasised the conservative nature of his family and 
hometown and would tell me proudly how his younger sister never left their home “more than 
one metre”. In a similar way to a number of my interlocutors, he described how Syrian women 
in Germany have “integrated”. During one evening at his apartment, Akram contrasted a 
woman he knew in Turkey to Syrian women in Europe. He told me the woman “is not like the 
girls you see here in Germany. She is not a prostitute (sharamuṭa). She is polite (muḥtaram) 
and sweet (ḥilweh).” Akram sought to marry a woman who was “unintegrated” and in early 
2017 he and I travelled to Norway for him to meet a woman he met online. The woman, who I 
will call Aisha, was 17 and lived in a small town about an hour from Oslo with her family.  
I was struck by Akram’s comments as we arrived by bus from the airport in Oslo to a 
city near where she lived. He made a series of comparisons between the quality of the built 
environment of the city and Dresden. He pointed to potholes in the road filled with water from 





the dirtiness of the streets and pavements and he contrasted the time we needed to wait for the 
bus to arrive with the regularity and efficiency of public transport in Dresden. He also drew 
attention to the fact that Dresden has a train, tram and bus service to get around the city, while 
this town only had a bus. He drew a distinction between the town and Dresden’s modernity, 
size and cleanliness. As we arrived at the woman’s town, he pointed to an industrial area with 
large factories close to the train tracks and said she probably lives in this area and laughed. 
When we met again later in the afternoon after he had spent time with Aisha and her mother, 
he described in detail how the area where she lives is an Arab enclave with rundown housing 
and few Norwegian people. He said the shop where they had arranged to meet felt like being 
in Syria. While he was there, he explained to me how he had intervened in the shopping of a 
woman,  
 
I was next to a woman. She was looking at something. I said, ‘this has pork.’  
She said, ‘are you Arab?’  
I said, ‘yes.’  
She was surprised, ‘do you eat pork?’  
I replied, ‘No, I don’t eat pork’. I told her, ‘Return it. I am living in Germany, but I 
came for a trip.’ 
 
In this quote, Akram fashions himself into an accomplished migrant bringing knowledge to a 
“backward” homeland in similar terms to Hansen’s interlocutors returning to Somaliland. 
Akram described with satisfaction how Aisha embodied a traditional Arab woman who lived a 
very cloistered life as a result of her conservative father. She and her mother hardly left the 
confines of her home, the school and the local shop, he told me, evidenced by the fact that they 
did not know the direction to the train station. When Akram talked about a future marriage, he 
described a strict delineation of gender roles, imagining Aisha as a diligent, nurturing, stay-at-
home wife who he would provide for as breadwinner and head of a single-income home. He 
explained that he would not want his future wife to work in Germany, even though in Syria 
this would not be a problem. In Syria, he said, “there is Islam”, but in Germany his wife could 
be assaulted in the workplace for wearing hijab, therefore invoking the far-right to bolster his 
role in Germany as breadwinner and his future wife as dependent. When I asked Akram if 





The construction of a “traditional” Syrian woman required glossing over many aspects 
of Aisha’s circumstances and personal history. Regardless of the circumstances in Aisha’s 
town, there was a general consensus that refugees in Norway have a better deal than in 
Germany – a higher stipend and a shorter time to wait for permanent residency. In fact, in other 
conversations, Akram talked about his intention to move to Norway one day to join Aisha 
because of the higher wages and better opportunities. Contrasting Dresden with her town was 
therefore at odds with the perception of Akram, and others more generally, of Norway as a 
desirable place to live and work. On top of this his construct doesn’t take account of the fact 
that Aisha attends school, is learning Norwegian and lived in Turkey for years before 
migrating, not to mention that they had conducted a relationship online. As in the cases 
described by Suerbaum (2018) and Hansen (2008), the traditional Syrian woman figure is a 
construct that doesn’t take account of processes of change. Furthermore, the presentation of 
himself as a sage, accomplished migrant who intervenes in the shopping of an elderly woman 
to offer moral guidance is at odds with the uncertainty of his circumstances. By his own 
reckoning, it would be a number of years before he was ready to marry, when he hoped to have 
graduated from his technical education that he would begin the following year and found a job.  
This would seem therefore to correspond to what Kandiyoti (1988) has termed 
“patriarchal restoration” that accompanies the unsettling of gender roles in displacement. 
However, articulating a discourse of hegemonic masculinity in order to “masculinise” in the 
sphere of the family as the terms by which to grapple with the loss of male authority in Germany 
only goes so far as an explanation. Akram, Khalid and others did express their anxieties about 
changing gender relations in the context of Germany, evidenced in the way they talked at length 
about women who “integrate” and the impact on married couples of the welfare state. Couples 
breaking-up and occasional accounts in the news of Arab refugee men attacking their wives 
were situated in the struggle of men and women to adjust to conditions in Germany. Yet, in 
contrast to Syrians in Egypt (Suerbaum 2018), or Somalis in the UK (Hansen 2008) or 
Denmark (Kleist 2010), Akram and others could see migration to Germany as a process of self-
realisation. They did not experience a loss of status which needed to be compensated for, but 
in many cases anticipated their futures in Germany as “engineers”. In other words, Akram and 
others could share conviction that they would one day fulfil the masculine ideal of the male 
breadwinner. In addition, describing women as “integrated” or “unintegrated” certainly 
conveyed anxieties and the intention to fulfil a particular ideal in future married life, but this is 





fact, it could be the opposite. Rather than “naturalise” women’s states, they discursively 
situated the vast majority of migrant Arab women in Germany and Europe within profound 
processes of change. If it is limited to see this as “patriarchal restoration”, how might we situate 
discourses and ethics of women’s “integration”?  
 
The Imperative to Integrate 
 
“Integration” in western societies is a contested concept which has several meanings. One 
helpful interpretation is that it “denotes what it takes for immigrants and refugees, and their 
descendants, to become proper members of a given society.” (Olwig 2013, 8) While most social 
scientific literature focusses on structural barriers to “integration”, public and political 
discourse tends to focus on “culture” (Ewing 2013, 19; Charsley & Spencer 2019). In the last 
few decades, women’s rights and gender issues have emerged as central terms by which to 
judge “integration” in Europe, where gender equality has become essential to the self-identity 
of the nation in opposition to the migrant “Other” (Rostock & Berghahn 2008; Heinemann 
2017). As Kofman et al. have written for a number of European societies, “Gender and 
sexuality are at the centre of debates to enforce integration, if not assimilation” (2013, 77). In 
Germany, concern for the rights of Muslim women has been reflected since 2001 in the “moral 
panic” over what Mandel describes as the “overdetermined symbols” of honour killings, 
coerced marriage, patriarchal violence and the wearing of the headscarf (2008, 11).  
This shift in discourse has been situated in the need to justify and implement new forms 
of immigration control, tied up with processes of nation-state formation and national identity. 
In the context of Austria, Scheibelhofer writes that the “negative effects on migrant men as 
well as women can thus be introduced in the name of defending human rights.” (2012, 328) In 
Germany, Foerster (2015) points to the shift after re-unification and the recognition of 
Germany “as a nation of immigration”. The result of which has been a commitment to move 
beyond a traditional ethno-centred conception of nationality, “towards commitment to 
progressive ideals, cosmopolitanism, gender equality, and a foundation in a particular set of 
values grounded in Christian ethics” (54). She cites, for instance, the 2007 Nationaler 
Integration Plan (NIP) which outlines the responsibilities of migrants who settle in Germany 
to integrate according to a “very specific gendered prescription” and “utilizes the trope of 
imprisoned and imperiled womanhood to create the symbolic boundaries necessary to mark 





the “War on Terror” from the early 2000s and the re-alignment of the right, in which “state 
power… [has] put into place legal and administrative structures that discriminate against 
Muslims” and are seen as a “corrective to policies on the left that have turned a blind eye to 
patriarchal customs” (Fekete 2006, 2). Policies include restrictions on female marriage 
migrants who are seen by the state as vulnerable to abuse, less likely to learn the language and 
who perpetuate across generations patriarchal norms in their assumed roles as primary carers 
of children. In Germany this led to changes to the law in the 2004 Immigration Act which 
raised the age of marriage and introduced pre-screening tests for marriage migrants, which was 
understood to better provide “the opportunity to resist the influence of parental authority and 
other familial traditions” (Kofman et al. 2015, 83). In addition to restricting marriage migration, 
there has been the introduction of civic integration courses and tests in a number of European 
states, as reflected in the 2004 European Council statement of common principles for 
immigrant integration. Despite some variation in models, there has been continuity across 
Europe in implementing steps for civic integration. In Germany, this found its most extreme 
expression in the “Muslim test”, a naturalisation test introduced by the Land government of 
Baden-Württemberg in 2006, where “all questions are formulated in terms of a binary 
opposition between liberal democracy and a certain idea of Islam, as prescribing or condoning 
arranged marriage, patriarchy, homophobia, veiling and terrorism” (Joppke 2007, 15).  
My interlocutors experienced such gender discourses as the site of exclusion and 
inclusion in manifold ways. For those who followed political discourse in Germany, there was 
exposure to anxieties about male migrants among mainstream parties, especially after the 
attacks by predominantly North African asylum seekers in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015-
16. Such a discourse was abundantly clear in campaign posters for the 2017 federal elections, 
where the majority of the far-right AfD’s posters invoked the threat of non-European gender 
norms, such as one poster that showed women in bikinis on the beach. The poster read: 
“Burkas? We are staying in our bikinis” (see Figure 7 on p. 107). Similar themes have been 
shown for other parties, including posters for the CDU during the 2016 Berlin electoral 
campaign following the attacks in Cologne on New Year’s Eve (Borneman & Ghassem-
Fachandi 2017, 130). The clearest encounter with these gender expectations was in the 
integration programme. As other scholars have noted, the integration course, a compulsory 
language programme up to B1 of the Common European Framework, can be understood as a 
process of acculturation to produce desirable citizens. Heinemann, who studied the integration 






[the] courses aim at conveying societal rules and the imagined values of the 
dominant society. The state offers courses with the assumption that subjects with a 
non-European citizenship, and even more so acutely when they are from so-called 
Muslim countries, do not share the same values as German and Austrian citizens. 
(Heinemann 2017, 178) 
 
Gender discourses as the site of integration were explicit in the orienteering course, a 
compulsory three-week programme which introduces German politics, history and society. The 
final week of the three-week course consists of discussions about society, with particular 
attention to the roles of men and women, and gender equality. Class discussions included the 
role of nursery schools, the nature of what constitutes “family”, including so-called “patchwork 
families” (see Figure 6), homosexual couples, and dating and marriage. The issue of women’s 
rights were a key part of the discussions. At one point, after a tempestuous discussion about 
the rights of Muslim men to marry from another religion but women who cannot, the teacher, 
Lars, told the class, “This word, Gleichberechtigunge (equal rights), is for you a mantra. There 
is nothing else. This is the hardest for Muslim people.” The concern for gender relations was 
further reflected in the 333 questions that are available for the 33 questions of the orienteering 
course exam. This included, for example, the following question (no. 267) about the rights of 
an adult woman to choose her own partner which reflects anxieties about the attempts of parents 
to control their daughters: 
 
A young woman in Germany, 22 years old, lives together with her boyfriend. The 
parents of the woman don’t think this is good because they do not like the boyfriend. 
What can the parents of the woman do?  
 
1 They must respect the decision of their adult daughter  
2 They have the right to bring their daughter back to their parents’ home 
3 They can bring their daughter to the police  
4 They search for another husband for their daughter 
 
On the final day of the orienteering course we saw the film Almanya – Willkommen in 





in Germany across three generations of a Turkish-German family beginning with the arrival of 
Huseyin to Germany in 1965, the film’s main protagonist and the millionth-and-one guest 
worker in Germany. In Almanya, Huseyin, whose recent offer of German citizenship occasions 
a process of soul-searching and reflection about his identity, announces to his family that he 
has bought a summer house in his village in Turkey and wants everyone to join him to renovate 
it. On this journey, we are told the story of Huseyin, his wife and children, by Canan, Huseyin’s 
granddaughter. The tragic comedy and feel-good story of migrants who settled in Germany in 
the 1960s shows a family which draws together their Turkish roots and German identity and 
climaxes with Huseyin’s acceptance of his granddaughter’s pregnancy outside marriage with a 
British man before he passes away. For Lars, the film offered an important point for his class 
of predominantly young male refugees from Syria, Iraq and Iran. “People say integration is 
impossible”, he told us, a conclusion that any observer of our class with its often bad-tempered 
exchanges would certainly have agreed with, “but to me this is nonsense (quatsch)”. He 
explained, “rules are rules, feelings are feelings” (Regeln sind Regeln; Gefühle sind Gefühle). 
Feelings, Lars wanted to convey, like those of grandfather Huseyin for his granddaughter 
Canan, trump the divisions and tensions of the “rules” of religion and culture that divide and 
segregate communities. It was a message of hope for his latest class of migrants and refugees, 
at the end of the course designed to lead them towards becoming good citizens.   
 
Resisting the Stigmatised Male Slot 
 
The consequence of discussing gender norms in the integration classes was reactionary 
responses that seemed to produce stereotypes, rigidity and an intractable sense of difference 
between Arabs and Europeans. Take, for instance, when Lars critiqued the decision to marry 
without first getting to know your partner. He asked the class how they are sure who they want 
to marry, and compared arranged marriage to a “fantasy book”. Haitham, a young Iraqi man, 
joined in and joked, “It is like a watermelon. When I buy a watermelon, I hit it to see if it is 
good or not”. Lars inferred that Haitham shared his doubts about such marriage customs and 
the tendency for married couples not to live together or have sex before marriage. However, at 
this point Haitham stopped joking and reacted angrily, turning the tables on Lars he critiqued 
how in Europe “everything is possible”, and that it was worse for people to “get together, live 
together and have a child” without marriage. A Syrian man in the class described how there is 





must be a virgin. At which point Lars questioned whether it was fair that a woman’s virginity 
is questioned, but a man’s is not. A number of students in the class started laughing, and one 
said, suggestively, “The man is always a virgin!” The speaker, enjoying himself, continued, 
explaining that if a man wants to marry but doesn’t have work or money then he will go into 
the street and wait for help from God. At this point the class split into groups who were laughing 
at his description, and those who were incredulous about his Orientalist trope of Arab, Muslim 
fatalism.  
Another debate concerned what constitutes a family. There were different hand-drawn 
configurations of possible families, including couples, couples with children, homosexual 
couples with children and the “patchwork family”. For each configuration, Lars asked, “Is this 
a family?” When he asked about the single woman and her child, members of the class 
responded: “keine Familie” (not a family). “Why?” asked Lars. “Because there is no father”, 
they said, provocatively. Lars reasoned that there was a couple and the father died: do we then 
have the right to say that the woman and her daughter are not a family? He changed the example 
to a man and his daughter: “would you class this as a family?” The students at the back of the 
class responded: yes, it is. Lars, growing more incensed, explained that this was discrimination 
against women, imploring the class: “Think about it!”(überlegt euch!”)   
The class discussions were not always so combative and on some occasions my friends 
said they had learnt to think differently about an issue. Hamad, a friend who did the course a 
different time, told me he was affected by the discussion about what constitutes a family, and 
he agreed with Lars that what matters is that family is based on values of trust and respect. In 
general, however, this was not the case. There could be a certain humour in these exchanges, 
where members of the class would seem to goad Lars by saying the opposite to what he wanted. 
There was light-hearted exaggeration, where they would fulfil his stereotypes casually and even 
apologetically. This could result in comments, such as, “this is how our religion tells us it 
should be”, and a smile. At other times, it was defensive and angry, and fulfilling the figure of 
the patriarchal Arab, Muslim man was stated as proper and preferable to an equally stereotyped 































The reactions of people in the class often differed considerably to outside of class. Often people 
I knew who smoked hashish, had a German girlfriend (or wanted a German girlfriend), talked 
about going to “discos”, and generally seemed to be at ease with gender norms in Dresden, 
would become reactionary in the context of the class. I was not the only one to pick up on this. 
Aliya, a Syrian woman from eastern Syria had studied law in Syria and comes from a family 
of professionals and intellectuals. She described how she had considerable personal autonomy 
growing up in an otherwise conservative area. In the class she tended to share the opinion of 
Lars and was critical of the gender norms that were championed by members of the class. In 
fact, on the second day of the class when we walked to the train station she steadfastly argued 
with four men from the group in loud voices about the rights of homosexuals, until Suhail, 
conscious of how the situation might appear to German onlookers, told everyone to stop. In 
particular, she was critical about the way young men in the class do not “think for themselves”. 
She told me in an interview after the course,  
 






They still don’t have a clear idea. We came to Germany. We have left the war, and 
we want protection. OK, shuw shtaghal laḥālk? (What are you doing for yourself?) 
shuw il-qarār l-nafsak? (What is right in your opinion?) bi-nufsak, shuw taʿmil maʿ 
akhla’ak? (In your opinion, what do you do with your morals?) mafī…. (nothing). 
I cannot accept the opinion of someone else who just tell me [how things should 
be]. All of them, these people, with all due respect, these people, and I have met 
many of them, their lives rotate around having fun (tslayeh), going to the gym, and 
that’s it, and coming and going (talʿa w roḥa), trips to the disco (mishwār ʿalal 
disco). There is no direction (mafī shī direction). I feel that they are lost. But if 
someone heard them in the class, maybe they would think they have direction. They 
have direction of religion, but them, no. They make themselves sheikh because they 
went to pray and after a while they see a girl, they do the opposite. They talk in a 
bad way. 
 
For Aliya, the difference between class members in everyday life and in the class was a result 
of not having “direction” and “being lost” and being unable to think for themselves. She 
criticised what she saw as a default culturalist position, in which angry and lost young men 
articulated rigid notions of a patriarchal religion and culture without thinking critically. She 
wants to ask them, “What is your opinion?” and tells me that she cannot accept the perspective 
of people who just tell her how things should be. This was expanded by Aliya in another part 
of the interview in which she contrasted these men’s opinions with those of her father’s friends 
from her hometown who were conservative but would defend their positions and live their lives 
consistently and were at the same time “open-minded” and able to listen to alternative 
perspectives and to accept people’s differences. 
There were similarities between Aliya’s comments and the way that some of my 
interlocutors in the class would speak about her. Although many people liked her personally, 
and some admired her as “strong” (qawiyya), they would often patronise her as someone who 
“did not think for herself”. In marked contrast to the way that they could be cowed by Aliya’s 
powerful and articulate positions in class, they would dismiss her as someone who “just 
repeated” Lars, “whatever the teacher says, she will repeat it”. The issue, at least in 
conversations with me or when I was present, was not Aliya’s values as much as it was the fact 
that she was perceived to be parroting the expectation of the state that refugees adopt particular 





critique of them; in both cases, the issue is that the other person does not think for him or 
herself. What this suggests is that for participants in the integration course, articulating the 
position of “sheikh” was the terms by which they asserted their capacity to think independently 
and to not parrot Lars or the state. The particular gender discourse of the class should therefore 
be situated less in terms of a “clash of cultures”, which is often how it could sound, and more 
as a process of expressing agency.  
 
Autonomy and Authenticity 
 
The problematic and contested aspects of “integration” were apparent in the meaning of “being 
integrated”. “Integration” (indimaj) could have the meaning of learning German and finding 
work and becoming a member of society. “To be integrated” (indimajet) was short-hand for 
assimilation and adopting particular social and cultural norms of the host society, as reflected 
in the orienteering class, and was reviled and disdained as emasculated and passive. I was first 
introduced to the figure of an “integrated” man on the way to the integration course with Saif 
and Hisham. They had pointed to an Arab man who they joked was “indimajet” because he 
was holding hands and flirting with a woman on the tram. I was curious about what it meant 
“to be integrated”. What is the difference between “integration” as language learning and 
finding work, and “to be integrated”? I asked naïvely. They explained that it was doing things 
that would not have been acceptable in Syria, and they gave the example of kissing in the street. 
An Arab who does this in Europe, they explained, is “mukhalaf” (backwards), or “ʿando nuqs” 
(low self-esteem). “But what is the problem if he does this in Germany?” I asked. Hisham 
replied, “The same people who do these things are the same people who don’t speak the 
language.” He explained, “They just come here and try to fuck as many women as possible, do 
drugs and drink.” However, Saif explained that he would have sex with women at home, 
without doing these things in public. Hisham added that he too had sex with women in Turkey 
and Lebanon. In the conversation, Saif and Hisham make it clear that the problem is not the 
ethics of being with a woman, but the way that this is displayed in public. Through positioning 
themselves as men who sleep with women, they were disassociating the moral dimension of 
seeing a woman from the issue of publicly enacting a European norm – of “being integrated”. 
The fact that such people ape European norms without being able to speak the language, as 





It was not only in the relationships between men and women that there was an anxiety 
about “integration”. It was reflected in a range of situations where the actions of others were 
perceived to entail uncritically imitating European norms. Take, for instance, the comments of 
Khalid about another member of our B1 language class when we had a picnic to celebrate the 
end of the course. Odai, who is from Syria and in his twenties, had brought pork to cook on the 
barbecue and was one of few people drinking beer. When I left on the tram with Khalid 
afterwards he expressed his frustration with him drinking. He told me, there were a number of 
non-Muslims there and they didn’t eat pork, or drink alcohol. But he brought lots of pork and 
was there drinking. “He’s Arab, and Muslim!” In his opinion he was trying to show off. “To 
say ‘look at me, look how European I am.’” Then the teacher will think, “wow he’s Arab and 
Muslim, but he drinks. It’s stupid.” The issue was not drinking itself or eating pork. In fact a 
number of Khalid’s friends drank and smoked hashish, although Khalid did not. The issue was 
the way that such actions were perceived as a kind of unthinking attempt to garner approval 
from the teacher by fitting in, and it was somehow misplaced and clumsy, or “stupid”. The 
several members of the class who do drink alcohol and eat pork ordinarily did not, out of respect 
to others, but Odai did.  
This was similar to another situation involving Khalid. One day during Ramadan in 
2017 I had joined Omar, Khalid and a friend of theirs, Federike, to drink coffee at a café and 
eat cake together. A few days later, Omar asked me about Khalid: Does he really not fast during 
Ramadan? He wanted to know if he was pretending not to fast in order to appeal to Federike. 
This, he explained, would be “kharouf” (sheep-like), a term that is usually used to refer to a 
man who is “under the thumb” of his wife or girlfriend. In this context, it is less about the 
control of a woman, but rather the kind of emasculation of enacting norms that mark one as 
acceptable in the German context. The issue therefore is not that he didn’t fast during Ramadan, 
unsurprising considering that Omar also didn’t fast, but that he might pretend not to fast in 
order to “integrate”.  
The way integration was problematised according to notions of autonomy and 
authenticity is reflected in responses to homosexuals in Germany. A number of times I was 
told about Arabs who become openly homosexual in Germany, and on numerous occasions 
what seemed to be at issue was not homosexuality per se, but an open homosexual identity as 
being non-Arab. Homosexual identity was perceived as contrary to Syrian cultural norms and 
to reflect a craven kind of integration and desire to fit in. One example of this reaction is from 





Laith, Ali told us about how he had met someone he knew from Syria. He said he was “dressed 
up like a gay” and he couldn’t believe his eyes. He said he kept walking and pretended not to 
see him but warned that if the man had come up to him and talked to him, he would have 
punched him in the face. What is interesting, however, is his next comment. He said that he 
had always known he was gay in Syria, but reflected that as far as he was concerned this is 
between him and God. The issue was the fact that he was being openly homosexual in Germany 
in defiance of the perceived norm in Syria, and this was seen by him to represent “being 
integrated” and therefore a loss of autonomy and authenticity. Ironically, of course, this 
contrasts to perceptions of a mainstream German audience who would see this as the opposite, 
being openly homosexual as a process of self-realisation and “coming out”.  
This is not to say that my interlocutors did not problematise things such as 
homosexuality or couples dating outside marriage, both of which are uncommon publicly in 
Syrian and Arab societies. Yet the transition from disapproval to opprobrium and disdain 
relates to the extent to which these become signifiers of “being integrated” – the perception of 
following, unthinkingly, European social and cultural norms. This unease and tension is 
reflected in a third meaning of the term integration. Above, I distinguished between 
“integration” and the problem of “being integrated”. In its third meaning, “to integrate”, when 
said in a suggestive tone of voice, could refer to sleeping with a German woman. This play on 
words reflects resistance to “being integrated”. Rather than conferring the passivity of adopting 
European social and cultural norms, it expressed agency and autonomy. It was not being acted 
upon, but rather acting upon the host society.  
We can therefore see the way that discourses of gender relations represent a particular 
response to the politics of integration in Germany. The production of a conservative discourse 
mirrors what Leila Ahmed describes for the politics of the veil. For colonial authorities in Egypt 
in the nineteenth century, the veil and the condition of women in society was seen to epitomise 
“Islamic inferiority”. The result of this narrative was resistance, and the process of turning the 
veil into a “symbol of the dignity and validity of all indigenous customs” (1992, 163). There 
seems to be a similar process taking place in the classroom, where men in the class “resist” the 
stigmatised male slot by assuming this very position. However, precisely because gender 
discourses were bound up with the imperative to integrate, in other situations my interlocutors 







Situational Discourses of Gender Relations  
 
Gender discourses of my interlocutors share in the idea of “oppositional identities” (Gilliam 
2006) that Schmidt (2011) references in the context of transnational marriages in Denmark. 
Transnational marriages are the cause of controversy and a “moral panic” in Denmark, 
therefore by marrying abroad, her interlocutors, Somali and Turkish men and women, assert 
their difference to the mainstream population. Discourses of conservative gender relations and 
the ideal of a “traditional” Arab woman reflect a similar notion of an “oppositional identity”. 
However, Schmidt makes a further useful point. She shows that even as her interlocutors 
differentiate themselves from the mainstream Danish public, they invoke values of 
individualism and choice that actually reflect “Danish values”. Among my Syrian and 
Palestinian interlocutors in Dresden, I observed how conservative notions of proper gender 
relations could change quite dramatically and the same individuals could, in different contexts, 
display their “open-mindedness” and even critique views considered to be conservative. If 
discourses of gender relations were the site of “oppositional identities”, deliberately brought 
forward to mark a refusal of the imperative to integrate, they could at other times take different 
forms and offer a site in which to express their capacity for inclusion in Germany. 
This was reflected in a debate between three friends, Muktar, Ayaan and Sami, who 
come from the same city in eastern Syria when I joined them on a trip outside Dresden. They 
told me that they enjoy smoking hashish and ʿargileh together and talking about “big” and 
“complicated” issues. It was in this spirit on the evening of the first day of our trip that Sami 
challenged the others to tell him one difference between Syria and Germany. They discussed 
religion and language, and then Ayaan said the main difference is how people see women. He 
said, “Ideas (afkar), the opinion, or view of women.” The majority of people in Europe think 
that women should be equal to men in everything. 
Sami challenged him on this asking if there are not women who have salaries higher than men 
in Syria? 
“Yes”, conceded Muktar, this does happen in Syria.  
Ayaan continued to force his point, he said “On Tuesday I was talking to my teacher about 
marriage, and he said to her: “would you marry your daughter to someone who has bad ethics?” 
She said, ‘the first thing is that you cannot talk about marrying your daughter. It is the daughter 





Seeming to grow more incensed by the conversation, Sami thundered back to Ayaan 
that this was the same as in parts of Syria. “We have a lot of women who marry who they want 
to marry!” At which point they agreed it was descending into shouting and was not worth 
continuing.  
This exchange reflects an instance in which there is the articulation of a very different 
norm of gender relations and problematisation of the distinction between Arabs and Europeans. 
What the tense debate reflects is the value accorded to processes of thinking critically, weighing 
up the evidence and being reflective. Sami, at least, has no time for simplistic assertions of 
difference that stereotype and generalise. He dispels the illusion that all men are breadwinners 
in Syria, or that women do not get to choose who they want to marry. Here, in a very different 
context to the combative exchanges of the integration course, there is much more space for 
thinking differently and openly about the nature and ethics of gender relations and Sami’s 
opinions are not seen as evidence of “being integrated”. In many respects Sami is atypical of 
the people I knew. I only met him on a few occasions, but he was keen to represent himself as 
socially liberal; he talked about his many German friends, his involvement in his city’s trendy 
music scene and characterised his decision to come to Germany as being primarily about 
“meeting women”. However, Sami was not the only one who problematised conservative 
discourses and the construction of a rigid and intractable difference between European and 
Arab societies. Individuals such as Khalid and Akram, who expressed conservative ideals of 
gender relations, could articulate very different values in other contexts, revealing that 
discourses about proper gender relations were not stable and consistent.  
I began the chapter with Khalid’s straightforward distinction between “integrated” and 
“unintegrated” Arab women in Germany. Indeed, Khalid could often express these kinds of 
views of the rightness and wrongness of gender relations and norms. I was struck one day when 
we were sitting in Starbucks with a friend of ours, Waseem, and he and Khalid began talking 
about Yusuf, someone I knew well. It was not unusual to gossip about others in Dresden, but I 
was surprised because I knew that neither Khalid nor Waseem were friends with Yusuf. I was 
even more surprised when they criticised Yusuf using terms that conveyed his failed 
masculinity. They explained that they had seen his WhatsApp profile picture which showed 
him and his girlfriend together and she was not wearing hijab. For both of them it reflected a 
lack of self-respect and it was offensive to display his girlfriend like this online. In similar 
terms to what I describe above in the case of men who are criticised as “integrated”, he failed 





On other occasions, however, Khalid seemed to criticise Arab men who were strict and 
“conservative” husbands. This came up when we went to Berlin one Saturday and we met his 
cousin by chance on Sonnenallee, or “Arab Street”. His cousin invited us back to his apartment 
and we went there to drink coffee and watch television. As soon as we left the apartment, 
Khalid was incredulous about the fact that he had visited his cousin five or six times and had 
still not met his wife. He thought this was either because he did not want him to see or meet 
his wife because he follows a policy of strict segregation, or because he is anxious about Khalid 
meeting his wife who may not wear hijab. Either way, he complained, this showed that he was 
“conservative” (mutʿasab) and “crazy” (majnoun), and he contrasted his cousin’s attitude to 
the relaxed and trusting attitude of his friends whose wives he would frequently meet and 
enjoyed talking to and spending time with. 
Akram also displayed this kind of complex and varying position. In contrast to his self-
representation as a patriarchal man, as on our trip to Norway, he could criticise others who 
refuse to change, or accept the values of the society they are in. Take, for instance, the following 
exchanges on a tram involving Riad, a pious man in his early thirties, and one of the few people 
I knew who went to the small mosque in Johannstadt every day. Riad and I were in the same 
orienteering class and on the way back from the course one day we talked about why, in Islamic 
opinion, Free Body Culture (Freikörperkultur), or FKK, was wrong. Khalid and Akram, who 
had been at their B2 language class at the same school, were standing nearby, but did not 
engage with the conversation and fastidiously looked busy on their phones. When Riad got off 
the tram, they started to criticise him. “He is a Sheikh!” they said mockingly. Khalid was 
sceptical, “he brings the ideas he has from Syria to Germany, but this is a mistake […] We are 
in Europe!” Taken aback by their disdain of Riad’s uncontroversial view (that Islam does not 
condone FKK) which had been shared by members of the orienteering class just a few minutes 
earlier, I asked Akram if he has a problem with FKK? He replied, sounding remarkably similar 
to Lars, the teacher of the integration programme who he had criticised in the past, “No, if 
someone has a problem with this then go. You don’t need to come to Europe.” He said that if 
people wanted a “Muslim life” then they shouldn’t come to Europe.  
“Do you think a refugee in Germany needs to be open-minded (minfitiḥ)?” I asked.  
“Yes, they can have other ideas, but they should keep it inside.” 
Confronted with the pious and self-righteous discourse of Riad, Khalid and Akram both 
problematised and mocked what they saw as the mistaken failure to adjust to the new conditions 





Khalid and Akram, whereby refusal of its legitimacy would reflect the virtue of being a refugee 
in Germany who refuses “to be integrated”. Here, however, it was the stage for the expression 
of a very different attitude. In the particular context of the conversation with Riad what is 
valorised is the capacity to adjust and be open-minded. 
This problematises what has tended to be treated as the tendency for migrant men to 
adjust to new gender norms or not in the context of displacement, which comes across clearly 
in Stef Jansen’s work with Bosnian men in the Netherlands. He distinguishes between the 
“serious or modern man” who engages in emplacement and disowns the patriarchal norms of 
Bosnian society to enact a form of patriarchy “compatible” with the West, and others, who 
“tended to be perceived, and often perceived themselves, as representatives of a peculiar form 
of masculinity, of a ‘really’ patriarchal culture” (2008, 193). In contrast, Ingvars and Gislason 
show how young, left-wing Syrian refugee activists in Athens “upheld [an] emerging pattern 
toward gender equality” (2018, 396) through attending demonstrations for women’s rights and 
sharing cleaning and cooking responsibilities equally. In contrast to these accounts, my 
interlocutors could at times assert conservative opinions on gender norms and, at other times, 
articulated more “open-minded” and alternative views. This seems to share with the way that 
discourses about gender norms have been shown to be sites of complex ethical reasoning. 
Magnus Marsden (2007) has written about this in relation to “elopement” among Chitralis. 
While people generally disapproved of elopement as dangerous and disruptive to society, they 
could nonetheless display that they were “modern” through championing the rights of young 
people to marry freely. Similarly, Schielke has conceptualised “romantic love” as a “grand 
scheme” among men in the village of Nizrat al-Rayyis in Egypt, which would conflict with and 
be negotiated alongside other grand schemes, such as Islam (2015). In the context of Dresden, 
young Syrian and Palestinian men’s contrasting accounts of gender relations and norms reflect 
the way that they are the site for expressions of dignity. At times, this could be reflected in an 
“oppositional identity” and articulating “hegemonic masculinity”, and at others, it was 
embodied in displaying open-mindedness, acceptance of alternative norms and, with it, the 




This chapter has explored discourses about gender relations among Syrian and Palestinian men 





displacement have tended to be interpreted as symptomatic of a crisis faced by men unable to 
fulfil expectations of the masculine slot. One response to such tensions has been to enact 
“patriarchal restoration”, in which displaced men seek to produce dignity in a context of stigma 
by asserting their “naturalised” claim to power and authority in the sphere of the family. This 
chapter has expanded on this by showing how in the context of young male Syrian and 
Palestinian refugees in Germany, such gender discourses are not the result of a default, 
culturalist position, but reflect a very particular engagement with the “imperative to integrate” 
in Germany. In this context, discourses and practices of conservative gender relations can be 
the site for the expression of dignity and virtues of autonomy and authenticity through display 
of the refusal “to be integrated”. At the same time, in contrast to literature on displaced men 
which has tended to describe how men adjust to a new gender order or don’t, this chapter draws 
attention to how such discourses and practices vary and are situational; in some contexts the 
ability to be open-minded, think critically and adjust was valorised. In this shifting picture, 























In March 2016 two Syrian refugees pulled badly-injured Stefan Jagsch, a candidate for the far 
right NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands), out of his car in the state of Hesse. 
The Syrians were reported to come from precisely the asylum shelter that Jagsch and the NPD 
had campaigned against and which led the NPD to gain over 10% of the vote in the 2016 local 
elections in the town of Büdingen. The irony was not lost on local, national and international 
media as reports contrasted the “helpful Syrians” to the “heartless NPD man” (Jürgs 2016). 
The Syrians were lauded for their responsibility and responsiveness, including precise details 
of their actions, such as what they told the firefighters arriving on the scene and their 
administration of first aid (Oltermann 2016). The Hessian Minister of Economic Affairs, Green 
politician Tarek Al-Wazir, quoted on Twitter an Arabic proverb: “Shame your enemies by your 
decency.”  
 
The unfortunate accident of the NPD candidate helps to introduce the central paradox at the 
heart of this chapter: the capacity for the far right in Germany, which campaigns on a platform 
of fear and resentment of migrants and minorities, especially Muslim men, to provide a context 
in which Syrian and Palestinian refugees displayed themselves as “responsible men” and 
worthy citizens. Literature has explored the extent to which refugees and migrants can face 
discrimination and victimisation in host societies (Vigh 2009; Lucht 2011). Refugees have been 
conceptualised as a marginal population without rights and stuck in a “state of exception”, or 
“bare life”, embodied in the site of the camp, following Agamben (1998). While ethnography 





and uncertain than Agamben’s concept of “bare life” (Ong 2006), there is no doubt that 
refugees can face discrimination and exclusion. Refugees and migrants can find themselves 
turned into what Stephens, writing about US policies of immigration control, has termed “pre-
emptive suspects” (Stephen 2018). This can be particularly difficult for male migrants. In the 
UK, Griffiths (2015) has shown how male asylum applicants whose racialised gender 
associates them with “agency, illegality, and/or criminality”, conflicts with border officials’ 
expectations of refugees as “feminised” and “passive” suffering bodies. Migrant men can also 
find themselves at much greater risk of victimisation for breaking labour market restrictions 
(Turner 2016). In their study of the representation of the refugee crisis, Castaneda and Holmes 
(2016) have explored the deployment in mainstream media and in the discourse of politicians 
of “deserving” and “undeserving” refugees. While Syrians in Germany were often seen as 
“deserving”, they have nonetheless been the object of negative characterisations, stereotypes 
and discrimination. They have been portrayed as “benefit scroungers” (Pearlman 2017), anti-
Semites (Özyürek 2016) and, in the aftermath of the attacks in Paris in November 2015, as 
“terrorists”. In the wake of sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015/16, male 
refugees were represented as threats to German women in what Kosnick (2019) has termed a 
“moral panic”. 
Closely related to such discrimination and negative representation is the emergence of 
far right political parties and social movements. The “refugee crisis” in 2015-16 has led to a 
surge of support for the far right in Germany, who utilised events to raise questions about 
immigration and its threat to a “native” national identity and population. This includes 
discourses which serve to represent refugees as either threatening and dangerous or “cowards” 
(Rettberg & Gajjala 2016). Scholars have explained support for the far right according to the 
notion of “politicised places”, in which the arrival of migrants combines with national anti-
immigrant rhetoric (Hopkins 2010), as well as a consequence of urban inequalities (Kandylis 
& Kavoulakos 2013). In Germany, Bock (2018) has shown how the refugee crisis led to the 
growth of the far right by functioning as a “catalyst” to “pre-existent discontent with austerity 
and multicultural liberalism” (394). In Sweden, Kimmel has explored how joining extremist 
far right groups can be the site of masculine maturity and a “rite of passage” (2007). There has 
also been interest in the strategies for dissemination and popularisation of the far right, such as 
the important role of marches in creating “collectives of emotion” (Virchow 2007). Alongside 
what drives support for the far right, there has been close attention to its impact on politics and 





to become a long-term political influence (Dostal 2015) and its effect on mainstream political 
parties (Stier et al. 2017).  
The plethora of work on the far right has not produced similar attention to the impact 
of its emergence on the lived experience of migrants and minorities. One exception is a piece 
by Machtans (2016) which explores the bind facing Islamic organisations in Germany who can 
inadvertently produce representation of Muslims as a collective and undifferentiated front in 
their condemnation of the far-right and its effect on society. In general, however, there has been 
little interest in the effect of far right parties and social movements on the lived experience of 
migrants and refugees. In Greece, Ingvars and Gislason (2018) elude to the formation of 
broader coalitions of solidarity between citizens and refugees in response to the neo-Nazi 
Golden Dawn but do not elaborate on the implications of this for their campaign in garnering 
support from the wider public. 
In this chapter, I seek to show the consequences for Syrians and Palestinians of living 
in the centre of far right politics in Germany. For my friends, the experience of hostility and 
discrimination would regularly be identified as the worst aspect of living in Dresden. The 
consequences of being singled out in front of a packed bus by an intolerant bus driver, for 
instance, could ruin a day and generate a lasting feeling of unwelcome. There could be concerns 
about safety and the perception of rigged bureaucratic decisions could make life harder and 
more uncertain. In most cases, the response of Syrians and Palestinians was to avoid trouble 
and keep their heads down. The experience of discrimination in Dresden was often closely 
linked to the far right, as someone who was discriminatory, for example, would be labelled a 
“Nazi” - an indelicate term which had little to do with people described as, or self-identifying 
as, neo-Nazis. However, responses to organised expressions of the far right could be very 
different. Rather than being part and parcel of the same picture of discrimination and 
inhospitality in Dresden, it was often treated as something distinct. I explore how this could 
take different forms, where the far right was seen as both indicative of native German society 
and, in other instances, its “abject Other”. Within both these conceptions of the far right there 
emerged a space in which to make a claim to belong in Germany as “responsible men”, either 
as worthy individuals in contrast to unworthy refugees, or as refugees collectively in the face 
of the far right. In doing so, the far right afforded a space in which refugees could challenge 







“There are too many men” 
 
There was a general perception among my friends that refugees were disliked and distrusted in 
German society and especially in Dresden. Dresden was often described as “the most beautiful 
city with the worst people” because of people’s hostility to refugees, and most of my friends 
had countless experiences in which they felt victimised. Public transport often seemed to be a 
site of such hostility. The experience of Rasheed, an Iraqi man in his early thirties who was a 
friend of one of my interlocutors, Mohammed, is typical. He told me one evening when 
Mohammed and I visited him that earlier in the day the driver of a bus he was riding on in 
Dresden had walked from the front of the bus to the back door and shouted at him in front of 
everyone to move away from the door. As he sat on the edge of a sofa smoking ʿargileh and 
looking shaken by the experience, he said, “It is racism. They would never speak to a German 
like that!” After the incident he had cancelled his plans and gone home to lie down in his 
apartment for the rest of the day. Such accounts of verbal abuse, or more subtle behaviours 
such as being stared at, were common complaints among my friends. Khalid, for example, 
described his dismay when he heard a “shutter” go off and saw a woman pointing her phone at 
him to take a picture. When I asked why she might want to take a photo, he said she would 
probably share it online and say, “ha, look at this refugee!” 
  These experiences reflect the point made by Hargreaves (2016) in the context of 
Muslims in the UK when he writes that most people complained of staring, verbal abuse and 
indifference rather than verbal and physical assaults. The experience of hostility and 
indifference, or the sharing of such experiences by other people, could create an almost 
constant sense of anticipation of hostility that served to exacerbate further the feeling of being 
unfairly treated and victimised. Mundane frustrations of everyday life could be situated in a 
broader terrain of hostility and exclusion, such as a bus driver refusing to wait. This happened 
a number of times and the explanation was always the “small-mindedness” (ʿaql ṣaghīr) of the 
driver. This was the case one evening when I joined Abdelkarim and his brother Nasser to a 
German language class at a small Pentecostal church on the outskirts of Dresden. After the 
event, Abdelkarim and I ran to the bus stop to meet the bus as it pulled up and we tried half-
heartedly to block the doors from closing while we waited for Nasser who was running towards 
us. When Nasser was only metres away, the driver managed to close the doors and abruptly 
took off, forcing us to wait thirty minutes for the next bus. For Abdelkarim and Nasser, it was 





trumped whether or not people made it on to a bus or tram, and I had seen many Germans suffer 
a similar fate.  
Syrians and Palestinians in Dresden would experience what Fraser has defined as 
“misrecognition”, when “institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute some actors as 
inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social 
interaction” (Fraser in Fraser & Honneth 2003, 29 in Kleist 2010, 5). To this extent, Syrians 
and Palestinians share the experience of hostility and discrimination of Muslim minorities more 
broadly in Germany, as reflected by German converts to Islam who complain of becoming 
“third-class citizens” and losing respect in public life (Özyürek 2014, 46). This sense of being 
excluded or “Other” was understood to centre around particular tropes. My friends would talk 
openly about how Germans were suspicious of them as potential “terrorists” in the wake of 
attacks perpetrated, or initially suspected of being perpetrated, by refugees from Syria, such as 
the attack on the Bataclan in Paris in November 2015. There was awareness that mainstream 
society feared them as patriarchal and misogynistic, which, as I showed in Chapter 3, could 
result in an exaggeration of precisely these norms as it becomes a stage for the expression of 
autonomy and authenticity in contexts such as the orienteering class. Yet in everyday life my 
friends lived in the shadow of such perceptions. Mohammed, for example, described his feeling 
of being under constant suspicion from Germans at the gym he attended that he would behave 
inappropriately towards women who were training there. As a result, he would avoid using 
machines that put him in close proximity to any women. 
The consequence of being victimised and the perception that as young male refugees 
they were already “suspects” shaped people’s conduct in everyday life. This helps to explain 
the reflections of Laith and Jamil during an incident while we were riding on trams and drinking 
to pass the time one evening. At one stop on the outskirts of Dresden an Algerian man had 
stood up in the other compartment and shouted in Arabic to an Arab woman sitting close to us 
that she was a “whore”, before he exited. As the tram left the stop he hit the window where she 
was sitting. For her part, the woman defiantly shouted back, before turning to two German 
friends to explain what he had said. Afterwards, I asked Laith and Jamil what they would have 
done if the man had approached the woman and I was surprised when they said they would not 
have intervened to protect her. Jamil explained it would be too risky as Syrians in Germany 
and Laith agreed. Laith gave an example of his friend to illustrate what could happen if they 
did get involved. He told me that his friend had helped an elderly woman who had been pushed 





did do something then they would move away and call the police. When I asked if this is what 
they would do in Syria, they laughed incredulously and indicated that in Syria they would 
definitely intervene. In contrast to Syria therefore, Laith and Jamil were hamstringed by the 
association of Syrian migrant men as dangerous and the potential for their actions to be 
misconstrued. When we eventually left the tram and waited by the stop to return to the city 
there was a woman stood on her own. Jamil turned to me and said, sarcastically: “the German 
woman should feel unsafe because there are two Arab men who might attack her, right?” 
The conversation with Laith and Jamil on the tram is a good example of how the climate 
of suspicion as stigmatised refugee men could result in a determination to avoid trouble. This 
was often the response of my friends to perceptions of discrimination. Akram explained this to 
me as a way to get by in a position of powerlessness when I approached him one day to ask for 
advice about a problem with the manager of the company owning my apartment in Dresden in 
late 2017, a couple of months before I was due to leave.  
The manager of the company had agreed that I could hand over the apartment to 
someone as a Nachmieter (new tenant) to complete the rest of the contract. However, when I 
approached her with details about my friend Hussein, a Syrian refugee in his early thirties, she 
refused. The problems confronting refugees in finding apartments have been documented (El-
Kayed & Hamann 2018), and this was often a considerable challenge for my interlocutors. This 
company, however, was one of the few in Dresden that was willing to rent to refugees, or so I 
thought. The manager explained to me in a surprisingly candid way that they had a new policy 
of not accepting Syrian male refugees. They had been “overrun” by Syrian men, she said, and 
she complained that they have too many guests, they make too much noise on weekday 
evenings, they hang around the building at night, and they intimidate female residents. She said 
she would accept a Syrian refugee woman, but not a man. A few days later, I wrote asking her 
to re-consider her ban on Syrian refugee men or I would see what options there were to take 
legal action because she was discriminating against Hussein on the basis of gender and 
nationality. In response, she went on the offensive. She denied their policy of refusing Syrian 
refugee men and explained that I could not leave the contract.  
It was in this context that I visited Akram to ask if he would help me decide what to say 
to the manager the following day, but his opinion about the situation was derisory. He mocked 
my attempts to hold her to account, “You are not giving a lecture at university!” he said after I 
finished the speech I had rehearsed. It is “her country” and “her company” and he spread his 





to say to get a Nachmieter. Kiss her arse. Kiss wherever you need to kiss to get her to agree.” 
For Akram, the notion of challenging her was a losing battle. While he might sympathise with 
the cause, he saw it as naïve and thought it would only harm myself. 
Akram’s attitude can be situated in the strategy for survival that had enabled him to get 
by the past five years as a young man in Lebanon and then Turkey after fleeing Syria in 2011. 
Yet, he explained to me such an attitude was also an important part of growing up in Syria, 
 
In Syria, we are used to this. If someone is bigger than someone else, you kiss their 
arse. You do whatever you have to do. There is an expression in Arabic: If you need 
something from a dog, you call it sīdī (sir). And all the people who tell you to do 
something about it, to make a complaint, go to court, they would do exactly the 
same.  
 
Discrimination was not, in the opinion of Akram, something that could be changed. Even if I 
went to court, he explained later in the conversation, the judges would always believe her over 
me because she is German. Akram’s strategy was therefore to call the dog “sīdī” and avoid 
trouble. In other conversations, he suggested that this would change once he was given the right 
to remain (qadm lijuʾ) and did not face his current condition of legal uncertainty. Until that 
time he intended to keep a low profile.  
Not everyone saw the need to avoid trouble like Akram, or Jamil and Laith. In fact, 
when I told Omar about the situation with the manager he said it was incumbent on me that I 
do not accept her terms of finding an alternative Nachmieter. “If you stay quiet, you are like 
the devil”, he told me. Yet, in practice, there were limits to what Omar imagined as his capacity 
to hold Germans to account. This was apparent on my last evening in Dresden. We had queued 
up at a club in Neustadt called Downtown and were getting ready to enter when the bouncer 
looked at Omar’s ID and said matter-of-factly he could not enter. He did not give a reason, but 
he said Omar could go to the bar above, called Groove Station. Adopting a more reasonable 
tone, or trying to stave off inevitable protestations, he explained that Omar could enter the club 
if the bouncers at the main entrance radioed to say he was allowed. We walked back to the 
main entrance and the man said we couldn’t enter because “there are too many men” (es gibt 
zu viele Männer) in the club. In fact, the issue was very clearly that he was a Syrian man, 
reflected by the way that the two German men waiting behind us had not faced any obstacles. 





security guard became defensive, challenging Omar to label him a “Nazi”. We walked away 
quietly, Omar in a quiet anger, disappointment and shame. “ana ikhjal minak” (I feel shy 
towards you) he told me after we entered a different club and got a drink, “it’s your last night 
and we couldn’t enter the club because of me”. He articulated his frustration at the stigma of 
his identity as a refugee man in Dresden. However, his mood quickly changed from regret and 
shame to frustration and revenge as we stood outside the second club and smoked a cigarette. 
He imagined that the tables were turned, and he was in the position of power and it was them, 
Germans, who were forced to flee their homeland to Syria. He imagined them queuing up 
outside a club in his city in Syria where he would tell them they could not enter, repeating the 
words he would use: “weil du Deutsch bist!” (because you are German!) Yet such a fantasy 
goes to show his own powerlessness to enjoy the position of authority of the bouncers outsider 
the club in Dresden, as such a reversal of power relations would only be possible in an unlikely 
future scenario in his hometown in Syria.  
Omar did tell me once about his friend who speaks German well and had held a woman 
to account after she was rude to him on a tram. His friend told her, he said, admiringly, “Do I 
not have two eyes like you? Am I not a person like you?” There were other accounts of 
responses. One friend bragged about hitting a German man who poured beer on him in the tram 
and offended Prophet Mohammed. In general, however, hostility and discrimination were seen 
as part of everyday life and most people sought to avoid trouble. The satisfaction of imagining 
fighting back or standing up for yourself was often articulated in a particular future, or an 
elsewhere. In Akram’s case, it was when he became a citizen; for Omar, it was a future point 
in Syria. The options for challenging discrimination were therefore limited and had the effect 
of producing a sense of being second class members of society. This presents a contrast to 
victimisation by the far right which, far from eliciting a sense of exclusion and hopelessness, 
seemed to open up a space in which to produce narratives of belonging and even the space to 
perform such belonging to a German public.  
 
The Far Right in Dresden 
 
Saxony, and its capital Dresden, are the centre of the growing populist far right in Germany. In 
September 2017, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), whose then co-leader, Frauke Petry, was 
based in Freital, near Dresden, became the first far right party to enter the Bundestag since the 





vote, and Saxony was the only state where the AfD won an overall majority, gaining 27% of 
the vote. Dresden was also the site of the founding of the controversial and influential Pegida 
movement, later set up across cities throughout Germany (Legida in Leipzig, for example), but 
never with the same success as in Dresden. The organisation reached the height of its popularity 
and influence in early 2015 at the time of the “refugee crisis”, when as many as 25,000 people 
protested in the centre of the city on Monday evenings. Pegida continued to meet every Monday 
during my fieldwork, often drawing hundreds of people for its “Spaziergänge” (walk) through 
the centre of the city.  
How do people explain the success and influence of the far right in Saxony and 
especially Dresden? Most commentators emphasise the role of the communist past. According 
to this theory, the culture of GDR, the German Democratic Republic, explains the appeal of 
the authoritarian far right (Chazan 2017). The history of the GDR also meant East Germans 
were relatively unused to foreigners because, unlike the migration of Turkish Gastarbeiter in 
the 1960s in West Germany, GDR did not witness similar migration, although there were small-
scale labour programmes with Vietnam, Mozambique and other communist or non-aligned 
states. Also there was never the same education and atonement about the Nazi past as in West 
Germany because in the GDR, under the influence of the Soviets, the atrocities of the Nazis 
were represented as the responsibility of West Germany. The most convincing explanation for 
the appeal of the far right, however, which was common among Dresdeners too, is the 
existential and material ramifications of the Wende, or reunification. Post-1989 saw a loss of 
community and family members who left to find work in the west of Germany, as well as a 
loss of employment and the indignity of overlordship by institutions and personnel from the 
once-despised West (Berdahl 1999). Even twenty-five years after unification, inequality still 
exists between former East and West Germany in employment and wages. The far right can be 
seen to answer to these frustrations and disappointments, as well as the bewilderment of 
change. In this context, Dresden, as state capital and the traditional regional centre of economy, 
government and culture, has become a site for the expression of such tendencies, even as the 
city itself often seemed to have less of an immediate far right presence than other parts of 
Saxony and elsewhere in eastern Germany, reflected, for instance, in the fact that the centre-
right CDU party kept its seat in Dresden in the 2017 federal election. Dresden also did not 
witness the kind of riots and violence of neighbouring Chemnitz over discontent with refugees 







Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
 
AfD burst on to the political stage when it narrowly missed the 5% threshold to enter the 
German parliament in the 2013 federal election, just six months after it was founded in April 
2013. Set up in Bad Nauheim in Hesse by economics professor Bernd Lucke and other business 
leaders and journalists, including, like Lucke, some former members of the CDU, the party was 
set-up to campaign on economic policy, and specifically against the euro at the time of the 
eurozone crisis and the bailout of Greece. Despite certain right-wing tendencies, such as 
claiming that nationalist pride is discouraged in Germany (as reflected in one of its main 
campaign slogans, “Mut zu Deutschland”, which can be translated as “dare to stand by 
Germany”), it did not display populist far right policies or language, which Azheimer defines 
as “nativism”, “authoritarian tendencies” (a “preference for strictly ordered society, strong 
leadership and severe punishments for offenders”), and a “thin” ideology of pure people against 
a corrupt, political elite, and majority rule above human rights (Arzheimer 2015, 537). While 
this may be the case, the view of the electorate in the 2013 federal election shows that the 
majority of its support did not come from voters concerned with economic policy but from 
concerns over migration and integration (Schmitt-Beck 2017). This election saw a split in AfD, 
between its founder, Lucke, and a more radical wing led by Frauke Petry who moved the party 
further to the right, shifting emphasis from the Eurozone crisis to the issue of immigration as 
well as “lifestyle politics”, such as the “three-child family”. This resulted in Bernd Lucke 
leaving the party in 2015 after losing the leadership to Petry, worn down by her faction’s 
“nationalist and xenophobic statements and lack of loyalty” (Grabow 2016, 174). The success 
of AfD in the 2017 election campaign was based on mobilising the electorate’s anxieties about 
immigration, and especially Muslim refugees. Their campaign posters included explicit 
reference to the threat of Islam and migration and one of the demands of the party was an 









Germany has for a long time had active right-wing groups and networks (Virchow 2007). More 
recently, as issues of immigration and integration have become more widespread, these low-
profile, neo-Nazi groups have been superseded by populist, less radical groups. The most 
renowned of which is Pegida: Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West 
(Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes). Pegida was founded as a 
protest movement in Dresden in October 2014 by Lutz Bachmann when it was announced that 
Dresden would house 12 refuge centres. Pegida is concerned with what it terms a “culture war” 
(Kulturkampf) and accuses political elites and businesspeople of colluding in “ethnic 
redeployment” (Umvolkung) in which ethnic Germans are replaced by ethnic minorities. It 
warns of the threat of “parallel societies” and Sharia law and agitates for closer ties to Russia. 
They are deeply critical of elites, which includes the media, who they term “Lügenpresse” 
(lying press), and politicians, described as “Volksverräter” (traitors of the people). They hold 
especial scorn for Merkel, who is the focus of a number of chants, such as “Merkel muss weg” 
(Merkel must go). Unlike AfD, it was not founded by a disaffected, politically influential, 






intellectual class. The founder, Bachmann, for instance, was a serial criminal who fled to South 
Africa in 1998 after being sentenced to prison for several years. Yet the party has appeal among 
a range of socio-economic groups, and people attending the meetings often have higher formal 
education and a regular income (Grabow 2016). The organisation is best known for its weekly 
“Spaziergänge” taking place every Monday evening in the centre of Dresden, characterised by 
distinctive chants and the prevalence of German flags which are still largely taboo in Germany. 
In June 2018, the demonstration was in the news because of chants of “sink, sink, sink” among 
supporters in reference to refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean. However, despite 
continuing to court controversy, commentators have observed how the evening walks play an 
important function in distinguishing Pegida from violent far right groups (Bittner 2015).   
 
The Reason of the Far Right 
 
Discrimination in everyday life in Dresden was closely linked by my interlocutors to the 
organised far right. The bouncer who prevented Omar entering the club, for example, was 
labelled “Nazi” and would be assumed to be affiliated with Pegida and AfD. Indeed, it was the 
presence of the far right that was often given as an explanation of the particular challenges 
associated with living in Dresden as the city of the “worst people”. The success of the far right 
nationally was also the cause of anxiety and could lead to doubts about the future. In Chapter 
1, for example, I cited the example of Mohammed who was anxious to find work as soon as 
possible after AfD’s success in the 2017 federal elections. Yet the response of many Syrians I 
knew to the success of AfD in the elections was not that this represented an unavoidable threat 
to their future in Germany, owing to their status as Arabs and refugees, but that it was a threat 
to some refugees: refugees who were not doing something with their lives, “dependent” 
refugees and criminals. 
The way that the far right produced a distinction between worthy and deserving 
refugees and despised others could be articulated in encounters with its members. In a 
discussion about Pegida during the orienteering course, for example, one member of the class, 
Aliya, told us about her brother who had an accident on his bike when he was cycling through 
the Großer Garten (Great Garden) in the centre of Dresden and was helped by what happened 
to be “two members of Pegida”. They said to him, she told the class, they do not have a problem 
with people like him who came to Germany to work, they only have a problem with people 





far right, Aliya communicated the distinction between worthy and unworthy refugees, and how 
her brother fits firmly into the former category.  
This was part of a pattern of accounts of encounters with the far right where initial 
hostility would appear to give way to a change of attitude after recognising that a refugee was 
working or was respectable in some other way. In some cases, being “accepted” by the far right 
could represent a kind of rite of passage or transition. This was the case for Laith, for example. 
For a long time Laith struggled to be accepted in the bar at the bottom of the building opposite 
to where he lived. He repeatedly received abuse from patrons even as he had warm relations 
with the two women who ran the bar. In the men’s toilets, there was a sticker declaring that 
this is a “Nazi Kreis” (Nazi area) with an image of a rifle. However, it was a source of pride 
for Laith and an expression of change in his status that over time he was able to be accepted by 
customers in the bar. When I visited one day in mid-2017, he told me they were now friendly 
to him because they would see him come to the bar late at night after a long day at work at his 
brother’s restaurant. Being accepted by patrons at a bar which had neo-Nazi stickers was 
therefore emblematic of his transition from refugee to “non-refugee”, as someone who works 
and is contributing to German society.  
The far right could be instrumentalised by my friends to distinguish between worthy 
and unworthy refugees. I described above the construction of refugees as either violent 
“terrorists” or “cowards” fleeing conflict and leaving women and children behind. This 
discourse was the terms by which Khalid, who is Palestinian, distinguished himself as a worthy 
and masculine man in contrast to Syrians fleeing Syria when he told me about an exchange he 
had one day with a member of Pegida who was demonstrating. The context for this is the 
distinction between Palestinians and Syrians fleeing the conflict in Syria, which I explore in 
more detail in Chapter 6. What is significant for understanding the following account is that 
while Syrians fled their homeland, for Palestinians, leaving Syria was experienced as a move 
from one form of statelessness to another. Khalid told me,  
 
I once talked to a Nazi. It was early on and there was a Pegida demonstration. I 
asked him, “why are you demonstrating?” He told me, “when we had a war here, 
we stayed. It was difficult, but we stayed in our country. If there is a war in Syria, 
then people should go there and fight. But why is it all the young men are coming 





if you want to fight Assad, or you are with Assad, you should go back to Syria and 
fight. 
 
Although the member of Pegida directs his ire at men fleeing Syria indiscriminately, Khalid 
marshals this to distinguish himself, as a Palestinian, from Syrians, on the premise that while 
Syrians were either for or against Assad and were invested in their country, this was not 
significant for him. In other words, Syrians were cowards for fleeing their homeland, unlike 
him as a Palestinian. In fact, for Khalid and others, migration to Germany could be seen as a 
step closer to “return” to Palestine. The far right discourse that young male refugees are 
cowards is therefore taken on by Khalid to distinguish himself from the figure of an 
emasculated Syrian refugee.  
What this shows therefore is the way that the far right could become the terms to express 
emic conceptions of worthiness and a site in which one could perform “insiderness” in relation 
to others. Such “insiderness” could even find expression through processes of “becoming” the 
far right. This could take the form of ironically repeating the slogans of Pegida, for instance. 
My friends would often spontaneously shout “Ausländer aus” (foreigners out), or “schize 
Ausländer” (shit foreigners). If an “Ausländer” was talking too loudly on a tram, or had his or 
her feet on the chairs, someone might say this in varying degrees of mock, ironic disapproval. 
While this was mostly done for humour, shouting expressions of the far right had the effect of 
symbolically turning the speaker into an insider, as someone capable of marshalling German 
to exclude someone else. I sensed for some of my friends there was an enjoyment in this role-
play and adopting a position that distanced them from the figure of an outsider. This was also 
the case in instances in which someone literally joined a Pegida demonstration. Jamil told me, 
for instance, about a time he joined a Pegida march from the main train station. He boasted 
about how no one knew he was Syrian, reflecting his bravery and guile, but also his similitude: 
he was unrecognisably “Ausländer” as a result of his fair complexion and his ability to perform 
like an insider.   
In the context of Dresden and the stigma associated with refugeeness, discourses of 
approval or recognition by the far right offered one measure of displaying their status as worthy 
citizens. Such a discourse emerged from processes in which Pegida and AfD were constructed 
as “native”. This was apparent in Khalid’s account above of an old, wizened German man 
recounting his war-time resilience, for example. In fact, this could be something of a bonus of 





distributed around different parts of Germany to exaggerate the benefits and advantages of their 
city to one another. What this seemed to express was one’s fortune and perhaps implicitly, 
accomplishment. It could therefore be a kind of competitive stakes leading people to make 
exaggerated claims about the advantages of where they lived. Boasting about Dresden tended 
to centre on two claims. The first was the relative abundance of affordable housing compared 
to places like Hamburg or Berlin. The second was that it offered the “real” Germany. In what 
could sound like the ethnicised discourse of the far right, cities such as Stuttgart, Hamburg and 
Berlin were often criticised by my friends as being “all foreigners” (kulu ajānib). Khalid told 
me this one day after he returned from a trip to Stuttgart. He pointed to a white man walking 
on the other side of the road and said in Stuttgart you don’t see this. This, he explained, is the 
advantage of being in Dresden: you meet Germans, and you can speak German. It is perhaps 
unsurprising therefore that the far right, consisting of predominantly white, middle-aged men, 
could be seen as legitimating claims of worthiness. However, the far right had a complex 
position for my interlocutors. Its perception as the embodiment of Germany was accompanied 
by a second discourse, one in which they were a minority, or fringe group, at odds with 
Germany’s liberal, democratic modern history.   
 
The Far Right as “Other” 
 
While the far right could offer terms for distinguishing worthy from unworthy refugees, there 
was at the same time differentiation between the far right and “Germans”. Germans could be 
described as reasonable, open-minded, Christian, and even clean; “Nazis” could be 
characterised as unclean, immoral and atheist. At times, the far right could be associated with 
a foreign power or interests. Bassem explained to me while we were waiting to see his 
supervisor at the Jobcenter that Pegida was a Russian plot to weaken Germany, for example. 
His imaginative rationale was that the arrival of refugees had led Germany to direct its overseas 
development aid inwards in order to provide for the newcomers and this in turn strengthened 
its economy. Pegida, by demonstrating against refugees, sought to end this and subsequently 
weaken Germany. Although no one else seemed to share Bassem’s concern about Germany’s 
budget for development, it was common for Pegida to be associated with non-Germans, 
especially German-Russian migrants in the 1990s. In part, this might be because of the display 
of Russian flags during demonstrations (see Figure 8), reflecting a tendency among far right 





Putin (Arzheimer 2015). There was also an impression of xenophobia among ethnic German 
migrants from Russia in the 1990s, in part, perhaps, because of the murder of Egyptian 




The perception of the far right as being non-German shares with a wider conception, as outlined 
in the constitution, that modern Germany and its citizenry is established in opposition to 
fascism. As Ewing writes, 
 
the modern German state is founded as a recurring act of renunciation, in which 
Germany as a modern democracy is defined in opposition to the repressive Nazi 
regime. The Nazi as extremist is abjected, as that which […] the modern German is 
not. (2012, 205) 
 
It is this “Otherness” to a German, liberal tradition which helps to situate the account of the car 
crash of Stefan Jagsch, the NPD politician in Hesse, that I began the chapter with. In a context 
Content removed: ‘Figure 8 – German and Russian flags at a Pegida demonstration in Theatreplatz 





in which Jagsch is the “Other”, the two Syrian refugees are, by comparison, situated as people 
who belong in Germany. This is part of a much broader trend in which newspapers were 
“supportive of the cause of refugees and hostile toward right-wing populist movements such 
as Pegida” (Vollmer & Karakayali 2018, 120). It is this capacity for the emergence of solidarity 
and recognition between refugees and the mainstream German population that informed the 
discourse of my interlocutors. Here, the far right was not a native arbiter of worthiness, but an 
“abject Other”, facilitating terms of inclusion as a democratic and liberal citizen. 
The capacity for the far right to enable solidarity with the wider population is reflected 
in the observations of Suhail about participation in elections in Germany. Suhail is in his mid-
twenties and was politically aware, actively participating in the short-lived revolutionary 
moment on his university campus in Syria. In Germany he thought he would not vote in 
elections because he could not endorse any party. Although he liked the Green Party, he could 
not vote for them “because they agree to anything”, including things he is against, such as gay 
marriage. The only exception to this state of affairs is the issue of the far right, he would unite 
with the majority of people in voting to stop “Nazis” from coming into power. This calculus 
was already apparent in Suhail’s activism in Dresden. As I explore in Chapter 6, Suhail and 
other Syrian friends were reticent about activism for Syria in Dresden, which was seen to risk 
undermining belonging in Germany. The one issue, however, that led Suhail to join a 
demonstration was in defence of Mission Lifeline, a boat owned by a charity based in Dresden 
to conduct search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean. The rescue operation was the 
topic of controversy when a Pegida rally was reported to have shouted “drown, drown, drown” 
about migrants following a speech by Siegfried Däbritz in which he attacked Mission Lifeline. 
Suhail told me with pride about the rally he joined to defend and show support for the boat and 
the organisation. In the context of Germany, Suhail’s political activism centred on issues that 
had the capacity to form broader anti-far right solidarity.  
This draws attention to how the far right offers a space for horizontal politics. It shares 
resonances with what Kallius et al. (2016) have shown in the context of Budapest at the height 
of the so-called refugee crisis when citizens and refugees came together in “horizontal politics” 
in order to oppose the “vertical politics” of the Hungarian state and NGOs. For Syrians and 
Palestinians, the potential for “horizontal politics” in response to the far right opened up a space 
in which to subvert their victimisation as either threatening and dangerous men, or cowards, to 
a German public. This certainly isn’t the case for everyone victimised by the far right in 





wider society. Lamya Kaddor, the head of the Liberal Islam Network in Germany, for example, 
described her insecurity about the emergence of the far right in Germany: “[e]very Muslim in 
Germany has experienced being inducted into the collective ‘you Muslims’. An inferiority 
complex develops from this experience because society permanently suggests that ‘you don’t 
belong’.” (Machtans 2016, 94) As a Muslim German, the discourse of the far right produces 
exclusion as there is a growing narrative of Muslims being unable to belong in Germany. For 
a number of my friends, however, the far right could have the effect of providing an opportunity 
to negotiate their belonging in wider society through what Ingvars and Gislason term 
“responsible masculinity” (2018). This is apparent in the observations of Omar around the time 
of the success of AfD in the federal elections.  
Omar told me once that his friend from Stuttgart joked that AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland) stood for “Ausländer für Deutschland” (Foreigners for Germany). The joke, we 
agreed, could only be made by someone who didn’t live in Dresden. Yet, unintentionally, it 
encapsulates the way that the far right could create a space in which Omar and others expressed 
their capacity to belong in Germany. When Omar and I met at a café the day after the 2017 
election he asked if I had seen the results and told me that AfD got 13% of the vote! I added 
that in Saxony they got 30% of the vote and only narrowly came second in Dresden. He was 
surprised, “They are stupid, they are donkeys”, he said angrily. “You know the German 
economy is stronger now because of us refugees. In 2016, the economy was the strongest it has 
ever been. If it wasn’t for refugees, the economy would have gone down.”  
For Omar, the far right vote elicited a defence of the role of refugees in strengthening the 
country. Omar also saw that part of the role of refugees in Germany was to challenge and defuse 
the far right. Rather than victims of a far right that grew in popularity and power as a result of 
the arrival of refugees, Omar saw refugees at the forefront of keeping the far right at bay in 
order to defend Germany’s liberal and democratic tradition. After all, he explained, the far right 
was around well before the arrival of refugees. His argument centred on the rule introduced in 
2016 that refugees cannot leave the state where they are placed (except in certain conditions, 
such as finding a job elsewhere), which aims to prevent the formation of ethnic enclaves in 
certain areas. Omar saw it as establishing the role of refugees in challenging the far right, 
 
The government is using refugees to challenge the Nazis in Germany. They know 
that if people live with refugees and get used to refugees, then they will no longer 





stories of people who used to support AfD and then they made a friendship or 
relationship with a refugee and changed how they think. 
  
In this interpretation, refugees are favoured by the government to take on the far right, 
becoming defenders of the integrity of the state and its democratic tradition. He articulates a 
picture of “responsible” masculinity, in which refugees are able to take on the far right when 
Germans are “terrified”.  
This potential for solidarity with Germans was an important part of Omar’s concern for 
how refugees represent themselves in Germany. This is reflected in a discussion he had with 
his friends one night about how to respond to the racism and discrimination they faced in 
Germany. He and his friends would regularly gather at each other’s homes and eat, play cards 
(triks) and catch up. On this particular evening they had been talking about their experiences 
of racism and the far right and how fed-up they were of being discriminated against. Omar told 
me that in the heat of the conversation one of his friends had told the group that “Germans are 
kuffār (unbelievers)”, and that they should show them their strength, suggesting they go to the 
street and do a demonstration. Omar asked me if I knew what Arab demonstrations were like? 
“We march, and shout, we are like donkeys. We will stay sitting in the middle of the road!” In 
his account of the demonstration, Omar emphasised the excesses of Arab men in ways that 
reflect what Jansen describes among some Bosnian men as the sense of their own masculine 
excess compared to the local population (2008). Yet he and others in the group were mindful 
of the implications of what their friend was suggesting. Omar explained to me that he told his 
friend that there was a risk that they would turn friendly Germans against them. Their fantasy 
on a Friday night of asserting their strength as young men confronted the need to represent 
themselves well to the German public. Their vulnerability as refugees necessitates showing 
their responsibility and not fulfilling the stereotype of dangerous Arab men. 
Omar contrasted the limits of an “Arab demonstration” to something he had recently 
seen shared on a Facebook group in response to posters that had started to appear in Dresden 
and other cities at the time. The posters were produced by a far right organisation called Ein 
Prozent (One Percent), and were placed on tram stops, lampposts, on the sides of buildings and 
elsewhere. Ein Prozent is a slick, far right “citizens’ initiative”, what it terms on its website as 
“a professional resistance platform for German interests”. It is headed by Philip Stein, a 
freelance author and publisher and markets itself as an organisation that enables the view of 





Although it shares much of the same ideology as other far right groups, such as Pegida (Stein 
spoke at a Pegida rally in February 2017), it tends to be ‘factual’, relying on statistics to capture 
a panic about growing numbers of ethnic minorities. The posters put around Dresden told 
refugees in large Arabic text and smaller German text: “return to your homeland, your 
homeland needs you” (arjʿau ila waṭanikum, waṭanikum biḥāja ilkum/ Kehrt nach Hause 
zurück – Eure Heimat braucht euch). Omar asked me, enthusiastically, if I had seen the picture 
of a letter that was put up in response to the posters? He boasted that it was “powerful” 
(qawiyya). The picture showed an A4 piece of paper stuck below one of the Ein Prozent posters 
somewhere in Germany. The letter reads: 
 
Dear Mister ???, 
 
We are sorry to inform you that at this time we cannot return to our homeland as 
there is a war and there is a dictatorship. As soon as the war and the dictator have 
finished, we would like to return. 
 
If you are going to write something new in the next days, you do not need to write 
it in Arabic, since we have learnt and speak German. 
 





What makes the anonymous letter meaningful for Omar is the way that it appears to speak on 
behalf of refugees to a German public. The letter displays the power to speak up, resist, and 
answer back. Not only does it show conviction and strength but also, more importantly, it does 
so in measured terms, such as beginning the sentence “we are sorry to inform you” and ending 
by thanking the individual for their understanding. In contrast to the violent demonstration that 
threatens to turn Germans against Syrians, the letter shows a commitment among Syrians to 
democracy: “If you are going to write something new in the next days…”, the author writes, 
displaying a readiness to engage the question of return openly and in the public sphere. The 





understand German, “you do not need to reply in Arabic” the letter reads. Significantly, in 
contrast to the “Arab demonstration”, this dialogue with the exclusionary campaign of the far 
right offers a site for the performance of “responsible masculinity”. 
Responses to the far right by Syrian and Palestinian refugees could go beyond a letter 
shared with German passers-by and on social media, extending to mainstream coverage in 
national and international media. This was the case for a demonstration in Cottbus in 
Brandenburg, north of Saxony that was co-organised by a Syrian refugee, Basem Nour Al-
dosh, and featured in Zeit Online, the online version of the Die Zeit newspaper which circulates 
to approximately 1.7 million people. 
I had some insight into tensions in Cottbus when a talk I was supposed to deliver as 
part of a school’s “integration day” in early 2017 was abruptly cancelled without explanation. 
The school was struggling with having two classes of men from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq 
and the day was an initiative to help address these challenges. Fast-forward one year to the 3rd 
of February 2018, Cottbus witnessed two opposing demonstrations in one day. In the morning 
was a demonstration called “Life without Hate” (Leben ohne Hass) co-organised by Al-Dosh, 
a 21-year-old Syrian living in Cottbus, as a response to weekly demonstrations by the far right 
against refugees in the city and growing intolerance and violence. On New Year’s Eve 2017/18, 
for example, several men had attacked an asylum shelter in the city and in January 2018 the 
city refused to accept any more refugees. In the week prior to the demonstrations, six men were 
arrested for distributing flyers of the extremist NPD, as well as pepper spray. The counter-
demonstration on the day was organised by Zukunft Heimat (Future Homeland), who also 
organised previous demonstrations against refugees in the city. Some in the movement called 
for all refugees to be removed from the city following a series of knife attacks by Syrian 
refugees. In January 2018, two Syrians stabbed a 16-year-old German boy and on a separate 
occasion three Syrian men are alleged to have threatened a German couple with a knife.  
The Zeit Online article, “They all want to save Cottbus” (Kagermeier 2018), is a good 
example of the capacity of the far right to open up spaces for Syrians and Palestinians to 
perform responsible masculinity to the German public. Although it is unclear to what extent 
Al-Dosh and other organisers intended the demonstration to be picked up by national and 
international media, it is clear that it aimed to present refugees to a German audience in contrast 
to the negative discourse of the far right. Al-Dosh is quoted as saying in the article, “Today we 
want to calm the mood and show that not all Syrians are the same”. It was also, significantly, 





demonstration by Zukunft Heimat in the afternoon, Al-Dosh replied, “That's democracy and 
it’s good”, and in response to suggestions of going to disturb the demonstration, he says “I do 
not want to disturb, [I] do not [want to] start a fight. That's why we are here.”, and he is 
described as rolling out a “peace flag”. Al-Dosh’s comments are contrasted to the violence and 
authoritarianism of the far right, as shown by their open attack on the “lying press” during the 
speeches. The article quotes Anne Haberstroh, deputy chairman of Zukunft Heimat, who asks 
the rally, ironically, “Who among you belongs to the highly violent, right-wing extremist 
milieu that the press thinks will shape our demonstrations?” to which some members are 
reported to raise their hands. 
For Al-Dosh and other organisers of Leben ohne Hass, responding to the far right entails 
a process of performing “responsible masculinity”. The extent to which this becomes the terms 
of inclusion in Germany is reflected in the way the media account depicts Al-Dosh and 
participants of the demonstration as insiders, and the far right as outsiders. The pro-migrant 
demonstration is embodied in the figure of Dietrich Hallman, an elderly, dignified native of the 
city. The article begins, “The Syrians of Cottbus have invited him, and Dietrich Hallmann has 
come gladly. It is his city.” It is through Hallmann that the article articulates the legitimacy and 
claim to belong of refugees themselves. In contrast, participants of the far right demonstration 
are presented as outsiders. Rather than the legitimacy associated with the aged figure of 
Dietrich Hallman, they are described as leaving the city at the end of the demonstration. To 
this extent, the demonstration shares with what Ingvars and Gislason (2018) describe for the 
sit-in protest organised by Syrians in Athens. Through the protest, Syrians presented an 
“emergent refugee masculinity” to the world and in doing so “male refugees could gain respect 
locally, regionally, and globally” and “challenge the media-led narratives of migrant 
criminality, immorality, and greed.” (385) This was similarly the case for the demonstration 
organised by Al-dosh and shared by the media. In Germany, the capacity of refugees to present 




This chapter has drawn attention to the affordances of the far right as the site of discourses and 
performances of moral belonging in Germany for Syrian and Palestinian male refugees. In 
contrast to work that considers the emergence, policies and strategies of the far right, little to 





victimised by it. In the context of Dresden, the capital of the far right in Germany, this chapter 
suggests that for my interlocutors the far right played a complex and varying role in their 
everyday lives. On the one hand, discrimination and harassment in everyday life could be the 
source of anxiety and feelings of unbelonging. As I have shown, the response to this was often 
to try to keep a low profile. Accounts of such victimisation often had an air of resignation as 
even expressions of resistance entailed fantasises about reversing power relations in an unlikely 
future scenario. This victimisation was in many respects seen as the result of widespread 
sympathy for the far right. However, there were considerable differences in responses to 
organised expressions of the far right, which could be the stage for narratives and displays of 
belonging in two quite distinct respects. First, as symbolic German “natives”, they could 
determine a worthy, masculine self from unworthy others, and become the site for the display 
of insiderness. Second, the far right itself could be constructed as “abject Other” to the modern 
democratic German nation and its citizens, offering space for the display and performance of 
belonging to a German public. In the face of the far right, my interlocutors and others could 
imagine and perform horizontal solidarities and construct themselves as carriers of a liberal, 
democratic German tradition. Bock (2018) has argued that the breakdown of state institutions 
during the “refugee crisis” opened up a space for minorities to display themselves as “reliable 
citizens” in Germany. In a similar respect, the emergence of the far right has provided 
opportunities for male refugees, otherwise maligned and feared, to display “responsible 
masculinity”. Rather than assuming the far right is always or consistently spelling bad news 
for migrants and minorities, this chapter suggests a more nuanced and differentiated picture 




















One afternoon I was sitting with Tariq and Ali at their friend Mostafa’s apartment after we 
had just helped him dismantle and move a bed that he had sold to someone online. I noticed 
that Tariq had been cold towards Ali, who was in his mid-thirties and, like Tariq, Palestinian 
from Syria, when he had asked him for help to fix his computer. Afterwards I asked Tariq what 
he thought of Ali. He said he doesn’t like the way he tries to get something for nothing. “I once 
gave him shoes and told him he could keep them, but when I asked him to interpret for me, 
because he is an expert (shātir) at German, he said he didn’t have time. What? (Shuw?) Did 
you become European?”  
 
This brief anecdote about Tariq’s disappointment with Ali reflects the expectations he has of 
his Arab friends and the importance of reciprocity in signifying this friendship; when Tariq 
lends Ali a pair of shoes, he expects his generosity to be reciprocated with help interpreting 
German. In the context of Dresden, same-sex friends could assume myriad important roles and 
functions and were the primary source of intimacy in contexts where most people came without 
family or relatives from Syria. The expectation that Ali assist Tariq in interpreting German at 
the Jobcenter is indicative of one such important role of friends in Dresden. What is significant 
about this exchange, however, is the way that Tariq makes sense of Ali’s failure to perform 
proper friendship in relation to “Europeans”. It is typically “European” for Ali to say that “he 
doesn’t have time” to help him, and his conduct seems to be explicable only as a reflection of 
symbolically becoming European. In this chapter, I explore friendship and broader accounts 





interlocutors expressed and performed dignity. In the particular context of Germany, I argue, 
these were the terms by which Syrians and Palestinians could assert moral superiority in 
relation to the host society, but at the same time carve out a space in which they had something 
to share with Germans. However, the chapter also shows that while friendship and social life 
take on particular ethical meaning for Syrians and Palestinians, they confront new kinds of 
tension as my interlocutors expressed uncertainty and mistrust of friends in the context of 
displacement.  
There has traditionally been blindness to friendship among anthropologists as a result 
of a disciplinary preoccupation with kinship, in part because of the assumption that friendship 
did not exist in non-Western societies where kinship ruled (Paine 1969; Guichard 2014). One 
way that friendship has been explored in contexts of strong kinship structures has been to show 
how unrelated persons can symbolically become kin (Abu Lughod 1986). More recently, 
scholars have sought to explore the importance and implications of local distinctions between 
kinship and friendship (Desai & Killick 2010; Carsten 2000), as well as the varying roles 
performed by friends in diverse social contexts (Guichard 2014). With regard to migration, 
work has shown how it can produce conditions for the development of strong friendships (Grätz 
2004) and the expansion of social networks (Hammond 2004). In the context of young asylum 
seekers in London, Wells has illustrated how young people produce new social networks in 
ways that contrast to perceptions and expectations of NGOs and officials (2011). As Hammond 
notes in the context of Ethiopian repatriates, “a group of people, finding themselves thrown 
together by their circumstances but sharing no other common personal history can develop 
close relationships” (2004, 11). Others have shown how displacement can lead to the 
breakdown of social relationships. Stevens describes in the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan, 
“the breakdown of community, family and friendships that accelerate the very human hardships 
of loneliness, boredom and depression” (2016, 60). Lokot argues, however, also in the case of 
Syrians in Jordan, that it is a mixed picture and there is evidence of social relations 
strengthening and weakening (2018).  
In this chapter, I explore the place of friendship in the everyday lives of young male 
Syrians and Palestinians in Dresden. In the absence of family, relatives, neighbours and 
community, friends could play a number of important roles. This function of the role of being 
a good friend, neighbour or family member chimes with recent work that has explored what 
Inhorn terms “emergent masculinity” (2012) by showing the importance of “responsibility” 





for its own sake but becomes indicative of culturalised discourses of “Arabness” in Germany. 
Work has tended to explore strategies for producing dignity among displaced and migrant men 
through processes of hierarchisation and “comparative strategies of self” to stigmatised others 
in relation to virtues such as work ethic (Suerbaum 2016), autonomy (Purser 2009), authority 
(Moroşanu & Fox 2013), as well as education and cultural capital (Vandevoordt & Verschragen 
2019; Sherman 2005). In this chapter, I explore how notions of friendship and sociality could 
take on this role. I situate this discourse in relation to mainstream German society in a process 
of what Goffman (1963) termed “reverse stigmatisation”, in which stigmatised minorities 
project back stigma to the majority, high-status in society. While studies of reverse 
stigmatisation have tended to reveal processes of self-exclusion, boundaries and difference 
(Kusow 2004; Espiritu 2001; Suerbaum 2016), I explore its complex and divergent 
consequences. By foregrounding sociality, care and responsibility to others as sites of moral 
excellence, these virtues can also in certain contexts provide the means of carving out a space 
for Syrian men to contribute to values, practices and responsibilities that are perceived to have 
been lost and forgotten in German society. However, at the same time as friendship becomes a 
mark of Arabness and something to be “given” to the host society, the very conditions that 
construct it in these terms (their status as a stigmatised minority in Germany) produce new 
pressures and uncertainties. Friendships could become fraught with doubt and mistrust; friends 
could remain unknown, they could lie and be “maṣlaḥjī” (exploitative), and friendships could 
end abruptly. 
 
Friendships in Displacement 
 
Meeting friends on Prager Strasse, inviting friends for dinner, having a friend stay over for a 
week, two weeks, a month, helping a friend translate German, going with a friend to take a trip 
in his new car, bringing food to a friend in hospital, hanging out with a friend at the local 
supermarket, helping a friend move his things out of his apartment, pick up a new sofa, or sell 
something online; friendships were, for most of my interlocutors, a constant presence, 
commitment and the object of discussion and reflection. In contrast to work that has shown the 
deterioration of friendships in the context of displacement, most people I knew had a number 
of friends they would see on a daily basis. Many of these friendships emerged from the camp 
where people were initially placed, or social housing (Sozialwohnung) where people waited for 





the same region where their asylum application was processed. This context provided a space 
for a “cosmopolitan conviviality” (Achilli 2015a), where people mixed with others from 
different ethnic, faith and national backgrounds. I was struck, for example, by some friendships 
between people from very different backgrounds who met in the camp and social housing, such 
as Jamil and Laith, good friends who got to know each other when they shared a room at the 
camp and would regularly meet in Dresden to spend an evening drinking, smoking and listening 
to Arabic music. Jamil is married and in his mid-thirties, a former head of a school, Palestinian 
and Muslim. Laith is in his early twenties, a former hairdresser, Syrian and a Christian. They 
were two of a number of friends who considered their friendship as highly unlikely if they had 
met in Syria.  
Friends were seen as relationships based on sentiment and the enjoyment of seeing each 
other, reflecting what has been noted as local conceptions of the difference between friendship 
and kinship (Desai & Killick 2010), as well as valorised for producing particular affective and 
emotional types of care work (Elliot 2016). This is reflected in the way that Omar, who is in 
his early twenties from eastern Syria, characterised his friendship to Faisal. He told me that he 
and Faisal had a “real friendship” (ṣaḍāqa ḥaqīqī), which he defined by the fact that they share 
everything. He tells Faisal about the European woman he likes, and Faisal tells him about 
applying to bring his family to Germany, reflecting what Wells (2011) has referred to as the 
importance of “self-disclosure” in friendships. In general, my interlocutors emphasised the 
importance of “seeing” each other (Obeid 2013), and this was often displayed through 
expressing regret about the time since they last met, in expressions such as “waynak? ma 
mbayn” (where are you? You’re not around), or “inta ma taṣalt fīnī” (you haven’t called me), 
or “ana mishta’lak” (I miss you). This could often take the form of accusations, and shares 
similarities to what Meneley describes as the way the invocation of anger (zaʿl) offered terms 
by which middle-class Yemeni women in Zabid sought to manipulate the actions of other 
women as well as display their love (1996, 146). Similar to Meneley’s example, the response 
among my friends to such comments could be to share regret, deny accusations of being 
neglectful and reverse them back to the other person, or else run off a list of important and 
pressing obligations that made it impossible to be in touch.  
The status of friendship as the site of affection, trust and sentiment, was reflected in the 
way that friends in the absence of family, relatives, a spouse, and wider community could take 
on roles that might not have been typical in Syria. Work has shown the importance of friendship 





means of living in affordable rented accommodation, finding work, and providing safety from 
the risk of physical violence on the street (Bozok & Bozok 2019). In Dresden, friends took on 
several roles, including assisting when someone was sick. In the context of the stress and 
disorder of migration and leaving family and home, many of my friends had recurring ailments, 
such as loss of hair, inflamed skin, and painful joints. On one occasion, Tariq’s friend was in 
hospital for several months with a serious illness, and I was struck by the kind of care that he 
and others provided him. They would deliver food, sit by his bed to provide him company, and 
even wheel him outside in order to momentarily “escape” from the hospital. In the absence of 
family and relatives there was a strong sense of responsibility and care which, in some 
instances, could have unanticipated consequences.  
Omar seemed to continuously suffer from bouts of illness, including skin that would 
regularly become painful and inflamed. One time his skin flared up, but he was reluctant to see 
a doctor because he found the experience intimidating. Therefore, when his friend advised him 
to apply a particular lotion on his body that had worked well for him when he had similar 
symptoms, Omar duly followed his advice. Later that day, however, he suffered a dramatic 
reaction and had to rush to hospital. In his retelling of the story, he impersonated the breezy 
confidence of his friend whose advice he had followed and contrasted it with the kinds of care 
he remembered from his mother who he described as being better than any doctor at diagnosing 
sickness.  
Friends also took on responsibilities such as lending money if someone’s stipend ran 
out in order to help cover costs, or joining friends in negotiations with institutions, such as 
going to the Jobcenter. When the friend of one of my interlocutors passed away, it was the 
friendship group that made all the arrangements for burial in a Muslim cemetery in Berlin 
because the man’s family was in Lebanon and they were unable to get a visa to come to 
Germany. Meanwhile, friends played a vital role in assuaging the threat and uncertainty of 
everyday life. Dresden was often a place that was experienced as unpredictable and dangerous 
in everyday life. This included obvious things such as avoiding the area around the football 
stadium when Dynamo Dresden played. But it was also less apparent aspects. A good example 
of this is when I joined Tariq and his three friends to go and buy a pair of Nike trainers from 
someone who he had been in touch with online through Ebay. As we approached the meeting 
spot outside an Aldi supermarket in Striesen, there was a woman waiting next to a car with the 
door open. When Talal sent a message, she seemed to look at her phone, and we were quite 





received a message asking if he was alone. When he replied that he had come with friends, the 
woman by the car promptly got in and drove away. It was a curious incident and it is impossible 
to know why she left, but for Tariq it was evidence that she was a “prostitute” because it was 
apparently quite common for people to use Ebay to solicit male refugees to pay for sex. 
Whether or not this was the case on this occasion is impossible to know, but it did seem to 
indicate the dangers and deceptions that beset everyday life in Germany and the role of friends 
in helping to offset such dangers. 
An important aspect of friendship was sharing and reciprocity, reflecting the 
observation of Pitt-Rivers that friendship depends on speech and actions that are “reciprocated 
in like fashion” (2016, 448). This relationship was displayed most evidently in the sharing of 
food. In Syria, I was told, shabāb would spend time together in a “qahwah”, a male-only café 
characterised by cheap tea and coffee and tables for playing cards, reflecting Kreil’s 
observation in the context of Cairo of the important role of coffee shops as a setting of intimacy 
among men outside of the family (Kreil 2016). However, in Dresden, most socialising took 
place at people’s apartments. This marked a shift from socialising patterns in Syria, reflecting 
a lack of alternative and comfortable spaces to relax in, the insecurity associated with going 
out late, but also because, unlike in Syria, people had their own apartments rather than living 
with family. Spending time at each other’s homes was described as “comfortable” (mūrīḥ) and 
“easy” (sahl) because you could relax together away from others, and it was in this setting that 
there was the sharing of food. The function of sharing food as the site of friendship in Arab 
societies has been long recognised in idioms such as “salt and cereal” for friendship among 
Bedouin in the West Sahara (Abu Lughod 1986) and “salt and bread” among Azalis in Lebanon 
(Obeid 2013). In Dresden, preparing and sharing food could be described as turning friends 
into “brothers”. This is what Khalil described when I talked to him about his experience of 
Ramadan in 2015 when he was still living in a camp. Like most people I met, Khalil described 
how Ramadan was not the same in Germany because of the absence of family. However, he 
had fond memories of preparing iftar dinners with friends in the camp when he and several 
others pooled their money together to buy food. He told me, “It was really nice; we prepared 
food together and cooked every night. We became like brothers during that month.” The new 
practice of sharing the home among male migrants could also result in the bending and play of 
gender norms. This reflects what Marsden has described as the “ambiguous and performed” 
gender of traders in conducting hospitality, where they could assume “bursts of role-playing” 





cooking in the kitchen could be symbolically feminised by his housemate who would sit back 
and become “man of the house”. A role that would be reversed later on when the same person 
would be expected to do the washing-up, prepare ʿargileh and make tea.   
Friendships were therefore characterised by being single-sex and egalitarian, and 
relationships that were both centred on providing pleasure and enjoyment, as well as often 
considerable commitments and responsibilities that included assistance with financial issues, 
emotional support and practical help, such as in instances of sickness. It is difficult to draw 
comparisons with the kinds of friendship my interlocutors might have had in Syria, but it is 
reasonable to see friendships as changing in character, form and intensity. In certain obvious 
respects, friendships would seem to grow and develop; the pattern of visiting and cooking 
together was greater in Germany than in Syria because young men live alone, for instance. 
However, discourses about friendship in Germany would often highlight these patterns as 
indicative of “Arabness” rather than the particular experience of displacement, and this 
culturalised discourse would often be compared to “Europeans” who were seen to lack these 
kinds of relationships.   
 
“Who are your better friends?” 
 
“Philip, you have friends in the UK, and you have Arab friends here. Now tell me, who are 
your better friends? With whom is it more beautiful (maʿ mīn aḥla)?” I was asked these 
questions by Akram after an afternoon we spent together in Dresden in the late summer in 
2017. We had met at the Palestinian shop, Al-Seba, in the centre of the city, and drank coffee 
at Starbucks before we walked to his apartment where Hamid joined us, Akram’s closest friend. 
They are both from the same city in the north of Syria and met when Hamid moved to Dresden 
and someone put them in touch and Hamid spent several months sleeping on Akram’s sofa as 
he slowly organised himself and found an apartment. We sat together and shared jokes as we 
watched videos together on YouTube in an easy-going atmosphere that was seen to define time 
spent together with friends. Akram’s questions were one of a number of times I was asked 
about my friendships in the UK and whether my friendships were better with Arabs in Dresden. 
For Akram and others, there was little doubt about what the answer would or should be: Arab 
friendships were “more beautiful” (ahla).  
Friendship could often be the site of a distinction between “Arabs” and “Europeans”. 





assist him, if someone failed to enact certain expectations of friendship, such as not willing to 
be generous by giving time and resources, they could be censured as “being European”. Arab 
friendships were often characterised as intimate, fun and spontaneous, in contrast to European 
friendships and sociality that were described as circumscribed, cold and formal. This could be 
referenced in relation to splitting the costs of things, only coming to visit for a short time, or 
making arrangements prior to seeing one another. I would be warned by friends, for example, 
that I should not be “German” when I tried to arrange a particular time to come to their 
apartment to visit.  
This distinction was apparent in the way that Omar characterised “European 
gatherings” when he was invited to the party of a European friend. He came to my apartment 
a few days before and asked me whether people will be getting drunk and when he should give 
the gift, and he complained that he doesn’t like “European kind of parties”. Sometime after I 
finished my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to find out more about Omar’s perceptions of 
different kinds of sociality. I was interested to know the meaning of an Arabic word I had noted 
down in a discussion with a friend about how the atmosphere of the “qahwah” in Syria differed 
to cafes in Germany. In his explanation of the word, Omar delved into the distinction between 
the sociality of Germans and Syrians/Arabs, and he was happy for me to quote his message in 
full. He told me, 
 
We don’t go and sit and smoke ʿargileh and say “how are you, so-and-so? How are 
you, so-and-so?” (kīfak fūlanī?) “Alhamdulillah. I did this.” No. We make fun of 
this and that (munaskhar ʿala hād). We shout (munṣayyiḥ). We swear (mnsib): 
“fuck your mum, fuck your mum”. For example, we will go and see a football 
match. We will see Barcelona and Real Madrid. If they score, we will hit each other. 
Even when there is no football match, we go and sit and enjoy ourselves (nqoud 
ntsalah) and we swear, and we shout. The Germans go and they talk between 
themselves, “Wie geht’s dir?” (How are you?) “Was machst du?” (What are you 
doing?) And these pointless (mtbayikhā) things. The Arabs they go and they swear, 
and they will see each other every day. The Germans don’t see each other every 
day, so they say, “how are you?” 
 
In his evocative description of the sociality he shared with his friends, he valorises “Arab” 





friends are not constrained by formality, such as asking “How are you?”, because they see each 
other every day. Instead, they make jokes and get absorbed by football and swear, shout and 
make fun of each other. Omar’s account of swearing and jostling reflects an ideal of friendship 
shared by my interlocutors as the capacity to be rude to each other, including calling each other 
names, such as “donkey” (jahash), or “dog” (kelb). When someone did something or said 
something considered annoying, or teased the other person, it would be common to share 
threats or curses. These exchanges were often said with satisfaction and evidenced the quality 
and strength of the friendship, reflecting a similar pattern of sociality described by Osella and 
Osella in the case of single-sex friendships among young Keralans. They show how these 
friendships often subvert hierarchy and caste division; the “gangs” are the site of “tough joking 
and testing” which “reinforce egalitarian relations” (1998, 191). The significance of this kind 
of breakdown of barriers was reflected on one occasion when Akram asked whether I swear at 
and offend my friends in the UK. When I said I didn’t, he replied, bluntly, “this means you are 
not really friends”. 
Arab friendships as the source of distinction to Germans could be reflected in discourses 
about hospitality. Scholars have shown hospitality’s “sacred, ethical and aesthetic dimensions” 
(Marsden 2016) and the way it can become the site of national self-representation and 
distinction (Shryock 2004). Among the displaced it can serve as a metaphor for the power 
relations between host society and the displaced as guests, and the way these can be reversed 
through practices of hospitality (Vandevoordt 2017). Hospitality among my friends could be 
valorised for its “sacredness” and discussed as a system of rules, expectations and traditions - 
what should be served, when, and by whom. Omar, for example, was proud of the hospitality 
that was offered from his region and he would describe the importance of hospitality in his 
upbringing, such as his responsibility to serve coffee to his father’s guests. However, more than 
a point of cultural prestige and the rights and responsibilities towards the “stranger”, in the 
context of displacement he and others saw hospitality as an expression of the depth and quality 
of friendship. Omar once boasted that he could travel to any city in Germany and call a friend 
and be able to stay as long as he likes; this, he said pointedly, was not possible for Europeans. 
Hospitality was similarly a source of pride and boasting for Rami. He drew a distinction 
between himself and Germans after he met a Czech woman on a tram one day in Dresden. She 
had stopped Rami to ask for directions at one of the stations and he happened to be going the 
same way. Rami asked where she was staying in Dresden, and she said the name of a hotel. He 





told me, “even if you are their friend, they don’t let you stay at their house!” He told her that 
she could stay at his apartment for as long as she wanted, contrasting his capacity to offer 
hospitality to the apparent absence of a culture of hospitality between friends in Germany. 
Openness to friends and the rights of friends to be able to stay as long as they like was therefore 
a source of pride and distinction to Europeans.  
The status of friendship was in fact part of a much broader set of assumptions and 
critique about social relationships in European society. My friends would contrast webs of 
relations of family, neighbourhood and community, “hyat ilijtima’a” (social life), between an 
idealised past in Syria and contemporary Germany. Adil is Shia and from a village in the north 
of Syria and came to Europe after harrowing years when his village was surrounded by ISIS. 
When I met Adil, he was coming to terms with another trauma: the risk of deportation to an 
eastern European country where his fingerprints had been registered. One day when I met Adil 
we discussed the difference between Germany and Syria, and the reasons why some people 
thought they could not live in Germany in the future. He explained, 
 
Here there is alcohol, in Syria there is alcohol. Here there are prostitutes, in Syria 
there are prostitutes. The difference [between Syria and Germany] is that Europeans 
are used to being alone. You will find, for example, everyone is alone. In Syria there 
isn’t this. If you live in a neighbourhood in Syria, you must know everyone in the 
neighbourhood. Arabs go and come together. For example, I live here and there are 
people who live next to me. I say hello, and go with them into their house, and if 
they have food, I will ask them for food. I will invite them to my house for food. If 
I want to go I will leave my son with them. This is not available in European society. 
Here is a house and here is a house and they will not know each other. 
 
Adil describes the contrast between an idealised Syrian society where there is trust, community 
and people know each other, and Germany, where people “are used to being alone”. His 
account is striking for the distinction it draws between Germany and Syria. Surveying the small 
groups of people sitting together in the park, he said in Syria people wouldn’t be separated like 
this; in Syria, everyone would know each other. 
The account from Adil reflects what Herzfeld has termed “structural nostalgia”, in 
which a “static image of an unspoiled and irrecoverable past often plays an important part in 





with an image of serenity from pre-war Syria, before the village where he lived was encircled 
by ISIS militants that led to the death of many of his friends. This idealised image of sociality, 
community and trust was common among my friends. Laith, for example, would often describe 
memories of a rich communality in Syria, from huge wedding gatherings to sharing greetings 
while walking along the street. He told me once, “In Germany, if two people were to walk into 
each other in the street they will say ‘entschuldigung’ (sorry) and keep walking. But in Syria 
they will say, ‘afwan muʿlim! Hābīb il-qalb (friend from the heart), come drink a glass of tea.’”  
The discourse about friendship should therefore be situated in a much broader set of 
relationships that centred around an ideal of sociality and trust. Syrians and Palestinians saw 
themselves as carriers of the social world they grew up in, understood as part and parcel of 
“being Arab”. Friendship, despite the ways it appears to have changed in Germany, was one 




The value attributed to male friendship and social life more broadly, and the way that this was 
valued as something “Arab” reflects its importance among Syrians and Palestinians in Dresden. 
At the same time, however, valorising friendships and the way it becomes an embodiment of 
cultural excellence should be situated in the context of displacement in Germany. What this 
points to is the way that ethics and notions of the good life are situated in particular political 
contexts. This is a point made by Didier Fassin, who has critiqued work in moral anthropology 
that separates the ethical from the political. He writes, 
 
the analyses of local moralities and ethical subjectivities have specified the moral 
and the ethical to the point that they often become somewhat separated from the 
political, as if norms and values could be separated from power relations, or 
sensibilities and emotions from collective histories. (Fassin 2012, 12) 
 
In other words, ethical value is irreducible, yet, at the same time, cannot be removed from 
“power relations” and “collective histories”. The discourse about friendship and social life was 
valued in and of itself among my friends, but its particular importance and its invocation as an 
object of “being Arab” in relation to Europeans should be situated in the context of Syrians 





context of Germany, it offered a discourse of oneself as a proper, dignified and accomplished 
person. This reflects the concept of “reverse stigmatisation”, which has been defined by Killian, 
following Goffman’s classic work on stigma management, as “the imputation of guilt and 
moral inferiority to the members of a dominant group on the basis of descent when the moral 
justification of the group’s position of advantage is being redefined.” (1985, 9) The 
characterisation of Europeans as having poor or non-existent social relationships reflects such 
“moral inferiority” and is a way of renegotiating the “position of advantage” of Europeans.  
A good illustration of this is the context of Omar’s invitation to a “European party”, 
which he said he was sceptical about because Europeans “don’t know how to have fun”. A few 
days after that conversation, on the night of the party, he came to my apartment unannounced 
late in the evening clutching the gift he had bought his friend and told me that he had been to 
the party. He said he had left early because a friend of the host would not stay if he was there 
because he is Muslim. Although the host objected, Omar said he would leave because he didn’t 
want to upset her friend by his presence. I was shocked and asked a flurry of questions, at 
which point Omar laughed and told me he made the story up. The reality was even worse, he 
said. His friend, the host, hadn’t replied to his message about the party and now he wasn’t 
invited at all! His story is striking because of the way that becoming uninvited provoked an 
account of exclusion on the basis of being Muslim. Despite being untrue, it reveals the risk of 
attending the party, reflecting the awareness and anxiety among Syrians and Palestinians of 
their stigmatisation in Germany. We can see his dismissive account of German sociality as 
serving to grapple with the terms of such stigma; he is stigmatised as a young, Arab male 
refugee in Germany, which he “reverses” through a valorisation of the excellence of a more 
genuine, “beautiful” and sophisticated sociality.  
Another example illustrates further how accounts of social relations could serve as 
“reverse stigmatisation”. I had been hanging out with Tariq when we met our friend, Talal, by 
chance on Prager Strasse and he invited us to his apartment. On the walk to his apartment we 
discussed the difficulty of earning a good wage in Germany. Talal said that what matters is to 
have a university degree in order to earn enough to buy a house. However, this shared 
expression of exclusion from professional occupations and high salaries was contrasted to an 
alternative interpretation that asserted dignity. Tariq explained that Europeans have to go to 
university and earn high salaries because they will not receive support from their parents. He 
asked me, rhetorically: “Is your dad going to give you money? Will he buy you a house? Will 





house. Talal agreed, explaining that he lived with his parents before coming to Germany. Tariq 
and Talal reversed the difference in opportunities to earn between Europeans and Arabs, and 
the status of work, to a distinction based on the quality of relations between members of family: 
Europeans need to go to university to earn money. This shares similarities to the moral critique 
of the distance between family members among the “elite” in the US by the “white working 
class” who see wealth as leading to moral deterioration (Williams 2017).  
These discourses of reverse stigmatisation mirror what has been observed elsewhere. 
In the case of Filipino migrants in the US, for example, Espiritu writes: “When asked what sets 
Filipinos apart from other Americans, my respondents - of all ages and class backgrounds - 
repeatedly contrasted close-knit Filipino families to what they perceived to be the more 
impersonal quality of U.S. family relations.” (2001, 421) Yet, I also think there is another 
important dimension to the function of making such a distinction between Arabs and 
Europeans. Espiritu has characterised reverse stigmatisation as “how the margins imagine and 
construct the mainstream in order to assert superiority over them” (Ibid, 416). In the case of 
my interlocutors in Dresden, this only goes so far in understanding the power and value of such 
discourses. The “beauty” of their friendships and sociality also generated a space in which to 
carve out a purpose and role in Germany, it gave them a “gift” to reciprocate. 
 
Sociality as a Gift 
 
Reverse stigmatisation among male migrants, or other forms of displacing stigma, such as 
through constructing hierarchies in relation to other stigmatised groups, can often centre on 
“hegemonic” masculine values of strength, autonomy and work ethic. Purser (2009) has shown 
how these values underpin hierarchising between Mexican men who find work on the street in 
San Francisco and those who find work through an organised centre for migrants. In Egypt, 
Syrian refugees have been shown to emphasise masculine traits such as productivity and an 
ethics of hard work to distinguish themselves from Egyptians (Suerbaum 2016). I heard similar 
notions of masculine hierarchising, such as friends who would contrast their work ethic to 
Germans. However, the capacity to be good friends, sons, neighbours, and even husbands, has 
very different implications. Rather than hegemonic masculine virtues of strength and 
autonomy, they invoke what Inhorn has characterised as “emergent masculinities”, referring to 
what she identifies as “new patterns of masculine practice” (Inhorn & Naguib 2018, 3). This 





working class men’s roles as providers in Cairo (Ghannam 2013; 2018), middle-class men’s 
“responsibility” as husbands (Norbakk 2018), the importance of providing good food for 
families (Naguib 2015), and the virtue of being protective and nurturing fathers (Naguib 2018). 
The way my interlocutors boasted about sociality and responsibility to others foregrounds what 
this work draws attention to as the importance of “care” in the construction of masculinity. 
Asserting the distinction between Arabs and Europeans on the basis of such values, this 
discourse does more than producing difference, boundaries and superiority; it opens up space 
for something to be shared. 
Suhail associated sociality and being embedded in family and community as 
constituting the “taste” or “flavour” of life, “ṭʿam il-hayāt”. He first told me the term when we 
were sitting at a tram stop close to his apartment after a long morning at the orienteering course. 
Suhail and I were sat next to each other in the course in what was, as I described in Chapter 3, 
an often combative environment which provoked defensive and rigid constructions of 
difference between Arabs and Europeans. Three days in, Suhail had wanted to sit and talk to 
me about “ṭʿam il-hayāt”. That day the course had descended into farce when there had been 
a discussion about marriage and the challenge men faced in meeting its costs. He said, as we 
sat by the tram stop, “Germans don’t have ṭʿam il-hayāt; the society is mufakak (broken or split 
up)”. He pointed to an elderly woman who was slowly crossing the road dragging a trolley bag 
behind her. “For example, why is she walking by herself? Why is no one helping her? Where 
is her family?” As was often the case among my interlocutors, he contrasted relationships 
between family members in Germany to Arabs. Particularly how in Germany it is normal for 
children to leave the house when they turn eighteen. I asked Suhail how this related to “ṭʿam 
il-hayāt”?  
“People understand this differently”, he replied diplomatically. For people in Germany this 
might be “living alone and drinking beer”, but for him “It is about society. It isn’t about being 
a single person and thinking about yourself.” 
The notion of society being “broken” was often invoked by my Syrian and Palestinian 
friends for describing the perceived weakness and fracture of community and family and 
implies change and the loss of social relationships that had once been shared. I was told by 
Bassem, for example, that if you went into the depths of the German countryside you would 
find a community that closely resembles Arab society, in which neighbourhoods are close-knit 
and families live in the same extended house. His point was that Germans had in the past shared 





discourses among converts to Islam in the UK in previous research I conducted. Joining a 
Muslim community could be described as forging a kind of communality that had once been a 
part of working-class British life. One woman described the intimacy and cooperation shared 
between neighbours in the past in her neighbourhood in Manchester and how she had recovered 
this through joining a mosque community (Rushworth 2016). Similarly, for Suhail and others, 
a discourse of society “being broken” served to convey what Germans had lost but also what 
could and should be recovered. I observed how Suhail enacted the role of good neighbour with 
two elderly Germans who lived opposite to him who would often sit together by the window 
next to his apartment. Although he didn’t do anything for several months for fear of not being 
able to communicate effectively, eventually he was pleased to invite them for tea in his 
apartment. From that time onwards he made a point of offering them tea and biscuits and 
making conversation with them whenever they sat outside his apartment.  
This was part of a pattern of practice of generosity and care among Syrians and 
Palestinians towards often elderly German neighbours. One of the reasons for this is that, like 
a number of my friends, many elderly people lived in social housing provided by the company 
Vonovia. Take the case of Latif, who is in his late thirties and a good friend of Rami. Latif 
lived on the fourth floor of a steps-only building in Gorbitz, an area of low-cost housing to the 
west of Dresden. He told me during a conversation one evening at Rami’s apartment that 
society in Germany is “broken” and he cited the case of an elderly woman who lived next door, 
also on the fourth floor of the building. He told us, “I asked her once, ‘how do you do 
everything? How do you buy things from the shop?’ She said that she does everything by 
herself. It is 105 steps to get to our apartments”, he said, in disbelief. “The woman has two 
children, but they don’t come to see her. In 2 months, I haven’t seen anyone come and visit 
her.” He explained that he helps her. If he is going to the shop he will tell her he is going and 
ask if she needs anything. Everyone at Rami’s apartment listened and shared their feelings of 
incredulity.  
The potential of young, male Arab refugees to contribute to society through enacting 
values of community and family has been recognised by Germans, who have afforded 
opportunities for Syrians, in particular, to care for the elderly. Rohde-Abuba (2018) has 
explored how young refugees in Germany are the site of “positive othering” discourses that 
stress their suitability to do care work with the elderly: “a narrative of cultural suitability draws 
on the assumption of a value system that subordinates young Muslim men to their elders in the 





and care-home managers imagine refugees as good care workers because of a perceived 
cultural predilection towards embeddedness in family and respect for the elderly. While Rhode-
Abuba critiques such essentialising of Arab men and reveals how these discourses often elide 
the amount of free and low-paid work done by refugees in care homes, it is nonetheless striking 
that these discourses were shared by many Syrians and Palestinians I spoke to.  
Sharing Arab sociality with Germans would often be described with satisfaction as 
processes of “them integrating with us”. This might be said with a hint of irony at the sight of 
an Arab restaurant with lots of German guests, for example. It could also be invoked to describe 
Germans who were enacting norms of Arab sociality. I was first introduced to the way that 
sociality was something that could be shared with Germans when one of my friends, 
Mohammed, told me that he passed a school and had seen German and Arab boys fighting in 
the playground. He commented with delight that “Germans are integrating with Arabs!” The 
reason for this “integration” was that German boys were assumed to be calm and polite in 
contrast to the physical, boisterous and intimate sociality of Arab boys. Mohammed’s 
observation draws attention to the way that this “Arab” mode of being together is something 
that produces “integration” of Germans to Arab norms. In reversing the terms of integration, 
dignity emerges from a site in which refugees coming to Germany have something to offer the 
host society. What this shows is that drawing attention to perceived differences in sociality was 
not just a stick to beat the host society and assert dignity through solidifying boundaries and 





















The image above shows a “German” man who is unhappy and alone in a dark house compared 
to a “Syrian” man who is also depicted alone but by implication of the dozen kebabs he is 
grilling is preparing to entertain a number of guests or provide for his family. His home is 
glowing, and so is he: he is relaxed, content and well-fed. It is unclear where the cartoon comes 
from, but it seems it might have originally been an Iranian cartoon, and the image is available 
online without “Syrian” and “German” written under the windows. Nonetheless, the image was 
easily co-opted as a representation of Syrians in Germany, especially as the image of the man 
grilling kebabs is a culturally resonant image of time spent together with friends and family 
and the ability of a male head of household to provide (Naguib 2015). I was shown the image 
by Layla when I was visiting her and her husband Yasin one day. When Layla showed me the 
image she recounted a time when she and her family and another family were having a barbecue 
in a city in central Germany before they moved to Dresden. She said,  
 
Germans would come up to us and look like they wanted to get to know us and 
spend time with us. They were happy to be with people who were joking and having 





fun and sitting together eating good food. They don’t have this. They should 
integrate with us! They would be happier if they did. 
 
I showed the image to a number of my friends and they all thought it was a good representation 
of the way things are in Germany; their own sense of the good life - of good food, happiness 
and sociality - in contrast to the darkness and loneliness of the lives of Germans. Many of my 
friends would agree with Layla that “they don’t have this”, where having “this” was a source 
of pride and dignity and something that would be boasted about. But, as I have shown in this 
section, it was also something to be shared. As happened in the few barbecues I enjoyed with 
friends, passers-by often found themselves presented with a skewer of kebab as they walked 
past and were invited to join: the sociality of Syrians and Palestinians was a gift that could be 
given to Germans.  
However, while friendship and sociality in the context of Germany were a source of 
pride and valorised as a gift to share, this same context could present new kinds of tension. 
Among friends, the conditions of displacement that enabled or necessitated strong friendships 
could be the same circumstances that served to create new kinds of uncertainty and doubts 
about the possibility to trust friends and the difficulty of really knowing one another. The 
idealisation of friendship that distinguished Arabs from Europeans sits uncomfortably with the 
time and effort spent doubting such friendships.   
 
 “It is everyone for themselves” 
 
The term maṣlaḥjī tended to refer to someone who only wanted to see you when they needed 
something. This was a ubiquitous accusation and would come up constantly, though not always 
seriously, in the process by which my friends monitored each other’s conduct. Accusing 
someone of being maṣlaḥjī could reflect a sense of the upset of the balance of reciprocity that 
Pitt-Rivers has described as underpinning friendship (2016). Take, for instance, a candid 
account from Tariq when he described his frustration with his close friend Amir. One day when 
I was with Tariq, Amir called, but in contrast to normal Tariq looked at his phone and then 
threw it to one side, saying “zinikh” (annoying, literally: rotten) out-loud with faint disgust, 
and ended the call. When Amir called again he ignored it. I asked why he had described Amir 





He always calls me up and asks me to come with him to translate at short notice! Am I your 
father?” he complained. “It’s stupid, and it is not normal (mish a’di)”  
In the context of displacement, there was plenty of scope for a friend to ask for too 
much. Tariq’s rebuttal, “Am I your father?”, reflects the way that such demands and 
expectations began to take on the role of kin and exceed what he perceives as his 
responsibilities as a friend. The root of this frustration was related to a need specific to the 
context of Germany, which was Tariq’s assistance to help interpret German. To this extent, 
being maṣlaḥjī and exceeding expectations of friendship was a challenge in Dresden. 
The accusation of maṣlaḥjī was not restricted to friends who could ask for too much but 
was also often applied to people who were suspected of knowing you in order to take 
advantage. I was told about this when I was walking back with Laith and Jamil after a few 
hours spent drinking and talking by one of the lakes in Dresden. There was a man who 
recognised Laith and called out to him. They greeted each other and asked a few questions, and 
the man asked Laith for a cigarette. I was surprised, however, when Laith told him that he 
didn’t have any. I asked him afterwards why he didn’t want to give the man a cigarette, and he 
replied, “he is maṣlaḥjī”. He explained that the man would only contact him when he wanted 
something from him, and he warned me to look out for maṣlaḥjī behaviour among my friends. 
In fact, I was often cautioned by friends about not falling into the trap of being maṣlaḥjī myself 
as I sought to navigate the needs of being a researcher with the expectations and norms of 
friendship. It was significant that the last parting advice I was given by Omar on my final night 
in Dresden was to keep in touch and not give people a reason to call me maṣlaḥjī.  
What accusations of being maṣlaḥjī give expression to is a sense of mistrust which is 
certainly not restricted to the context of displacement. Mains (2013), for example, has written 
about friendship among young men in Jimma, Ethiopia. In a context of economic uncertainty 
and a society where friends are expected to share money and possessions, his interlocutors 
could be concerned about whether friends express genuine affection or self-interest. Indeed, 
the kinds of doubts and suspicions about friends can be seen as part and parcel of what 
constitutes intimacy itself. Kelly has shown how in court cases that seek to verify someone has 
suffered torture there is a close relationship between sympathy and suspicion; there is not only 
mistrust of the “Other”, but also mistrust of the person who it is possible to relate to (2012). 
Among the Amazigh in the Atlas Mountains, mistrust “is rooted in the idea that familiarity is 
insufficient ground for trust”, and that familiarity “cannot be used as a basis for generating 





common aspect of friendship and social intimacy. However, what was described by my friends 
was something that was not part of a general condition of friendship but was rooted in 
displacement to Germany.   
The particularity of the context of displacement is apparent in a remark that Omar made 
one day when he expressed his frustration with shabāb in Dresden. As we sat in the café where 
we would meet regularly to talk, he told me that if he was in his city he would confront all the 
shabāb here for “who they are”. Here he puts up with their “lying” and “being maṣlaḥjī”, but 
in his city he was very quick and good at working people out. He would tell people if they were 
being maṣlaḥjī “even if they are doing it maybe 1%!” Omar therefore drew a distinction 
between friendships in his city in Syria and in Dresden. He understood that his close friends 
lied and were maṣlaḥjī in Syria, and that such mistrust is a part of being friends, but he was 
able to recognise this. In Dresden he is unable to really know whether people are lying or being 
maṣlaḥjī because they are not people he knows in the same way. What Omar describes is 
distinct from seeing such mistrust as part of friendship and intimacy in the way described by 
Carey among the Amazigh. Rather, it is the condition of displacement and the impossibility of 
really knowing one another that creates new and uncontrollable forms of uncertainty. This 
shares with what Lokot (2018) has noted among Syrian refugees in Jordan. They described 
how in Syria friendships were based on knowledge about a person’s family, but this was not 
the case in Jordan. In this setting, people “are faced with Syrians and Jordanians they do not 
know and whose families they are not familiar with, this makes forming new friendships 
difficult” (10). 
Mistrust among friends could also be connected to structural uncertainty and insecurity 
about their future as refugees in Germany. We can see this in the case of Akram, for example. 
One day I was talking to Akram about applying for an Ausbildung and he told me his options 
in cities across Germany, one of which was Hamburg, which he said was his preferred option 
because this is where his cousin lives. In previous conversations he had given the impression 
of wanting to stay close to his friends Hamid and Khalil, so I asked him whether he would be 
happy to leave the friends he had made in Dresden. He dismissed my question as naïve: “Why 
would I stay for Khalil and Hamid?” he asked. “Would they stay for me? It is everyone for 
themselves!” (kul wāḥid laḥālu) In Akram’s view, there was no expectation that he or his 
friends would consider remaining for each other because in the context of Germany everyone 
needed to look after their own interests. This can be seen to reflect what has often been 





the “ambiguous nature” of friendship that distinguishes it from kin and from lovers, so while 
kin are always “zemed”, or “close ones”, “an individual’s status as a friend is rarely definitive 
and long-term.” (Mains 2013) At the same time, however, Akram’s insistence on “everyone 
for themselves” speaks to a more pressing uncertainty about friendship. This found expression 
in a separate discussion which I recount in Chapter 4 when I told Akram about confronting the 
head of the company that managed the building where I lived because she refused to accept a 
Syrian male refugee as a tenant. In response, Akram explained that I should not take the risk 
of being unable to terminate my rental agreement for a friend, who, because he is a refugee, 
could not be relied on, telling me: “If you lost all your money and you were sat by the side of 
the road, refugees would just walk past you. They would look at you and leave you.”  
Akram’s warning about “refugees” expresses generalised mistrust as a result of the 
uncertainty of people’s condition in Germany. Akram’s notion of the “beauty” of friendship 
among Arabs I referenced earlier sits in tension with the uncertainty that comes with their 
circumstances in Germany. In his scepticism about “refugees”, Akram describes something 
slightly different to the notion of being maṣlaḥjī. I didn’t get the impression that this was a 
result of people seeking to instrumentalise friendships, but more the selfishness necessitated 
by the structural uncertainty and insecurity of being a refugee. 
The nature of friendship in Dresden was reflected in the way that it was quite common 
for seemingly good friends to suddenly no longer talk to each other with no intention of getting 
back in touch. Alongside what this suggests of the underlying uncertainty of friendships among 
Syrians and Palestinians in Germany, it also reflects something broader about friendship in 
displacement. The ease with which people could stop talking to each other in Dresden is 
initially surprising considering the small size of the city and the relatively circumscribed spaces 
where Syrians tended to go, shop, study and hang out. However, in Dresden, friends were 
distributed in separate spaces throughout the city. Despite its small size, there was considerable 
isolation and it could be easy not to meet. On top of this, friends could often know each other 
on an individual basis and not as part of a group. Friends who met in the camp or in a language 
class might not share other close friends and therefore it was relatively easy to stop seeing each 
other. The consequence of these structural features is that it could be hard for tensions and 
mistrust to be contained or overcome.  
Friendships would end, typically, when one person no longer returned calls or replied 
to messages. This was such a common and effective strategy that one friend, Khalid, used to 





block” and that would be it, we would not see him again. This was the experience of Ziad, a 
Palestinian asylum seeker from Lebanon who I knew well until, ironically, he stopped replying 
to my messages. He told me once about a friend of his, Bilal, who suddenly cut off all contact. 
Ziad and Bilal had come to know each other in the camp and they were very close, the evidence 
for this, he said, was that when Bilal’s sister came to visit Dresden he had asked Ziad to help 
with arranging things and showing her around the city. His friend, however, stopped replying 
to messages. Ziad wrote and called several times and even put a flower in his post box. When 
I asked if this was a normal thing to do when a friend is not in contact, he explained that the 
normal thing is to put a flower outside someone’s house but this was not possible at his friend’s 
16-story apartment block. On Eid al-Adha, he went to the apartment, rang the buzzer and 
wished him “Eid Mubarak” and said it was important “to be around people close to you”. 
“What did he do? He said thank you and hung up.” At this point Ziad accepted that Bilal did 
not want to be friends. However, months later, and the day before Ziad was telling me this 
story, he had been in touch again to say he was sorry. He told Ziad he is important to him and 
he would never want things to come between them. When Ziad went to his home to talk to him, 
Bilal explained that he thought it was important to walk the appropriate path (tariq munāsib). 
He had heard that Ziad was going to a Kneipe (pub) and hanging out with the wrong people. 
He was getting a bad reputation so Bilal decided to cut off contact. Ziad asked his friend: “Did 
I ever ask you to come with me?” Ziad explained to me that he would stay in touch for a short 
while in order to show Bilal that what he did was wrong, and then he will stop talking to him. 
I asked Ziad why he thought Bilal was getting in touch now and he replied that he wasn’t sure, 
but he thought it might be because he is an optimistic person who can have a positive effect on 
people. “I can change the way people feel. In five minutes, I can make your mood positive or 
negative.”  
Ziad’s account illustrates the tensions and uncertainty between friends, and how this 
could lead to the end of friendships. Bilal’s decision to not want to be friends with Ziad reflects 
the difficulty of knowing people in Dresden because, despite their intimacy, the realisation of 
Ziad’s bad reputation makes him question their friendship. In the context of the alienation of 
Syrians and Palestinians in the urban environment of Dresden this results in him cutting off all 
contact and makes it impossible for Ziad to see him; in another context, this kind of tension 
might not have resulted in such a dramatic foreclosure of their previously strong friendship. In 
the end, Ziad’s friend does come around and spontaneously gets in touch, but Ziad suspects 








Drawing attention to practices and discourses of friendship and sociality among Syrian and 
Palestinian men has shown how they were an important part of everyday life in the context of 
displacement. Friends, in particular, could take on diverse and manifold roles and expectations. 
In the specific context of Germany, where Syrians and Palestinians find themselves as a 
stigmatised group in society, their perception of the strength and “beauty” of friendship and 
sociability could become terms by which to compare themselves to Germans and a source of 
dignity. Almost all my friends expressed the sense that Germans lacked what Arabs had: joyful 
sociality and communality, or “the flavour of life”. This discourse shares a lot with what 
scholars writing about minority communities in North America have described as “reverse 
stigmatisation”, and this is certainly one aspect of the way my friends would boast about the 
difference between Arabs and Europeans. Yet this is only part of the explanation. What 
emerges as distinctive about the valorisation of friendship and sociability in contrast to 
Germans is the way that it embodies “emergent masculinity”, reflecting a sense of 
responsibility and care to others. Discourses of German society as “broken” created an 
opportunity for Arab refugees to “fix” the society, which seemed to find its most common 
expression in being good neighbours and offering forms of care to elderly Germans who were 
perceived to be neglected by family and society. In this capacity, Syrians and Palestinians could 
carve out a space in which to assert a role; a space in which Germans “integrate with us”. At 
the same time, however, these discourses reveal that the same context which helps to make 
social relationships a point of cultural distinction, a site of thick ethics, and one source of 























Muktar and I were sitting at a Turkish restaurant on Prager Strasse. Next to our table a giant 
television screen showed news in Turkish. It was the 26th of November, mid-way through the 
Syrian regime’s offensive against rebel-held areas of Aleppo and the news reported that the 
region of Hanano had fallen. Muktar, who is in his early twenties, speaks Turkish and is from 
a town near Aleppo, did not seem interested. He steadfastly avoided looking at the television 
as though it was a trap. He stared at his phone while I, and the rest of the restaurant, were 
fixed on the footage.  
 
During a B1 language class, Khalid, who is Palestinian from Syria, drew a heart with the flag 
of Palestine on it. In the break, he asked the teacher if she knew the history of Palestine and 
she said she did not know much. He played her a YouTube video of the history of the occupation 
of Palestine through a series of maps beginning in Ottoman times and ending with the 
expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied West Bank.  
 
These brief vignettes capture a difference I noted among Syrian and Palestinian interlocutors 
in Dresden. There was a much greater tendency among Palestinians from Syria to engage 
political activism and raise awareness about Palestine and protest during tensions, as it was for 
Syrians to demonstrate around anti- (or pro-) Assad positions. This is despite the turbulent 
crises of the Syrian conflict, a period in which the Assad regime reversed losses and reclaimed 
power over large swathes of the country through often destructive bombing campaigns and 





politics in public and to express cynicism about political activism; people who were adamantly 
anti-regime in private, such as Muktar, would mock and belittle anti-regime protestors. In this 
chapter, I explore the difference in responses to and practices of political activism between 
Syrians and Palestinians by exploring the perceived consequences of such activism in relation 
to citizenship and belonging in Germany.   
Migrant political activism has tended to be associated with claims to improve the rights 
of asylum seekers and refugees in host societies, such as the Sans Papieres movement in Paris 
(Balibar 2000), Afghan protestors’ claims for the right to third-country resettlement in Ankara, 
Turkey (Erensu 2016), or Palestinian claims for refugee status in Brazil (Moulin 2012). Interest 
has centred on protests and demonstrations that have sought to confront the immobilisation, 
marginalisation and limited rights offered to migrants in host societies. An influential concept 
in this regard is “acts of citizenship”, which interprets such rights-claiming as not only 
“enacting” citizenship but also expanding the meaning of citizenship itself (Isin 2013). Scholars 
have also explored the impact of political activism in diaspora communities on homeland 
politics, including playing important roles in funding, perpetuating and ending conflict, as in 
the case of the Somali diaspora (Kleist 2008), and Turkish and Kurdish Germans in relation to 
Turkey (Vertovec 2005). This work has also drawn attention to how diasporic political activism 
not only relates to the homeland but the position of migrants in the host society (Østergaard-
Nielsen 2003). Al-Rasheed (1994), for example, shows how the transnational political activism 
of Arab and Assyrian Iraqis in London is closely connected to their different intentions to 
remain in the UK. Others have shown how such activism can have “integrative effects”, as in 
the case of second-generation Somalis in the UK whose protests around remittance payments 
offered an opportunity to reframe representation of the Somali community in Britain 
(Liberatore 2018). 
In this chapter, I contribute to this literature by exploring the political activism of 
Syrians and Palestinians in relation to their differential positions in Germany. There were 
instances of anti-regime political activism among Syrians in Germany, and there is evidence 
that Syrian refugees can be active in establishing civil society and diaspora organisations, such 
as the Citizens for Syria in Germany organisation set up in 2013 (Bekaj et al. 2018, 85). 
Nonetheless, many of my interlocutors remained aloof and even critiqued such activism as out 
of place, despite, in many cases, living the war in Syria in their everyday lives. To this extent 
I follow Kelly (2008) in asking not why people get involved in political activism, but why 





was problematised by many Syrians. In contrast to what I described in Chapter 4 as the potential 
for demonstrations against the far right to display “responsible masculinity” as terms by which 
to make a claim to belong in Germany, demonstrations against the regime were seen to assert 
victimhood and display “refugeeness” rather than their status as citizens-to-be. This was a very 
different picture for Palestinians from Syria, who are predominantly third-generation 
descendants of Palestinians displaced in the 1948 Nakba and who were refugees in Syria. For 
most of my Palestinian friends, activism was not seen as raising a tension between 
“refugeeness” and belonging, in part because conflict in Palestine was not the immediate source 
of displacement to Germany. However, while Palestinians could embrace political activism as 
an expression of Palestinian masculine identity and compatible with claims to belong in 
Germany, such activism carried potentially unsettling consequences as it generated suspicions 
and anxieties in Germany because of its association with anti-Semitism.  
 
Comparing Syrian and Palestinian Activism 
 
There were two demonstrations in Dresden in December 2016 to protest against the regime 
bombing of eastern Aleppo. On Wednesday, 14 December, I was told by a Syrian friend, Aarif, 
who had come to Germany on a student visa, that there was a demonstration just beginning 
outside Starbucks on Prager Strasse, situated next to the emerging “Arab Street”. It seemed to 
be hastily arranged and Aarif only knew about it just before he called me. At its peak, there 
were approximately 350 people, as reported by the local newspaper Dresden 24, and protestors 
were clustered around a large plinth where a line of men stood and took it in turns to make 
speeches. People in the crowd were holding placards that said things like “Save Aleppo” in 
Arabic (anqidhū Aleppo), or “Aleppo bleeds and the world bleeds” in German (Aleppo blutet 
und die Welt), or “Save us” (Rettet uns). On one side of the protest there was a line of people 
who stood holding placards with photographs and statements about the conflict in German. 
People shouted out slogans and campaign statements in Arabic from opposition rallies in Syria, 
such as: “If you don’t protest, you don’t have honour”, or “Fuck yourself Nasrullah” (the leader 
of Hezbollah). There were also chants in German from other sections of the crowd, including 
Aarif and other students, such as “Stop den Krieg” (stop the war), “Bashar muss aus” (Bashar 
must go) and “Freiheit Aleppo” (Freedom for Aleppo). The second demonstration, held the 
following Friday, was entirely in German and included a re-enactment of a scene of 





Aleppo (see Figure 9). These were not large protests, and certainly nothing compared to the 
size of demonstrations in cities with a larger number of refugees, such as Berlin. Clearly, 
however, people did engage political activism in Germany to protest the war in Syria. A search 
on YouTube also reveals largely small protests in Germany during flashpoints of the war, 
including the bombing campaign of Eastern Ghouta in early 2018. 
At the same time, however, many Syrians did not participate. I was surprised by the 
response of most of my interlocutors, who not only avoided the protest but expressed 
scepticism towards it. As Kelly (2008) writes in the context of people who did not participate 
in armed resistance in the Second Intifada in the Occupied West Bank, it is as important to 
understand why people do not participate as it is to understand why they do. What characterises 
responses to the demonstration was the perception that it was out of place in Germany and was 
even a threat to the future of Syrians in the country. Consider, for instance, Iyad, who is a 
doctor from Aleppo, and who I knew was anti-regime. He described a strong sense of 
indignation at the protest when I went to visit him the evening after the second demonstration. 
He asked about what happened and how many people attended, and then said dismissively that 
he didn’t agree with it. “It is bringing the revolution here […] If they want to fight Assad then 
they should go back to Syria!” His opinion was shared by others, such as Omar from eastern 
Syria, who was against the regime and was one of the few people I knew who had the Syrian 
revolutionary flag on the wall of his apartment. He told me when we discussed refugees 
demonstrating in Germany, “If I wanted to do a demonstration here for Aleppo then I would 
go to Syria and kill Assad […] You are a refugee!”  
In another discussion I had at the time of the demonstrations for Aleppo with Jamil, he 
adopted the tone of a detached observer to express his cynicism. Jamil is Palestinian from Syria 
and had spent some time living near Aleppo with his wife and children. Unlike Iyad or Omar, 
he presented himself as being neither pro- nor anti-regime, although he regretted the revolution 
and the chaos it had brought. I expected Jamil to be critical of the demonstration when I went 
to see him at the apartment of his friend Hisham, but what I found striking was the manner in 
which he expressed his cynicism. He took pleasure in the incongruity of the demonstration in 
Dresden. Sitting on the floor of Hisham’s bare apartment, he asked with a sense of anticipation 
whether they shouted slogans of the opposition, such as “īd ilnizam” (the hand of the regime), 
and whether they called supporters of the regime “butchers” (jazaryyn), growling the words 
and adopting an angry facial expression. He told me that supporters of the regime will call the 





sides. He concluded, dismissively, “they think they are still in Syria.” He told us that the 
situation in Syria is “finished” in German (fertig), and it “has gone” (rāḥt). When he got up to 





This reaction to the demonstration reflects a reluctance to engage with the conflict in Syria 
more generally. There was not a widespread determination to articulate wrongdoing by the 
regime, to share their victimisation, or rally Germans. Muktar’s refusal to register news of the 
bombing of Aleppo on the television in the Turkish restaurant on Prager Strasse is indicative 
of a more general reticence to engage politics in public. This was apparent during a discussion 
in an A2 German language class where there were Syrians from different regions, including 
Arab Sunni Muslims from across Syria, Christian brothers from Homs, and a Kurdish man 
from Aleppo. When the teacher told us that the next day’s topic would be about politics in 
Syria, I was curious about how the class would turn out, anticipating that it might lead to 
division. However, I experienced something similar to what Achilli (2015a) describes in the 
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way he expected his Palestinian interlocutors in Jordan to engage the political and was 
perplexed by its absence. The hour-long class discussion remained focussed on the intricacies 
of the political system in Syria and the closest the class came to censor the regime was a 
comment from Yasin, a middle-aged man whose son was presumed dead in a regime prison in 
Syria, that “when there are elections in Syria, Assad wins 99.9% of the vote”. 
The response of Syrians was in contrast to the activism of Palestinians in Germany. 
Like many Palestinians I knew from Syria, Palestine was an important part of Khalid’s life in 
Germany and would find public expression. For instance, one weekend Khalid and I took a trip 
to Berlin to buy a new necklace with a map of historic Palestine from a shop on Sonnenallee, 
or “Arab Street”, and to eat knafeh, a sweet pastry from Nablus in the Occupied West Bank. In 
his apartment, Khalid and his housemate had a small set of shelves that functioned as a space 
for physical objects from or associated with Palestine, which included glass bottles containing 
materials such as earth from Jerusalem collected by a German friend of Khalid’s from the 
camp. Khalid would confront Germans about Palestine, such as when he saw a man walking 
with an Israeli flag in Dresden one day and he and his friends approached him to ask why he 
supported Israel. He told me they explained to the man politely that Israel is on land belonging 
to Palestinians, but then they were more forthright and he admitted the man was intimidated 
by him and his friends. 
Opportunities to engage in activism were a feature of everyday life for many 
Palestinians. A Swedish man who hoped to walk from Sweden to Jerusalem to raise awareness 
for Palestine stayed a few nights in Dresden at the home of Talal, an active campaigner for 
Palestine. When I met him one evening, he told me he was welcomed like a “hero” at the 
Palestinian supermarket in Dresden and was offered food and greeted by staff and customers. 
As we sat and ate together, he invited us to come with him on the walk and join his mission to 
raise awareness about Palestine. Talal said that if he did not have his wife in Dresden he would 
definitely join him on the walk, and he was adamant that I should walk with him, telling me 
forcefully, “take your tent and go!”  
Political activism could also find expression online, as was apparent in a conversation 
I had with Ali, a Palestinian from Syria. One day when I visited Laith’s apartment, Ali was 
visiting for coffee and I noticed that he was wearing the same necklace as Khalid. He explained 
that he had in fact met Khalid after asking him about where he bought his necklace. Ali told us 
that earlier in the day he had seen a Facebook post about Palestine and something the Israeli 





where the village was, but he couldn’t find it. “Then I had an idea; I could take a picture of a 
Palestinian flag and stick it somewhere in Palestine”, through the feature on Googlemaps that 
allows you to “stick” pictures to particular places. He subsequently scrolled to villages in Israel 
and added the Palestinian flag as an image, “It had never occurred to me before”, he said.  
Over the course of my fieldwork, there was a “gathering” (ibtisām) and a demonstration 
in response to crises in Palestine. The first ibtisām was organised by Talal and Ali in July 2017 
in response to the Israeli decision to add metal detectors to the Haram Ash-Sharif. There was a 
white sheet laid on the floor with the map of Palestine displayed in sand, with pictures of al-
Aqsa mosque placed around the map, as well as photographs of the eight men killed in protests. 
There was a second sign on the floor that declared: “Jerusalem ist eine Arabische Stadt” 
(Jerusalem is an Arab city). The gathering had a celebratory atmosphere, to mark the fact that 
metal detectors had not been added, and at one point a group of women attending the 
demonstration ululated, a mark of celebration at weddings. The second demonstration was 
organised by Talal in December 2017 in response to the decision to move the US embassy to 
Jerusalem. This was more frenetic and at around 4pm as many as two hundred people gathered 
outside the main train station, waving Palestinian flags and forming a chorus of protest against 
the US. 
What is striking, however, is not the high level of participation of Palestinians in 
demonstrations, but the way people reflected on and talked about them. When I met Palestinian 
friends in the days after the ibtisām and demonstration, I would constantly be asked where I 
was and why I hadn’t attended (I had plans on both days). After the first demonstration, I would 
tell them I was disappointed not to have come and they would reply “you missed out!”, or “it 
was beautiful” (kānat ḥilweh). In contrast to the scepticism towards demonstrations for Syria 
among my Syrian friends, there was a sense of pride and the expression of enjoyment. I noticed 
that weeks after the first event Khalid and others had pictures developed from the day 
prominently positioned in their homes showing them at the demonstration holding Palestinian 
flags together with Palestinian friends. Of course, not all Palestinians were so enthusiastic about 
getting involved, but unlike Syrians, the issue was not that the protests were out of place but 









Starting a New Life 
 
The reluctance among Syrians to engage political activism contrasted to attitudes in private 
where it was common for my Syrian friends to invoke the war in Syria in everyday life. 
Memories of being in Syria could be triggered by the sound of an airplane passing above, or 
seeing a gun on display, or a range of objects, sounds or circumstances, or nothing at all. The 
following quote is from a “piece to camera” by Omar during fireworks on New Year’s Eve 
2017/18 to his friend who was recording with his phone on Augustusbrücke, a bridge in the 
centre of Dresden,  
 
God is Great, glory be to God, thanks to God the city of Dresden has been stormed 
(iqtiḥān) to support our vulnerable (mustḍʿfyn) brothers in Dresden; with God’s 
permission we support our vulnerable brothers in Dresden.  
 
In his broadcast, Omar draws association between the fireworks and the war in Syria and 
positions himself as part of the opposition to the regime in Syria (muʿaraḍa) who have stormed 
the city of Dresden to support their “vulnerable brothers”. Omar would often invoke his 
memories of participating in demonstrations and rallies in 2012, describing the sense of 
solidarity, the mass of people and what they chanted. Although his city was late to join the 
protests, it had the honour of having “the longest demonstration”, he said. In his accounts of 
the protests, Omar would embody their energy and optimism, repeating the chants in a low, 
deep voice, sharing videos from YouTube on his phone, and shifting in his chair at the café 
where we were talking. It was like the protests, which by this time had happened five years 
previously, had taken place yesterday. 
The demonstrations and conflict could be lived in people’s homes through television 
series, YouTube videos, social media and phone calls to friends and family living in Syria. This 
way of living the conflict online was a constant aspect of Muktar’s everyday life, who would 
almost always have his phone set up on his sofa playing Syrian television series or news reports. 
One evening he showed me a video produced by the regime which showed planes attacking a 
city in Aleppo Province. He pointed to the soldiers in the video, saying: “kelb” (dog), “kelb” 
(dog), “they are from Hezbollah”. When I asked how he knew this, he said it was the way they 
run, “a Syrian would never run like this”. He laughed mockingly at propaganda footage of 





“Now I’ll show you the opposite”, he said, and he quickly brought up footage from a city 
besieged by the regime. The video showed interviews with children who talked about what 
they wanted to eat most. Phones relayed in real time the many sides and perspectives of the 
war in Syria and was the means by which people surrounded themselves with information as 
well as its past and present soundscapes and suffering (see Ingvars & Gislason 2018).  
Syria and its politics would define people’s relationships to one another in a number of 
ways in Dresden. The geography of the revolution and ensuing war could be used to “place” 
people, as was the case on one occasion when Suhail and I visited a friend of his who came 
from Suhail’s hometown in eastern Syria. His friend had neighbours visiting after Friday prayer 
and as they introduced themselves to Suhail and said the regions they came from, Suhail would 
situate each individual according to the role their region had played in the revolution and war. 
Politics could also determine the boundaries of friendships. Muktar, for example, chose his 
friends according to what side of the divide they fell, whether pro- or anti-regime. He explained 
to me once, “if someone says one thing positive about Bashar, that would be it,” he would not 
talk to them. He was clear that he would never be friends with someone who was Shia, who he 
said were always pro-regime. When one day we went to eat manāqīsh from the main Palestinian 
supermarket in Dresden, he wondered aloud after we left the shop whether the Lebanese man 
working at the oven, who he seemed to have a good relationship with, was Shia. Would it 
matter if he was, I asked? “Yes”. 
“But I thought you said in Syria people don’t care about your religion?” I asked  
“Before the war, it wasn’t important. But now it is. It is important in Germany.” He replied.  
It was not always the case that people made such distinctions. Others among my friends 
would deliberately separate politics from people and could express the virtue of being able to 
engage in restrained discussion and disagreement. They would accuse people who refused to 
speak to someone on the other side of the divide as “small-minded”.  
Many of my Syrian friends therefore lived in the shadow of the war in Syria and were 
privately critical of the Assad regime, which raises the question as to why they were against 
political activism. I asked this question to Adil, someone I met a number of times on his trips 
to Dresden from a city in the west and had ambitions to become a journalist. He is Shia and 
came from Syria after harrowing experiences of being in a village surrounded by ISIS. 
Intrigued by his perspective, I took the opportunity one day while we sat in Alaunpark and did 
an interview to ask him about the reluctance of Syrians to engage in activism or talk openly 






People have different opinions and loyalties. If you start to talk openly about the 
situation in Syria someone will have a problem with you and you don’t want to get 
into a conflict in Germany over this, so you don’t talk about it. When people come 
to Germany they just want to forget and leave everything behind and start a new 
life here. 
 
Adil’s observation of Syrians wanting to avoid conflict can be seen in part as a reference to the 
literal risk of repression and retaliation from the regime. This is the point raised by Jörum in 
his explanation of the reluctance of Syrians in Sweden to engage in anti-regime activism. He 
questions the assumption that activists outside of the homeland can agitate “without having to 
fear its repression” (2015). He reports harassment of anti-regime activists by members of the 
Syrian embassy in Sweden, a point confirmed by Swedish Secret Services. Activists have also 
reported that members of their families in Syria suffer for their actions, including interrogation, 
being held hostage, and even murder. This was certainly an issue raised by some of my friends 
who described their fear of the regime’s repressive surveillance. When I returned to Dresden 
in April 2019, for example, Muktar told me that if there was a vote in Germany about Assad in 
the future, there are people who will say they are going to vote against Assad but will then 
enter the voting booth and vote for him anyway because they fear the regime will find out. The 
gruesome murder in Hamburg of prominent anti-regime activist Mohamed Joune in January 
2019 illustrates that such anxiety is not misplaced.  
Adil’s account, however, suggests something more than a fear of the consequences of 
activism. He describes not wanting to get embroiled in the conflict as part of a process of 
moving on; political activism, Adil says, could be an obstacle to “starting a new life”. Yet I 
have shown that many of my friends lived in the shadow of the conflict in Syria and there is 
little evidence that people sought to “forget” about events, as Adil says. In fact, there was a 
strong moral discourse about not forgetting and moving on, and the suggestion of a clean break 
could be rebuked. My friends would often privately criticise others who they felt did not 
remember, reflect on, or who too emphatically insinuated their disinterest in Syria or return to 
Syria. However, while people did not generally seek to “forget” and “leave everything behind”, 
there did seem to be a general sense that political activism was an obstacle to life in Germany. 
This reflects the attitude of people such as Iyad to the demonstration for Aleppo who 





“think they are still living in Syria”. What this points to is the perceived implications of political 
activism on the position of Syrians in Germany. 
 
Refusing the Refugee Label  
 
The importance of Germany as the context for political activism was apparent during the 
demonstrations for Aleppo I attended. There were different views as to what extent the 
demonstrations should reflect norms from Syria and other Arab countries or be comprehensible 
to Germans. At one point, for example, there was a speech in Arabic about Iraq which upset 
Aarif, the person who invited me to the demonstration, because it was not about Aleppo and it 
was in Arabic, which meant it was incomprehensible to German observers. Indeed, there was 
pressure from many in the audience to use German, much to the dismay and confusion of 
attendees who were unable to speak the language. At one point this tension between an “Arab” 
or “German” demonstration seemed to be expressed when someone ironically shouted 
“taqbīr!” (to say Allahu akbar), while those around him laughed and told him to be quiet.  
Concern for their representation to Germans reflects work that has shown how political 
activism among migrants, diasporas and minorities is negotiated in relation to belonging in the 
host society (Liberatore 2018; Portes et al. 1999). Østergaard-Nielsen, a leading scholar of 
diasporas and political activism who has worked on Kurdish and Turkish minorities in 
Germany, has summed up the important role of the host society on transnational political 
activism as follows, 
 
[…] only the crudest analysis would ascribe homeland political orientation among 
migrants to the agency of the sending country only. Not only are such efforts often 
reactive rather than proactive, but the extent to which this falls on fertile ground 
also relates to the societal and political-institutional context in the receiving 
country. (2003, 767-768) 
 
What is striking is that political activism for Syria was in many respects the source of 
legitimacy for the right to be in Germany. As Castaneda and Holmes note, Syrians were 
represented as “real” refugees in German media because they were “forced to flee by the 
ongoing civil war and the involvement in this war of its international protagonists, especially 





was a surprisingly long period when common negative tropes of refugees and migrants were 
absent in representations of Syrians in the German press, reflecting the way that Syrians were 
at the head of what has been termed the “global meritocracy of suffering” (Bob 2002, 36). 
Furthermore, although Dresden could be a hostile and unsympathetic place for refugees 
because of its association with the far right, its history and status as a symbol of the brutality 
and destruction of war meant that the conflict in Syria resonated with local people. The 
relationship and tension between Dresden’s history of destruction, Syria’s destruction, and the 
inhospitality of the far right in the city was the subject of the film “Dresden Refuge”, part of 
the project “Europa Transit”.6 
There was a general recognition among my friends that anti-regime activism was the 
source of broad sympathy and support among Germans. The installation of “Monument”, three 
full-sized upturned buses to represent the defences of anti-regime forces in Aleppo, by artist 
Manaf Halbouni in the centre of Dresden in early 2017 is a good example of this (see Figure 
10). The recognition associated with being a victim of the regime would be mobilised by 
Syrians in response to attempts to deny their right to claim asylum in Germany. For instance, 
in Chapter 4 I showed a letter that was written in reply to the sticker campaign telling refugees, 
in Arabic: “Return to your homeland because your homeland needs you.” In the letter, the main 
explanation for not being able to return is that the regime is still in place. Invoking their status 
as victims of the Assad regime reflects the way that this was legible to Germans, who have an 
understanding of the war in Syria. Activism against the regime would seem to only court 
controversy with one segment of the population, the far right, who, my friends observed, wrote 
angry online comments on media coverage of demonstrations. However, the support and 
legibility of political activism to mainstream public opinion was an important part of what 
made it problematic for many Syrians. This is because activism could be seen to construct their 
victimisation and display their claim to be in Germany on the basis of their forced displacement 






                                                             








This distinction between being in Germany as citizens and being in Germany as victims of the 
regime is reflected in Omar’s explanation to me during a visit to Dresden in April 2019 when 
we talked about the prospect of returning to Syria. In a conversation in his class at school, he 
was asked the meaning of “homeland” (Heimat). His answer, he told me, was that it is his 
family, friends, and freedom. What made Syria home for him when he left at the age of 17 was 
his neighbourhood (ḥāra), his school, his friends and his family. In Germany, he now has such 
a neighbourhood, new friends and school. In contrast, the claim to be in Germany on account 
of victimisation by the Assad regime was shallow and insubstantial, reducing being in Germany 
to a condition of displacement. Omar told me that when he is approached by someone and 
asked when he will return to Syria, he will say that there is a war, or Assad is still in power, 
otherwise he would return. In saying this, he explained, he wants to put the other person at 
ease, “you lie to them to make them feel more comfortable” because “someone will only ask 
you this question if they want you to return. It is impossible for someone who loves you to 
come up to you and ask when you will return.” Returning after the end of the conflict was not 
what Omar wanted and neglected all the reasons that made Germany his new “homeland”; it 
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was something he said to appease people who he perceived as wanting him to leave. Political 
activism can be seen as raising a similar tension by situating Germany as a site of temporary 
displacement from Syria.    
This tension is further apparent in the following exchange between Omar and his 
cousin, Karim. I went to their apartment at the end of the siege against ISIS in their hometown 
by US and Kurdish forces in late 2017 and Omar was anxious and restless. For Omar, 
“liberating” his city from ISIS did not justify the means. He said his city “isn’t just Daesh 
(ISIS)” and asked us rhetorically if the city belonged to ISIS or its people? At this point his 
cousin intervened and said he didn’t want to talk about this topic: “It gives me a headache.” 
“What, and you think this doesn’t affect you?” Omar shouted at him.  
His cousin said they are in Germany and they have started their lives again. But Omar warned 
him that when ISIS was removed from their city, there was a risk that Germany would send 
them back. 
Karim replied to him: “If you concentrate on your life. If you learn the language and you get 
work, then they will not return you. There are people who have been here 10, 15 years and they 
haven’t gone back.” 
Omar and Karim’s back and forth shows the uncertainty of victimisation in the claim 
to belong. Omar sees the destruction of their city and the power of Assad as portending 
conditions of their return to Syria because Germany would soon accept the legitimacy of the 
regime. He expresses the fragility and uncertainty of their status as “victims”. In fact, Karim 
shares this sense of uncertainty and emphasises their claims to be in Germany on the basis of 
being productive citizens-to-be. What matters is to enact good citizenship by “concentrating 
on your life”, learning the language, and finding work.  
Throughout previous chapters I have drawn a link between masculinity and citizenship, 
in which masculine identity could offer terms for negotiating belonging in Germany (as well 
as presenting a barrier to such belonging). In Chapter 4, I showed how demonstrating against 
the far right could create a space in which refugee men displayed “responsible masculinity” to 
a watching German public. Others have noted how demonstrating during the Arab Spring could 
be the source of a valorised masculinity. Norbakk (2018) has described how participation of 
middle class men in the “youth revolution” in Cairo in 2011 that led to the downfall of President 
Hosni Mubarak served as “masculine capital” for men who otherwise found it impossible to 
gather the necessary financial capital to be able to marry. Demonstrating against the regime 





with pride, such as the comments of Omar I described above. Demonstrating in Germany, in 
contrast, was not seen to accrue the same “masculine capital” because despite the possible 
repercussions it was seen as a pale imitation of the risks and sacrifices of anti-regime activists 
and members of rebel forces fighting in Syria. This is reflected in some of the quotes I 
mentioned above which challenge demonstrators to “go to Syria”. Nor was participating in the 
demonstrations a means of showing commitment to democracy and their “responsibility” and 
their “strength” in Germany as the condition of belonging, as I suggest was the case for 
demonstrating against the far right. For my interlocutors, despite the fact that the conflict in 
Syria was legible to a German public, demonstrating and campaigning for Syria seemed to 
enact their status as temporary refugee-victims.   
The result of this problematisation was the surprising condition in which demonstrating 
insincerely could become a marker of belonging in Germany. I introduced the chapter with 
Muktar’s steadfast determination not to watch the news of Aleppo being bombed by the regime, 
despite having strong feelings against the regime. When I first heard about the protest for 
Aleppo taking place, I thought Muktar would want to get involved. I wrote to ask if he wanted 
to join, but I didn’t get a response. When I saw him the next day at the school standing with 
Syrian friends, I was surprised when he asked flippantly whether there were any beautiful 
women at the demonstration, and said forthrightly that he would have gone to the 
demonstration to try to meet attractive Syrian women. Shortly afterwards we walked up the 
stairs to our classroom, and Yasin, who had attended the demonstration, was there. They 
stopped to talk to each other and Muktar described their conversation in the following terms,  
 
I told him that the people at the demonstration were just playing (yalʿabu). I said, 
“Aleppo has gone (rāḥt). It is in the hands of the regime. Will these people [the 
demonstrators] ever return? No. They were just shabāb chasing girls. They were 
just trying to have some excitement. In Berlin, there were thirty Syrians who were 
arrested for being drunk [at similar protests].” 
 
Muktar seems to condemn shabāb at the demonstration for “playing”, “chasing girls” and 
“getting drunk” and their insincerity is reflected in the fact that they will not return to Syria. 
Yet he seemed to actively cultivate this attitude himself, both in his comments after the first 
demonstration and to an even greater extent when we both attended the second demonstration. 





constantly about the cold. He stayed close to the edge and laughed mockingly at the things 
being said by the speakers and afterwards talked at length about how he had tried to chat up 
women at the protest. What this seemed to suggest was his determination not to participate 
sincerely, and to embody the attitude of the shabāb he dismissed as “just wanting some 
excitement”. Muktar’s attitude shows that refusing to participate seriously becomes a means to 
address the implications of political activism as perceived by many Syrians: by demonstrating 
insincerely, Muktar refused a temporary refugee-victim identity and performed a claim to 
belong in Germany. In fact, later on in the discussion at the school above, Muktar distinguished 
the shabāb from Yasin, who he said did demonstrate sincerely. Yasin’s participation was 
different precisely because his whole life had been in Syria and he was unable to move on. In 
contrast to the shabāb who performed insincerely and refused to engage the political, Yasin 
was in many respects a “typical” refugee, a victim of his displacement who could not or would 
not move on. 
The relationship between political activism and terms of citizenship and belonging in 
Germany reflects what Achilli (2014) describes for Palestinians in al-Wihdat Camp in Jordan 
at the time of protests during the Arab Spring. Achilli’s interlocutors share with my friends the 
way they dismissed such political activism. They describe pro-democracy protestors as 
“troublemakers” (darawyn), for example. For Achilli, such a refusal is a mechanism by which 
Palestinians manage to combine two conflicting loyalties: Palestinian nationalism and 
Jordanian citizenship. He writes, 
 
The difference between “enemy” and “friend” should be thought of as being 
intrinsic to Palestinian refugees’ status. This distinction is played out in the tension 
between “refugee-ness” and “citizenship”, between “Palestinian-ness” and 
“Jordanian-ness”, and between the effort of living an ordinary life in the context of 
integration in Jordan and the nationalistic struggles of an exiled and marginalized 
community. (2014, 242) 
 
In Germany, political activism similarly entails bringing forward a tension between citizenship 
and refugeeness, but the terms are quite different. For my interlocutors, such activism does not 
pit them against the state, in the way that protesting during the Arab Spring would have for 
Palestinians. Rather, it is about refusing the refugee slot, in which their legitimacy is a result 





among Syrians who have strong claims of grievance against the Assad regime achieves is to 
overcome their perception of the limitations of refugee identity in making a claim to 
citizenship. In similar terms to Achilli, at least part of the response seems to emerge from a 
strategy of “descent into the ordinary” (Das 2006). This is different to the circumstances of 
Palestinians in Germany.  
 
“From an unknown Asian state” 
 
For many of my Palestinian interlocutors, political activism was part and parcel of what it 
means to be Palestinian. The clearest expression of this was the way that people talked about 
attending demonstrations, where there was rarely hesitation about whether to attend or not, and 
there was the assumption that they would be present at the next one. In contrast to the 
scepticism among Syrians, there was a sense of pride and even enjoyment about attending 
demonstrations. When I spoke to Rami after the demonstration in December 2017 to protest 
moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, he described it as a social occasion; a 
gathering of friends with a “beautiful atmosphere”. The demonstrations, despite strong feelings 
of resentment at events taking place, were part of a long tradition of campaigning for Palestine 
and memorialisation of dispossession from historic Palestine. This sense of attending as the 
expression of being Palestinian was reflected in the responses of friends when I apologised for 
not being able to attend the ibtisām (gathering) in June. They would tell me that it was a shame 
I couldn’t come but there would be another opportunity to attend soon, reflecting the sense of 
continuous crisis and the inevitability of their own participation. The fact that people expressed 
the sense that such demonstrations for Palestine did not achieve anything was, in many 
respects, besides the point.  
This would seem to reflect the observation of resistance as an essential aspect of 
Palestinian identity (Sayigh 1979; Jean-Klein 2001). Gabiam (2016), for example, has explored 
the importance of suffering, temporariness and refugeeness for Palestinians in camps in pre-
war Syria, and there is a rich literature that shows the importance of notions of resistance to 
Palestinian masculine identity. As Achilli writes, scholars have explored the way that 
masculinity is linked to “irreducible resistance and independence” (2015, 264). This is perhaps 
most notable in Peteet’s (1994) account of the way that beatings and detention in the Occupied 
West Bank were the site of masculine accomplishment during the First Intifada. However, other 





can often be negotiation, avoidance and uncertainty with respect to resistance. For instance, in 
Allan’s account of Shatila camp in Lebanon, she writes of her surprise about how her 
“interlocutors were more willing to question - and even subvert - the nationalist doxa of 
perseverance and resistance, than to adhere to it dutifully regardless of where it was taking 
them” (2013, 2; see also Barbosa 2018). This work therefore invites us to go further than 
situating Palestinian political activism as being intrinsically about a Palestinian condition of 
“resistance” and “steadfastness” and to situate activism in its context. 
Palestine as a cause for Palestinians was seen to have very different implications 
compared to Syria for Syrians in Germany. While political activism for Syrians was seen as an 
expression of their displacement and the terms of their being in Germany, for Palestinians, 
activism was situated in broader claims about historic injustice that is deeply embedded in 
Palestinian identity (Suleiman 2016). This far-reaching and moral dimension of the Palestinian 
question is reflected in how Talal described the demonstration he was organising to protest 
against the moving of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in December 2017. He was 
confident there would be a high turn-out of people because Palestine is different to any other 
issue, “it is only Palestine that makes people from different Arab countries meet together and 
work together.” While we talked, his friend was putting up posters in Arabic supermarkets 
inviting “everyone who has solidarity with Palestine” to join the demonstration (see Figure 12). 
The issue of Palestine was seen by Talal as having a timeless dimension. When I asked if he 
ever worried that people would get tired of campaigning for Palestine, he said “it is impossible 
to get tired of demonstrating for Palestine. How long has it been now? 70 years?” In contrast 
to Syrians, therefore, activism entailed for Palestinians a different bundle of associations than 
the immediate condition of displacement and the symbolic assertion of their victimhood and 
otherness and desire to return.  
This difference found expression in the pragmatic distinction between Palestinians and 
Syrians and the relationship to return. For Syrians, Syria was present as a site of deportation, 
even as it was the basis of the right to be in Germany. This was even more the case for Iraqis 
who often struggled to get asylum in Germany. In contrast, Palestine for Palestinians was 
situated differently. It was often remarked by Palestinians and non-Palestinians alike that it was 
impossible they could ever be “returned” to Syria, Palestine, or anywhere else because they 
were not recognised as having a state to return to. Their ID cards had “XXXX” written on it in 
the space for their nationality. In the case of Palestinian asylum seekers, such as people from 












In fact, the possibility of “return” to Palestine was not seen as being in tension to belonging in 
German; for many of my friends, migration to Germany and gaining citizenship could be 
conceptualised as offering the best chance of “return”. Consider the following conversation 
when I went to visit Talal and we called his friend living in a city in the west of Germany who 
is also Palestinian from Syria. His friend was surprised that I was speaking Arabic and I 
explained that I had been studying Arabic recently in Ramallah. He replied: “waḥid Allah! Ar-
rajʿa la Ramallah!” (One God! Return to Ramallah!) I asked if he misses Syria. He said he 
missed his mother but nothing else, “We were very tired from our life in Syria.”  
In general, do Palestinians miss Syria? I asked. 
He explained: “There are people who can get nationality in Germany, and then return to 
Palestine. If we stayed in Syria a thousand years we would never be able to return. Because of 
this Palestinians don’t want to go back to Syria.” 
Figure 12 - Publicity for the demonstration against moving the US embassy to Jerusalem. The heading reads, 







There is a difference therefore that while political activism for Syrians was felt to raise 
tension between their status in Germany as temporary refugee-victims, and worthy citizens-to-
be, this was not the case for Palestinians. Palestinian activism did not enact their refugee-ness 
in the same way as Syrians because it was not the cause of their present displacement. As 
Talal’s friend expressed, activism in Germany was in many respects concomitant with a claim 
to be in Germany, as it was through becoming German that Palestinians could gain the 
possibility of return to Palestine, a point also noted by Allan (2014) in the discourse of 
Palestinians in Lebanon wanting to migrate to Europe. 
Palestinian activism was differently situated for Palestinians compared to Syrians for a 
number of reasons. While activism for Palestinians was part of a long tradition, for Syrians it 
was contentious and liable to fracture. The scale of the violence in Syria (in which Palestinians 
have suffered enormously, such as the destruction of Yarmouk Camp) also contrasts to the ebb 
and flow of crises and violence in Palestine, and there is a difference in the level of risk 
associated with such activism in Germany in terms of the threat to Syrians of retaliation by the 
Assad regime. At the same time, it is important to situate political activism in the here and now 
and the location of Palestinians and Syrians in Germany. What encourages Khalid to bring up 
the question of Palestine in language classes, and makes Syrians avoid the topic, is tied up with 
its associations and implications as refugees in Germany. While for Syrians it seems to produce 
exclusion, and the conditionality of their belonging, Palestine for Palestinians represents 
something quite different. There is therefore the opposite of the “descent into the ordinary”. 
Rather than taking activism for granted as part of the condition of being young Palestinian men, 
this analysis attempts to show how the context of Germany facilitates activism as virtuous for 
Palestinians, and as important in the forging of a refugee male identity. However, this produces 
its own tension as campaigning for Palestine as young, Arab men, could bring with it 
accusations of anti-Semitism.   
 
Tensions between Being Palestinian and German Citizenship 
 
Enacting Palestinian political activism could pit Palestinians against public opinion in 
Germany. Khalid shared a number of instances in which he experienced scepticism, suspicion, 
or a refusal to engage with the question of Palestine among Germans he met. For instance, he 
told me one afternoon about a conversation he had with his language teacher about Palestine, 





at the beginning of the chapter, this time it was the teacher who initiated the topic. She asked 
him, he said, putting on a prying voice, “So what is the problem between Palestinians and Jews 
then?” He explained, “It was a really strange thing to ask!” He replied to her, “There are no 
problems between Palestinians and Jews. There are problems between Israelis and 
Palestinians.” He told me he knew she was asking to see if he would say something against 
Jews, “but I caught her” (kamashta), and he simulated moving his hand to catch something in 
the air. He told me that he turned the question on her, asking her why she did not know the 
history of Palestine when she teaches politics.  
Activism for Palestine was liable to lead to accusations of anti-Semitism in Germany, 
especially at a time when there is mounting concern about high levels of anti-Semitism among 
Muslims in Europe (Witte & Beck 2018), including evidence to support such claims. A 2018 
report, for example, noted that 42% of “young Muslims with an Arab background” in Germany 
had anti-Semitic views compared to 25% in the population more broadly (Feldman 2018). 
Fears of anti-Semitism among Muslims in Germany is not new. In 2002 and 2003, for example, 
the German Ministry of the Family commissioned the Center for Democratic Culture based in 
Berlin to prepare a report about “anti-Semitism, homophobia, and gender discrimination among 
Muslim immigrants” (Özyürek 2016, 44). However, there has been growing alarm in recent 
years, particularly as a result of the “refugee crisis” and the arrival of predominantly young 
Muslim men. In April 2018, for example, Angela Merkel described “a new phenomenon” as 
refugees “bring another form of anti-Semitism into the country” (Witte & Beck 2018). Özyürek 
has shown how anti-Semitism among Muslims in Germany is often understood according to 
an “import-export theory”, the belief that Europeans have historically exported anti-Semitism 
to Turks and Arabs, but while Europeans themselves have overcome anti-Semitic ideology, 
Muslims have not and require intervention from the state. Such a notion of “Muslim anti-
Semitism” characterises “Muslims as immoral perpetrators and excludes them from the fold of 
the ethically normative European/German community.” (2016, 61) The way Palestinian 
activism could prompt fears of anti-Semitism was most manifest during demonstrations across 
Germany against the moving of the US embassy to Jerusalem in December 2017 which resulted 
in what might be termed a moral panic in response to burning Israeli flags close to Brandenburg 
Gate and the Holocaust memorial.   
Khalid was aware but generally unphased by this tension. This was apparent in a 
conversation at my apartment one day when he was looking online for a Palestinian T-shirt to 





before the demonstrations in December 2017, but it was nonetheless apparent that it would be 
provocative. When I asked if he was serious about buying and wearing the T-shirt in Germany, 
he said he was because he has “Meinungsfreiheit”, or freedom of speech. I could often be 
surprised by the lack of awareness or concern among my interlocutors of the implications of 
certain actions, such as intimidating Israeli tourists. This could happen when we were sitting at 
Starbucks and the person I was with might recognise someone as Israeli and call out Arabic 
swear words used by Israelis, such as “sharamuṭa” (whore), or something similar, at a volume 
they may or may not hear, and there would be satisfaction if someone discerned a change of 
behaviour, such as a lowering of voices. In general, there were broadly-shared anti-Semitic 
tropes, including Jewish control of big business, the media and the weapons industry, reflecting 
the high-prevalence of such tropes in the Middle East more generally (Rabo 2014; De Poli 
2014). This could include perceptions of Jews as “clever” and good people to know. When 
someone needed a lawyer, for example, he could be recommended to find a Jewish lawyer.  
Some Palestinians were at great pains to make a distinction between Jews and Israelis. I 
introduced Talal as the organiser of the protests and one of the most politically active 
Palestinians I knew. The way his rap songs promote dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis, 
at least in the songs he performed to German audiences, made him popular in Dresden and he 
was often invited to events and to speak to local media. After performing one day, I asked him 
why he sings about peace. He told me, “Arabs are stupid because they do not distinguish 
between Jews and Israelis. I am not for peace with Israel, I am for peace with Jews.” Later at 
his apartment, he explained: 
 
Here the majority of people are scared of talking about Palestine, because of Hitler. 
But people do talk. They say they are with Palestine, but in the path of peace. I have 
a lot of songs against Israel. Here, they respect your opinion. 
 
Talal did not identify a tension between Palestinian activism and German public attitudes when 
there was a distinction between Jews and Israelis. However, a little later in the conversation it 
seemed a bit more complicated than he suggested. He played me a song where he lambasts the 
killing of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers. I asked if he plays this song at events with Germans 
and he said he doesn’t. It would seem therefore that he was careful about how he represented 
himself to Germans. This care was reflected in demonstrations he organised, where he worked 





him a few days before the protest he organised for Jerusalem in December 2017 that I described 
above and he told me about the precautions he was taking in making a decision about who to 
invite to speak.  
It is ironic that while Palestinians often did not perceive a tension between political 
activism and claims to belong in Germany it could become the site of such tension. Political 
activism could have the effect, in some senses, of turning Palestinians into Syrians - in terms 
of their perceived “deportability”. One striking example of this was what Khalid told me about 
the remarks of police who attended the demonstration against the moving of the US embassy 
to Jerusalem in December 2017. In light of the controversy of burning flags in Berlin, the police 
warned protestors at the beginning that “if you burn flags, you will be sent back to Syria”. 
Through their political activism for Palestine, Palestinians could therefore find themselves 
confronted by the threat of deportation to Syria. Another observation about flag burning at 
Palestinian demonstrations similarly suggests the way that activism for Palestine could serve 
to produce uncertainty and exclusion for Palestinians. The day before the demonstration against 
the moving of the embassy, I had asked Suhail if he was planning to attend. He joked about 
whether protestors would burn Israeli flags and shook his head saying he had heard that police 
in Germany were using video cameras to catch anyone who burns flags at the protests. “It is 
just like in Syria”, he said, referring to how the regime would film protestors and catch them 
afterwards. Demonstrating for Palestine could have the effect of pitting Palestinians against the 




This chapter has explored political activism or lack thereof among Syrian and Palestinian men 
in Dresden. Syrians tended to see political activism as out of place in Germany, despite often 
strong anti-regime sentiments. Palestinians, on the other hand, were often more committed to 
political activism for Palestine and did not problematise it to the same extent. There are a host 
of reasons why my friends would or would not engage in political activism in the context of 
displacement, including the perceived risk of such actions for their safety and the safety of their 
family or relatives in Syria. I have drawn attention to the relationship between political activism 
and inclusion and belonging in Germany. Literature has tended to show how political activism 
can be the site of masculine identity as well as the expression of “citizenship” in the form of 





to be the case. In contrast to the capacity for activism to enact “responsible masculinity” when 
in opposition to the far right, as I showed in Chapter 4, in the context of activism against the 
Assad regime it was seen to produce one’s identity as forcibly displaced and to “become 
refugees”. Many of my Syrian interlocutors therefore sought to “descend into the ordinary” 
and avoid such activism. This was markedly different to Palestinians from Syria. Rather than 
seeing activism as part of an intrinsic condition of “being Palestinian”, I show how this reflects 
the way that such activism was situated differently for Palestinians than Syrians, whereby the 
question of Palestine was not seen as producing “refugeeness” and exclusion in Germany. 
Being Palestinian and becoming German could be seen as closely intertwined, and the 
masculine virtue of such activism was therefore not problematised. However, while there was 
generally considerable empathy among Germans towards Syrian anti-regime activism, this is 
less the case for Palestinians, whose activism could provoke fears of anti-Semitism and, with 


















In 2016-17, the dust had yet to settle for many of the Syrians and Palestinians I got to know 
who were coming to terms with their new status in German society and plotting pathways for 
the future. What emerges from this thesis is the way that in this period of flux, of finding 
somewhere to live, learning German, making new friends, learning the rules of bureaucracy, 
and so on, there was a powerful imperative for Syrians and Palestinians to grapple with their 
new identity as refugee men in a society that had become ambivalent towards refugees, and a 
city that embodied this ambivalence. In this context, Syrian and Palestinian men’s everyday 
lives as refugees in Dresden sought to communicate and enact their dignity as men worthy of 
belonging in German society. What I have explored is the complex, lived experience of such 
attempts.  
This thesis is part of a growing body of ethnographic work that investigates the 
experiences of displaced men. Until recently, men have tended to be an “unmarked category” 
in studies of displacement which have focussed on the category of “womenandchild” (Jaji 
2009). This growing attention has revealed the risks of a loss of status and purpose for forced 
displaced men (Pasura 2008; Kabachnik et al. 2013). Alongside the recognition that some men 
can confront considerable gender-specific challenges in displacement, work has also sought to 
develop a more complex and rounded pictures of male migrants, moving beyond what Inhorn 
has characterised as the “hackneyed trope” of a “crisis of masculinity”, to consider the 
resourcefulness and resilience of masculine identity in displacement. This has revealed 
evidence of the ways male refugees seek to establish dignity as men and “unbecome refugees” 





This thesis contributes to the growing interest in drawing out the gendered experiences 
of male migrants but goes beyond a focus on the consequences of displacement on masculine 
identity. Rather, it has situated strategies to fulfil expectations of masculine maturity in the 
process of negotiating belonging and inclusion in Germany, a context where young male 
Muslim migrants are marked by their ethnicity, age, religion and gender as already a problem. 
Among Syrian refugees in Athens, Ingvars and Gislason (2018) have explored the intersection 
of gender with a political claim. In their study, young leftist Syrian male migrants displayed 
their “responsibility” in arranging a sit-in protest to contest being denied the right to migrate 
further into Europe. This reflects what they characterise as a “new refugee masculinity”, in 
which masculinity is turned from something that marks them as threatening and dangerous, 
into something that reflects their “democratic sensibility” and worthiness as citizens. Inhorn 
and Isidoros, reflecting on this study, have described how this reveals “attempts by Syrians to 
communicate a very different idea of what it means to be a refugee man” (2018, 7). In many 
respects, this study takes up a similar question of exploring the relationship between gender 
and a political claim, in this case in the process by which Syrian refugees position themselves 
as worthy citizens with a claim to belong. However, in contrast to the successful sit-in protest 
in Athens and the realisation and display of the “responsible” refugee man, this study has 
shown a much more fragmented, complex and uncertain picture as it emerges in the sites and 
settings of everyday life in Germany. It shows that there is constant attention to communicate 
a dignified identity as male refugees who contribute to, belong in, and even protect the nation 
and its values. Yet this can also be in tension; masculine identity and claims to citizenship could 
find mutual expression or conflict with one another.  
At times, emic notions of masculine self-realisation were concomitant with positioning 
oneself as a worthy citizen. Fulfilling the terms of neoliberal citizenship, in which the capacity 
to earn represents a claim to citizenship, is compatible with masculine identity centred on being 
productive, self-sufficient, and the breadwinner. The virtue of being “caring” men with 
“beautiful” sociality emerges both as a reflection of proper, moral masculinity, as well as a 
“gift” to offer the host society; a form of reciprocity that offers respectability and value as equal 
citizens rather than the moral subordination of refugees as recipients. Similarly, the far right 
opens up space for the display of “responsible masculinity” and the claim to belong in 
Germany. In other instances, however, and as a result of the way that diverse Syrian and 
Palestinian men are situated differently in Germany, forging a masculine identity could seem 





policies that were seen as providing the terms for self-realisation and inclusion for some 
looking to enter white collar and skilled blue collar jobs, were experienced as exclusionary by 
others looking for lower-skilled blue collar work, or aspiring traders and small business owners. 
In some cases, masculine expression was achieved through rejecting terms of belonging, as in 
the performance of patriarchal norms in response to the “integration imperative”. There could 
also be the opposite situation, where demonstrating and being politically active, often 
associated with masculine virtue, was refused by Syrians who sought to distance themselves 
from its association with victimhood and refugeeness, and therefore circumscribed inclusion 
in Germany.  
What emerges is not the accomplishment of a “new” masculinity that marks male 
refugees as responsible and worthy men to the German public, in the way described for Syrian 
refugees in Athens by Ingvars and Gislason. Neither, however, did my interlocutors conform 
to what Jansen has termed “misplaced masculinity”, in which the pursuit of masculine 
recognition is out of place (2008). It is more accurate to characterise Syrian and Palestinian 
men in Dresden as vacillating between two poles, in which masculine “respectability” could 
mark them as belonging in Germany as insiders, but also, in other instances, be at odds with 
these terms. In some cases, this could manifest in unexpected ways. Palestinians who saw 
political activism as worthy could risk being labelled as anti-Semites by mainstream public 
opinion. Distancing oneself from welfare has been shown as terms by which to masculinise by 
displaying autonomy and self-sufficiency as well as conforming to a neoliberal citizenship 
regime, but this could be turned on its head in Dresden where receiving welfare could in the 
narratives of some of my interlocutors be the setting for masculine strategies of risk and 
resilience, as well as entailing “claims-making” that articulated citizenship. Far from being a 
neat and tidy picture, the relationship between gender identity and citizenship could manifest 
in diverse ways for my interlocutors. It is also a picture that will change and evolve over time 
as Syrians and Palestinians are no longer newcomers. It is worth ending therefore by reflecting 
on possible questions for future research. 
 
Future Directions of Study 
 
It quickly became apparent when I returned to visit Dresden in 2019 to what extent the findings 
of this thesis represent for many of my interlocutors a specific moment in time – an instance in 





there were marked personal changes, such as the arrival of a wife and children from Syria 
through family reunification that could prompt a shift, overnight, from the lifestyle of a shab 
(young man) to that of a husband and father. The particular conditions I follow in this thesis, 
as newly-recognised refugees whose everyday lives were shaped by an integration agenda, had 
changed dramatically for many who were no longer attending language classes or being 
summoned regularly to the Jobcenter. During my fieldwork there had been a lot of talk about 
the future, about what needed to be done by when, and attempts to position oneself in particular 
ways. It had also created a lot of spare time. Expressions I heard often during my fieldwork 
were that “I don’t have anything to do” (ana ma ʿandi shī), or “I’m free” (ana fāḍi). Mornings 
in language classes would create free afternoons, getting permission to do another course could 
take months, a trip to the Jobcenter might puncture an otherwise free week. When I returned to 
visit, however, many of my friends stressed how “busy” (mashgūl) they were and bemoaned 
what was for some a tiring routine of early mornings and long commutes to get to low-paid 
work or the classes of a vocational education. There were fewer afternoons spent waiting at the 
Jobcenter, hanging out with friends in the centre of Dresden to pass time, or staying at home 
watching television series.  
The intervening months did not seem to have prompted similar changes for everyone, 
however. Rami, who I described in Chapter 1 as an aspiring trader conceiving plans to migrate 
to Canada where “he is allowed to work”, was still waiting for his break. He had bought a 
second-hand laptop and was doing a free course on the Internet which he hoped would help 
him work after the Jobcenter said they would not pay for him to do a night-time course in 
website design. He still wanted to start his own business and told me about someone he knew 
who had set up a website for an Arabic food shop that would deliver food to the door. However, 
he said, as he often had during my fieldwork, “everything in Germany is complicated”. 
Similarly, Khalid continued to be unemployed and to attend meetings at the Jobcenter. He 
explained that he had gone from one “black” job to another, mainly in fast-food restaurants, 
hoping to get an official contract. He wanted to do a vocational education but had not signed 
up. We met at a restaurant where he had found work and he told me about his satisfaction of 
not having a plan, but later complained of being bored in Germany.  
There were two main observations I took away from the visit which point to the 
changing terms of displacement in Germany for many of my interlocutors, regardless of what 
they were occupied doing. The first was that several of my friends had laid carpet in their 





my fieldwork but nonetheless remained largely utilitarian and few of the homes had carpet 
when I left. The laying of carpet and the extent to which this was a pattern for a number of 
individuals suggests a shift in perspective; a new sense of permanence and settlement perhaps 
reflecting the fact that everyone had in the intervening year had their visa extended for a further 
three years. The second observation relates to the new kinds of questions and challenges 
prompted by entering workplaces, vocational colleges and schools. I noticed that a number of 
friends talked about how they had hidden their Muslim identity to German peers and bosses or 
teachers. Akram told me that he had turned down sweets with alcohol in them when they were 
offered around his class, and when the teacher asked why he wouldn’t eat something with 
alcohol in it, rather than explain he is Muslim and does not consume alcohol, he replied that 
his doctor had said he was not allowed to. There was a similar account from Mohammed who 
told me that he would not tell his colleagues about fasting during Ramadan but instead would 
take time off work and say he was going on holiday. In these cases, and in others, they described 
their obfuscation when it came to revealing their Muslim identity. In contrast, during my 
fieldwork, Muslim identity had often been in the background for individuals. It was understood 
to be an important part of their negative characterisation in German society but second to the 
stigma of their identities as refugees. In the new sites and settings of everyday life there was a 
growing shift towards ethnic and cultural distinction, pointing to an issue raised by Pearlman 
(2018) who wondered to what extent cultural distinctions will become more present and 
divisive for her Syrian interlocutors over time.  
The changing circumstances and concerns of my interlocutors opens up avenues for 
further research. What the accounts of hiding Muslim identity reveals are the new kinds of 
negotiation taking place between Germans and Syrians in the sites and settings of everyday 
life. This presents opportunities to explore the sharing of such spaces in ways that were 
uncommon during my fieldwork. Scholars have suggested that male migrants seek to “fit in” 
and perform approximations of local norms of “hegemonic masculinity” (Howson 2002). This 
did not seem to be the case in my experience, in part because there was limited interaction with 
locals, with the exception of often elderly German neighbours. To what extent then do 
increasing encounters prompt new terms, expectations and norms for gendered belonging in 
Germany? At the same time, this raises questions about the German “hosts”. As Charsley and 
Spencer have argued, “integration” is a two-way process in which “all members of society 





with Arab refugees, already the case for Germans living in various parts of the city, affect the 
norms, assumptions and lifestyles of its inhabitants?  
An important part of the discourse of my interlocutors was their capacity to be able to 
contribute to German society, both now and in the future, in particular through becoming 
gainfully employed and productive men who pay taxes in the future. However, doomsayers 
about refugees in Germany chart statistics of high levels of long-term unemployment of 
previous refugees in Germany. To what extent will this be the case for Syrian and Palestinian 
refugees, as an economist predicted in 2015 (Wößmann 2015), and what are the implications 
for such men on masculine identity and the terms for negotiating belonging? This question also 
connects to changes taking place over the life course of men themselves, such as marriage and 
fatherhood, which are influenced by factors such as employment. Ghannam (2013) has referred 
to “masculine trajectories” to capture the way that expectations of masculinity change over 
time. How then do changes over men’s lives shape the terms by which they seek to carve out 
a space for belonging in Germany? In a striking chapter, Naguib (2018) has described the 
importance of care and providing for children for men migrating to Norway in 2016. To what 
extent do age and “life events” such as marriage and having children shape the kinds of 
practices and discourses around masculinity and belonging in Germany? Indeed, in the case of 
men who manage to arrange family reunification, these changes can happen very suddenly. 
This also raises the question of how such life events change in Germany, and how in turn this 
shapes notions of masculinity and maturity, particularly in light of literature that has brought 
into focus the importance of men’s roles as husbands and fathers, and “responsible” 
masculinity. There was already discussion about the implications of men being unable to afford 
mahar (bridewealth) in Germany, and the expectation that their future wives would need to 
work, in contrast to the enduring middle class ideal in Syria in which the man is the sole earner 
and breadwinner after marriage (Norbakk 2018). 
If masculinity changes over the life course and creates different expectations for 
different men, so does the meaning of being a “refugee” (Pearlman 2018). This study has 
emphasised the stigmatising associations of the refugee label and the attempts of young 
displaced men to overcome such stigma by asserting masculine identity and belonging as 
insiders in Germany. To this extent it was often stated by my interlocutors that people ceased 
to be refugees when they gained financial autonomy, or the right to remain. Yet, as Ludwig 
(2016) has shown in the case of Liberian refugees in New York, even 15 years after arrival 





When, if ever, and how, does “refugeeness” manifest for Syrians and Palestinians in the future? 
I got some insight into the changing terms and experiences of the status of refugees when I re-
visited Dresden. Mohammed was one of the few people I knew who was able to find 
professional work without needing to retrain because of his fluency in English and IT skills. 
Having found work and therefore evidence of income, as well as the money to be able to travel, 
he wanted to try and visit his cousin in England who he had not seen since he was a child. He 
completed the application and paid the money, and then more money, in fact a total of £500. A 
few weeks later after travelling to Berlin for his interview at the British embassy, he was 
promptly refused, the Home Office would not allow him to visit because they feared he would 
try to remain. For Mohammed, this was a slap in the face. He was hundreds of pounds poorer 
and his sense of owning a “powerful” passport had been shattered: he could not go where 
Germans with German passports could. This denial of freedom of movement provides an 
insight into the changing terms of refugeeness and (partial) citizenship. At the same time, 
refugee identity and status may not only reside in the experience of restrictions and stigma but 
could in the future be a source of pride. “Refugeeness” for some of Pearlman’s Syrian 
interlocutors was seen as “a lightning rod for political claims”, for example (2018). When the 
dust has settled, will the refugee label be a source of dignity and political conviction for some 
Syrians (as it is for many Palestinians), even when, or if, they cease to be refugees? 
This also raises the question of the future relationship to Syrian or Palestinian identity 
in diaspora. I have focussed on the adjustments and future stance of refugees seeking to 
negotiate belonging in Germany. In time, however, this may well shift more towards creating 
spaces for the expression and reproduction of Syrian and Palestinian identity. Hage has 
described how “feeling at home” depends on “shared symbolic forms, shared morality, shared 
values and most importantly perhaps, shared language” (1997, 103). How will such “feeling at 
home” manifest in the future for Syrians and Palestinians? Will it reproduce the political and 
sectarian divisions that people have carried with them from the conflict? The creation of 
diasporic events and associations have been shown to be important sites for the display and 
fulfilment of a valorised masculinity, in contexts such as cultural associations of the Somali 
community in Denmark (Kleist 2010), or the church for the Zimbabwean community in the 
UK (Pasura 2008). These sites can often serve as spaces in which to craft a sense of dignity 
that is otherwise denied in the context of the host society. What function will these play for 
Syrian and Palestinian male refugees in the future? To what extent will they manifest changing 





This extends to the question of transnationalism for the future Syrian and Palestinian 
diaspora. In Chapter 6 I showed the refusal of political activism among Syrians, in part because 
of the way in which it was seen to perform refugee identity and outsiderness. A question in the 
future will be to explore the formation and role of such transnational ties and how they evolve 
and change. This relates to the avenues for status and belonging in Germany. Scholars have 
shown how exclusion in host societies generates conditions for the forging of transnational ties 
where there is the chance to establish status and dignity (Hansen 2008). To what extent will 
Syria in the future offer a site for such ties and in what terms? One important aspect is the 
relationships forged online between Syrian and Palestinian men in Germany and Arab women 
in places like Jordan, Syria, Palestine and Turkey. This was a site that was difficult to learn 
about and one that I did not at the time recognise as being an important resource for how men 
assert dignity in the context of Germany. Future research should seek to explore such 
relationships, but also, more broadly, representation of the experience of displacement online. 
For the Syrians and Palestinians I got to know in Dresden, they will no doubt be affected 
by many of these questions in the future. This thesis offers insight into a brief but critical 
moment in the trajectories of Syrian and Palestinian male refugees in Germany, a period in 
which they were accepted as refugees and entered new pathways to integration. What I have 
shown is the diverse processes and consequences by which young male refugees sought to 
communicate dignity through negotiating respectable masculinity and making claims to 
citizenship. What happens next is in process. As time passes there will be new ways to express 
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